The Media Success Story
The Agra Summit had not even finished when the Indians launched a full scale analysis of what had gone wrong with their set gameplan to expose Pervez Musharraf the military dictator as a showcase of autocracy in sharp contrast to the relative freedom enjoyed by the world’s “largest democracy”. In New Delhi on the way to the Summit at Agra, Musharraf succeeded in one short day in becoming a media darling in the eyes of the Indian public in contrast to his Kargil-monster painted image. Belatedly the Indians woke up to the fact that things were not going according to script. While 15 July was a relative lull, they pounced on the now famous breakfast meeting on 16 July with Indian editors/publishers as a blatant Pakistan ploy to pressurize India by conducting diplomacy through the media. Short shrift was given to the fact that it was not any Pakistani devious plan but a Pranoy Roy initiative to air the breakfast meeting on Star TV, and that the other Indian TV Stations just picked it up so as not to remain behind. The Indians conveniently also forgot that it was Sushma Swaraj who had gone on a fishing expedition a day earlier with depth charges meant to scuttle the peace process. Much was made of Secretary Information Anwar Mahmood’s public disclaimer about Sushma’s claims that there were no discussions about Kashmir at Agra in the one-on-one between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee.
While preparing a set-piece battleground for complete diplomatic and media victory, India had not counted on the rebellious nature of the Pakistani print media which fights each other and the government in power at all times but invariably come together in a time of crisis (or on hostile territory) behind whoever is the ruler. Agra was a Pervez Musharraf success story, he won the media war hands down. He was ably supported by a galaxy of media personalities from Pakistan, for once Pakistan came away from an important international event with the sweet smell of success. This success can be laid squarely on the military regime’s free media policy. It seems India badly miscalculated that the Pakistan print media would badmouth an unelected President of a military regime and embarrass him no end in a foreign land on international primetime. They did not count on the solid support he had painstakingly generated by the biggest gamble of all, he took a calculated risk in conceivably being the only military regime in history to have a free media. What he got back in return is a grudging legitimacy normally denied to military rulers. By the time the Indians realized they had badly miscalculated and belatedly attempted damage control, Pakistan’s media was ruling the Indian airwaves. One must commend the freedom and sophistication of the Indian electronic media, their potential is nothing short of tremendous. This freedom was used to maximum effect by Pakistani print media-persons, who in turn benefit from being far freer than India’s print media.
1000 yrs in Less Than 100 hrs?
About the best thing that could have happened to Pakistan and India was to have no agreement at all at Agra. Munich is a benchmark that compromises made on appeasement can have a terrible backlash. Refusing to fall into the trap of having to satisfy an expectant world at any cost, the two countries decided to walk away from the negotiating table without a Joint Declaration containing compromises lacking sincere intent. There may not have been the success of a Declaration, there was no failure of the peace process at Agra. Consider the intent behind a play of words in the language of the draft declaration, any agreement reached under such compulsions would have been torn apart by domestic dissent on either side before the ink was dry, the two leaders would have been eaten up alone by the lions-in-waiting on either side. Maturity prevailed in foregoing a short-time exultation of a contrived success, and in agreeing to continue future discussions in the congenial atmosphere that seems to have largely replaced the public acrimony of the past the countries may have had their first real success on the road to achieving lasting peace. Instead of the dialogue of the deaf prevailing since Kargil, a growing understanding (and a public deference hitherto missing) was manifest in the statements of the two Foreign Ministers the day after Agra. Many commentators have observed that 54 years of mistrust, suspicion, conflict, etc could never be erased in three days, unfortunately the divide goes back over a thousand years plus. Given such an environment even if the miracle had happened, the very speed of the understanding would have been its undoing.