Lessons from History
The lessons of realpolitik emerging from Afghanistan are extremely scary for countries hard put to defend themselves, both physically against aggression as well as targeted media campaigns that may be less than liberal with the truth. Before the two World Wars, the major powers would decide the fate of nations at their will, which country could or could not exist, and if they should exist, in what form? A de facto government-in-place in Kabul allowed the Punjsheeris to virtually compose the Interim Government heavily weighted in their favour, ostensibly at the expense of the Pakhtuns, in fact at everyone’s expense, fellow Tajiks included, among them their nominal leader former President Burhanuddin Rabbani as well as warlords Dostum and Ismail Khan. That the US, whom some of us look upto as the symbol of fairplay and justice, compromised their high moral standards at the altar of convenience, was disappointing. A hint of silver lining is that Hamid Karzai got his way in moving Punjsheeri troops out of Kabul, Fahim and Qanooni reluctantly signing off on that arrangement with the International Peacekeeping Force.
Back to the Past
According to US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld, Mullah Umar, who is making a last stand in Kandahar, will probably go down fighting as he is “not the surrendering type”. Or so he is hoping so that Umar does not become a hot potato in their hands. In the meantime Osama bin Laden scurried away to find cover in some hole, probably the Tora Bora cave complex near Jalalabad, leaving in his wake dead and dying strewn across the Afghan countryside, the consequences of his many deeds, viz (1) distorting the Taliban interpretation of Islam and (2) leading them into collective suicide in militarily opposing the mightiest nation on earth. For the sake of his own hide, this man sacrificed not only his trusting hosts but those from foreign lands who believed his spiel, a latter day “Pied Piper” leading a naive and gullible people down the one-way road to death and destruction. Meantime about 1,500 US Marines near Kandahar are carrying out high-visibility exercises around their desert forward base, meant to keep the defenders of Kandahar on edge expecting imminent attack. The idea is to bomb and bluff the Taliban out of their stronghold and avoid casualties. Unfortunately some of the US casualties have been self-inflicted due to misdirected or stray bombs (“friendly fire”).
Untangling the Taliban
On the run for more than a fortnight since Oct 8, 2001, the Taliban faithful rallied somewhat to make a last stand in the five Provincial strongholds around their spiritual capital Kandahar. Once “foreign influence” on Mullah Umar in the form of Osama bin Laden took off for parts unknown, possibly deep into Pashtun heartland in the mountainous area astride the Pak-Afghan border between Khost and Jalalabad, rumours of imminent collapse in Kandahar because of disunity and internal dissension among the hard-core faithful, seemed to abate. The first US ground troops finally landed in Afghanistan, the Marines securing an airfield in the desert south-west of Kandahar as a firm base. Kandahar is indefensible and will certainly fall but widespread destruction and collateral damage to civilians all over Afghanistan could have been avoided by concentrating on simply isolating this city in the first place in keeping with the primary war aims. Airpower diplomacy of the late 20th century has not quite replaced gunboat diplomacy of the nineteenth. Starting with Iraq in 1991, the zero-sum casualties air-war strategy continued with Bosnia and Kosovo. In the end it is the infantry that must go in, the infantry which must hunt down the enemy. You may call them Special Forces, Rangers, Marines, whatever, high-tech cannot replace the foot-sloggers, they are the only ones who can hold ground. When the “lucky bomb” theory did not work, the only option left is the physical use of ground troops to root out the Taliban hierarchy.
The Battle for Mazar
If bombs of differing lethal value were not falling on Afghanistan with increasing frequency, the “war on terrorism” could well be a phony war. Despite the urgency of the air campaign, thirty days into the war there is no ground battle worth the name except around Mazar-i-Sharif, the capital of Balkh Province. Literally meaning the “tomb of the saint,” the Balkh River makes this city a part of Afghanistan’s most fertile regions, producing cotton, grain and fruit. Once the Soviet Union’s chief transit point for trade, Mazar (for short) is 35 miles south of Termez, a major river port of Uzbekistan on the Amu Darya (Amu River), the border with Afghanistan. Mazar-i-Sharif’s chief claim to fame is the purported discovery in the 12th (or was it the 15th?) century of the tomb of Hazrat Ali, son-in-law of our Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Whatever the truth, the shrine next to the blue-tiled mosque is venerated by all muslims, in particular the Shia sect. 200 miles away to the south-east, Kabul is connected by road through the Salang Tunnel, Herat is about 300 miles away to the south-west near the border with Iran.
An extensive and difficult mountain territory, the Alborz Range, lies south and south-west, with a flat desert terrain to the north, east and south of the city. Populated mainly by the Uzbeks, Mazar’s nearly quarter million population has a fair percentage of Tajiks and Hazaras, Pashtuns make up about 10%. The surrounding population is also mainly Uzbek, with a sprinkling of Tajiks to the east and Hazaras (Shias) in strength to the south in Bamiyan Province. Mostly Uzbeks populate the provinces of Samangam and Baghlan due east, as well to the west in Jozejan and Faryab. Through Kholm a road goes east to Kunduz, Takhar and Badakshan Provinces. A road passes south through Ap Kupruk to Bamiyan Province. Once the capital of Afghan Turkmenistan, the loss of this crossroads city of Mazar-i-Sharif will be a grievous blow to the Taliban, maybe not a fatal one. Without occupying Kabul as a capital city in its grasp, the Opposition can only claim some legitimacy if they have physical possession of Mazar-i-Sharif. Its capture may invite wholesale Uzbek and Tajik defections from the Taliban ranks. More importantly, on “the domino theory” the Provinces of Balkh, Samangan, Faryab, Jozejan and Ghowr would link up with the Alliance territories of Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badahshan, Parvan and Kapisa, in effect providing the Northern Alliance not only with continuous real estate but its government legitimacy of sorts.
The Cracks Widen
For the first few weeks after coming to Federal power, the Ms Benazir government could do no wrong. Instead of rushing into many things at one time, it adopted a more deliberate posture. While its authority in the Sindh Assembly was undeniable, the PPP-PML (J) combine increased its majority in Punjab to make a comfortable government. The PPP masterpiece was the process leading up to the election of Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari as President. In contrast to this high point, the PML (N) Opposition touched its lowest ebb, the final desperate offers of the Presidential candidacy to all comers gave the impression of desperation and total disarray. Yet ten weeks into what should be an unquestioned rule, the PPP is caught up in a series of self-created problems as well as the impossibility of governing a country like Pakistan by adopting the safe course of status quo and survive, more so when the intelligentsia and the people have got used to the dynamism and movement of constant initiatives and change which was the hallmark of the Nawaz Sharif regime. Even the caretaker regime of Moeen Qureshi recognised this. While frenetic activity by itself may not necessarily mean development and progress, the general public tends to have a positive view of their leaders as striving hard on their behalf for economic emancipation. The psychology of public perception drives Third World populations rather than any acknowledged fact, therefore, any government that shows indications of inactivity, indeed of apathy in letting some widely hailed ordinances lapse, may soon find itself in deep trouble.