Changing Geo-Political Equation
Five years after the annunciation of the Bush Doctrine in the 2001 US National Security Strategy, the US has started to implement its new strategic direction first outlined fully 31 years ago in the famous May 25, 1965 Galbraith Memo. The 5-year hiccup happened mainly because of 9/11. Even though that watershed initiated wholesale changes in conventional geo-political direction, the main thrust of post-Cold War US strategic thinking since the Galbraith Memo has been to contain China within Asia, using India as a proxy. In the 60s the containment was meant to be mainly military, inclusive of geographical and ideological borders, with ideological differences blurred by socialism’s downfall and the meteoric corresponding rise in capitalism, China’s containment has now to be both economic and military.
Two Countries, One Nation
For over 30 years now we have been carrying the burden of the horrific experience of the break-up of the country, in one symbolic measure the President set the ghosts of 1971 to rest. A simple apology meant a lot to the Bangladeshi psyche, the President being a uniformed person the effect was force-multiplied many times. The official Bangladeshi reaction was swift and concise, 1971 is now behind us, it was time to move ahead and strengthen relations to the benefit of both countries. Both for Pakistan and Bangladesh it was important to get over 1971.
Understanding Each Other
At Agra Pakistan and India seemed very close to an agreement, post-Summit statements make it quite clear that both sides were in fact far apart in their respective perceptions about what the agreement amounted to. Pakistan held out that their long-standing stand on Kashmir being a core issue was about to be formally recognized, India felt that its main concern, “cross-border terrorism” was going to be addressed by Pakistan and this would drastically curtail the freedom struggle within Kashmir. Such different interpretations post-Summit would have made any Declaration a non-starter, the various clauses could have been used as enough pretext by extremists on either side to destroy whatever understanding was developing among the leaders and intelligentsia of both the countries, seriously retarding the peace process. Both Musharraf and Vajpayee are very conscious of hard-liners in their constituencies, that is why they avoided eroding each others’ domestic standing by giving these hard-liners due cause. When two people meet to solve a problem, the sensitivity each displays for the other’s problems despite disagreeing with each other goes a long way in creating the right atmosphere for eventual solution. The good chemistry between Musharraf and Vajpayee was the main success of Agra, that it did not result in an “instant Declaration” may be temporarily disappointing, in the cold light of reality one can understand it has created the foundation that will eventually lead to lasting solutions.