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Emerging Election Alliances

With about 50 days to go for the Elections, election alliances/electoral adjustments are now taking shape. While the final list of candidates will be a sure evidence of the actual compromises made, it is comparatively safe to give a broad outline of the emerging scenario pertaining to the effect that the alliances and adjustments may make on the eventual outcome.

The Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA), of which the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is a major member, comes out intact, in fact adding to its original strength pre-April 18, 1993. It may have lost Tehrik-i-Istaqlal but has gained significantly because of the defection of PML (Junejo) faction led by Chattha from PML(N). Individual members of the Chattha Group are potent political beings (though Chattha himself may find it difficult to get re-elected) and will cause considerable problems for Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab and Sarhad. The PPP-JUI(F)-PML(J) combine in the NWFP has become a formidable force in its own right and a tough fight is expected with the PML(N)-ANP alliance. However, the Alliance is facing a lot of strain from the internal PPP problems about seat allocation. During the Balakh Sher Caretaker period and after, the Sindh Government under Muzaffar Shah (Pir Pagara faction of PML) had supported the anti-Nawaz Sharif forces because of GIK’s influence through son-in-law Irfanullah Marwat but in Sindh the PDA and PML (Pir Pagara) remained opposed to each other, a sort of an armed truce. In Sindh, the three contending forces are PPP predominantly, opposed by the Pir Pagara faction of PML and the MQM. PML(N) is almost non-existent but there are enough Nawaz Sharif supporters in every constituency to have nuisance value. The PPP really does not need any electoral alliance in Sindh but will probably leave out a few seats as a part of the general agreement with other parties. This will be a real sacrifice and will not be taken kindly by its rank and file, PPP seat aspirants are a vocal, aggressive lot.
The PML(N) announced very early on that instead of having an IJI-type alliance they will go for electoral adjustments with like-minded parties. In this respect, its most significant electoral adjustment is with the ANP, making the Nawaz Sharif faction of the PML an extremely potent force in the Sarhad and giving him considerable boost in Balochistan. The ANP support also helps PML (N) in Sindh on certain fringe seats in Karachi. Another significant ally that PML (N) has garnered is the Tehrik-i-Istaqlal (TI). While TI by itself is hardly a major political force, it possesses potentially a hot political property in Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan, Mr. Clean to the Pakistani public in a sea of political corruption. Asghar Khan appeals to a broad section of people fed up with nepotism and corruption, particularly the Senior Citizens (50-65 years age group) that has very decided views on human and national values has a strong enduring admiration for the Air Marshal. He has the potential to deliver the crucial swing vote in many urban constituencies to PML (N) if he can convince the Senior Citizens to come out and vote. If Nawaz Sharif’s PML gives the Air Marshal running room he can make the difference between electoral victory and defeat.

The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) has cobbled together the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) and has become increasingly sophisticated in its appeal to the electorate, particularly aiming for the women vote. While JI has the advantage of dedicated party workers who are well organised and effective, they are still in a minority in every constituency in Pakistan. Unlike JUI factions which have rural support, JI’s maximum appeal is in the urban areas. It has tried very unsuccessfully to get back to the good graces of the electorate it lost to the MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad but even in extremely favourable circumstances because of the pressure of Operation Clean Up, the JI has not managed any significant defection from the MQM. While the JI Chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, has repeatedly declared “a pox on both the major political groupings”, the JI could be in danger of being almost wiped out of the electoral map in the coming elections if it decides to go it alone or under the banner of PIF. Its only chance for electoral survival is to go with the PML(N) if it can overcome the antipathy between its two leaders and come to a pragmatic political compromise. PML(N) stands to lose about 8-9 seats in the Punjab for the NA elections without the JI support while JI could get 7-8 seats in Punjab and Sarhad with PML(N) support. In an overall context, it may mean a difference of almost 30-35 seats. The JI quarrel with ANP notwithstanding optimists hold out some hope of a pragmatic PML(N) – JI adjustment to come to terms with electoral realities.

Mainline MQM, despite the artificially created factions, with its solid bloc of 15 seats will be most sought after post-the-elections, i.e. if it does not have an understanding with the PML(N) before the polls. Having given permission for Operation Clean-Up in Sindh, PML (N) can hardly be in a credible position to effect an electoral alliance with the MQM but PML (N) leaders like Ch Nisar Ali and Malik Naeem have always had open channels of communications that can be exploited. Frankly the MQM would do much better by seeking a possible compromise in Sindh with PPP like it did in 1988 but pre-elections the PPP may not seek to publicise such an alliance as it will effect its secure Sindhi vote bank in the interior of Sindh. The MQM may well decide to go on its own and wait out the elections before deciding to go with whoever is the likely winner. One thing is definite, whoever the MQM sides with has the better possibility of making the next Federal Government of Pakistan. In contrast to Sindh, the Mohajir votes in the urban constituencies of the other Provinces are up for grabs. If Gen (Retd) Aslam Beg enters the electoral fray, most probably on the side of PML(N), he may be able to sway those crucial swing votes to his choice of parties.

There are a number of other parties which can be of help to the major political forces on the national scene or regionally to make governments. In this respect JUI (F) will certainly play a role in NWFP and Balochistan while JWP of Akbar Bugti and PNP (Bizen/Hasil Bizenjo) will also get some seats in Balochistan Province. The Sindh extremist parties may get wiped out by the PPP juggernaut in Sindh. The TNFJ remains a small but potent force providing likely swing votes in the different provinces, particularly in some areas of Punjab and Sarhad. It is peeved to have been overlooked by the PDA in its alliance with JUI (F) and PML (J) in NWFP but has yet not firmed up its likely reaction as yet. It has a small tally of votes in critical constituencies and this may well become swing votes if the race is close in any one constituency.

In contrast to 1988 and 1990 when the IJI emerged as a strong alliance, the PPP is the major beneficiary of alliances and adjustments in 1993. The defection of the Junejo faction has been a major blow to Nawaz Sharif’s effort to regain the PM-ship but whether the vote bank of the defectors remains intact against the promise of his new found and fresh political potency is a thing of the future, to be decided at the Polling Stations. Certain significant changes to the election scenario are in the offing but it is still too early to gauge the exact mood of the electorate.

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