The Battle for Karachi
Wherever people of different races, religions, sects and political persuasion, etc make up the population of a major metropolitan city, there is always a struggle for dominance, the pursuit of power and the sharing of the economic pie making for strange bedfellows. Given Karachi’s major port city status and commercial capital importance, the competition is more intense and focussed. To compound the problems, this a city bereft of the healing balm of democracy. Not a single town or city in Pakistan has a local government, for that matter the whole country is without local government since the PML(N) government fell two years ago. The ruling PPP got a drubbing in the last general polls in almost all the urban areas of the country and is now unsure of itself in the rural areas, consequently it does not seem to have any intention of letting the Opposition exercise their democratic right of rule at the local government level. This is in sharp contrast to the eloquent rhetoric about “democracy at the grassroots level” that Ms Benazir is so vociferous about, particularly when she is out of power. The logic being used to deny power to the Mohajir majority in Karachi is that if the majority got power they would deny the various minorities their legitimate socio-economic rights. This convoluted logic chooses to remain silent about the present situation in which power keeps going the rounds within a tight circle of vested interest who deny the majority their democratic due but say that this is on behalf of the minority communities, who in fact are as much deprived as the majority. Given that all this defies rational analysis, how do we as a city and as a nation climb out of this black hole?
On paper at least the struggle has presently turned from the killing streets to the negotiating table. The two main antagonists, the MQM(A) and the PPP, having consented to a ceasefire of sorts, this arrangement seems to have filtered down selectively to the warriors belonging to the law enforcement agencies or to the various militant groups, granted that RAW-inspired violence will continue to sabotage any peace moves. The body count has come down to 10-12 daily and even lower, climbing briefly for a day to 25 plus. That the talks are continuing despite the vitriolic statements from both sides is a hopeful sign that tacitly recognizes pressure to sort out the issues or risk being sorted out themselves. Having drained this city of its material and emotional resources, there is no sign among the militants on either side of any combat fatigue. The great silent majority of Karachi’s population meantime lives on in deep anxiety and apprehension, not free of the considerable doubt about the city’s continued existence as a viable entity. The bottom line is, can our children plan to live in this city in the future? For many Karachi is the end of the line, having burnt all our boats our backs are to the sea facing a nemesis born out of our leaders’ vulnerability to greed and ambition. Unfortunately for this country nobody has really answered the question, who is this enemy?.
Missed Opportunities
It is May 26, 1993. The Supreme Court has just restored Mian Nawaz Sharif as PM of Pakistan. On the hill a lonely (and suddenly beleaguered) President waits with apprehension about his former protege’s next move. Ms. Benazir Bhutto similarly waits anxiously with her worry beads. If Mian Nawaz Sharif should choose to go to the President and make up as any politician in his place would have done in similar circumstances, showing magnanimity in victory, the game is over for her for some time. On the outside chance that the PM expands on his confrontation, there is hope yet. Riding the crest of success, Mian Sahib chooses the path of confrontation and thus takes the “laurels from his (own) brow and casts them into the dust”, to quote Churchill about Wavell after his defeat at the hands of Rommel in the desert. Next, having formed the Government after the 1993 elections and thus displaying its coalition majority, the PPP shows signs of political accommodation over the election of a compromise President, maybe even someone like Senator Sartaj Aziz from the PML(N). Again Mian Sahib’s hawks prevail, the PML(N) stands firm about a PML(N) President of their choice, seesawing between Gohar Ayub and Wasim Sajjad. Net result, PPP goes for its own candidate and we see the non-controversial and generally liked PPP stalwart Farooq Khan Leghari elected as President. Third flashback, President Leghari immediately resigns from the PPP in an effort to display genuine neutrality in his new role as President and journeys to Lahore, inviting Mian Sahib to tea in the Punjab Governor’s House and if not, requests to go over himself to Mian Sahib’s house in Model Town to call on the Leader of the Opposition, in fact leaning over backwards beyond the limits of protocol. Peevishness persists and discourtesy aside, the meeting has not yet materialised, two years later. In Mian Sahib’s political history, the field is strewn with missed opportunities, so many and so crucial that it would require much more than one single article to recount them. Teflon-like hide aside, one cannot keep on passing the buck to his Advisors.
Given the present Karachi situation and the grave danger that it poses to the existence of the country, the Leader of the Opposition has taken the initiative and called a Conference of all parties on Karachi. Given the foot-dragging of the PPP regime as far as negotiations with MQM are concerned, this is indeed a most welcome proposal to draw the MQM(A) back into the national mainstream. One should take the analogy of the ultimate symbol of terrorism, the air hijacker. Does one stop talking to the hijacker or does one immediately start talking to him in order to gain time and wear down his demands? While labelling MQM as terrorists may be a moot point in a city full of terrorist groups of various ilk and creed, the PPP should certainly not stop talking with the majority party in Sindh’s urban areas. To circumvent PPP’s obduracy on this issue, Mian Sahib took a political lead of great significance by calling this Conference and then proceeded to shoot himself in the foot by refusing to invite PPP.
PPP Wins Battle, May Lose the War
In the National Assembly elections of Oct 6, 1993 the PPP with 86 seats got an edge of 14 seats over PML(N) with 72 seats. The failure to get a decisive knockout in the first round is catastrophic for the PPP given the percentage of votes Nawaz Sharif has managed to gain. For the first time in Pakistan’s history, after the Quaid had led the Muslim League in election victories pre-1947, the Old Party has made a decisive impact in Pakistan’s political life as a genuine political entity. Emerging from the clutches of the Establishment and machinations thereof, the Muslim League has broken the myth of invincibility that the PPP had inculcated over the years. It is most important to note that the PPP’s vote bank has remained secure at around 38-39% nationally with strong roots in all four Provinces.
Muslim League national vote percentage-wise was 40% with majority votes over PPP in Punjab (5%) and Sarhad (4%). It is now time to remove the (N) suffix from PML and acclaim Nawaz Sharif as the rightful heir of the Muslim League heritage. The Muslim Leaguers who were with Chattha should seriously think of either merging with the PPP or returning to the mainline ML fold. The lack of a clear majority for PPP can only translate at best into a weak Federal Government with the possibility of only one Provincial Government under its direct authority. Given the sorry history of Federal interference in Provincial affairs this could be the prescription that would be most advisable for Pakistan’s integrity and sovereignty. In any case the first crack at making the Federal Government rightfully belongs to PPP in the supreme interest of democracy in Pakistan, one hopes that this will come about.
The MQM Boycott
The announcement by the MQM(A) that they will boycott the forthcoming elections has come as a great shock to the people of urban Sindh in particular and to the masses of Pakistan in general. The party is representative of Karachi and Hyderabad in the real sense and their absence from the electoral hustings would deprive these cities of a genuine voice in the National and Provincial Assemblies.
On the evening of September 28, it seemed that matters had been settled amicably at the highest level between the Army and the MQM hierarchy. Barely 48 hours later, the whole agreement was in shambles, what had gone wrong during this short interim period? From all accounts it seems that a small incident has been blown out of proportion subordinating the public interest to personal egos. Stating of the incident that seems to have triggered off the fresh squabble is not important, but it has brought back into focus all the suspicions in a rush and fostered misunderstanding between a primary national institution and a small but potent political force with a legitimate role to play on the national scene.
The Sindh Cauldron
The Federal Government ordered the Pakistan Army in May 1992, at the “request” of the Sindh Government, to restore the rule of law in the Province. Rather than giving them powers under Article 245 of the Constitution as demanded by the Army during the Beg era, Article 147 was mandated as being enough to accomplish the mission. The complexities of the situation demanded that the first phase was to physically eliminate the various marauding gangs in the urban and rural areas. Their potential to foster anarchy having been destroyed, the second phase was to eliminate those who were actually responsible for controlling, aiding and abetting crime. While the first phase was a success, the ground rules laid down by Article 147 (notwithstanding the amendments made later) and divergence from the substance of the original mission frustrated the efforts of the Army in eradicating the root cause of the trouble in the Province.
Formerly Commander 5 Corps before he became Chief of General Staff and then COAS, late Gen Asif Nawaz was best equipped to disseminate his inherent Sindh knowledge in the successful tactical execution of Operation Clean-up but why are we still at square one (except in interior Sindh) as far as the strategic results are concerned? Gen Beg had been far-sighted in refusing to “chase shadows” with powers less than comprehensive to deal with criminals through the whole strata of society. The compelling circumstances being absolute anarchy around the corner in a crucial Province, late Gen Asif Nawaz had hardly any choice but to bite the bullet. The Army hierarchy was extremely naive in assuming that having had their chestnuts pulled out of the fire, the Establishment politicians in the Provincial Government had any sincere intention of allowing justice to take its natural course and allowing their supporters in the Army’s famous list of 72 “Untouchables” to be picked up. In American parlance, the Army was used, the military hierarchy was had, taken for a ride.