90 Minutes in an Hour of Crisis
In the first exclusive one-on-one comments made after the much-awaited Jan 12 speech, General Pervez Musharraf annunciated the parameters he set out for himself, “I wanted to address issues bedeviling Pakistani society and focus on priorities, confront internal problems damaging Pakistan’s image internationally and raise the morale of the Pakistani nation and, lastly, lay out support for the Kashmiri people without it being labelled as cross-border terrorism or compromising Pakistan’s sovereignty and self-respect, i.e. a good enough signal to India that I wanted to pursue the peaceful route in Kashmir but I wanted them to clearly understand that they could not bully us, we were ready to fight if we had to”.
Given not only a national but a world-wide audience, he said “I had no room for vacillation or empty rhetoric, I had my work cut out for me”. A day earlier, the Indians had tried to provoke him (and Pakistan’s manliness) through a rather strange Press Briefing by the Indian COAS Padmanabhan in which he virtually threatened Pakistan with nuclear extermination. Musharraf said, “militarily I can equate my speech as attacking across a minefield to capture vital ground, the danger very much visible from the enemy’s small arms and artillery fire but also the invisible ones like the mines planted just beneath the surface. I had to keep my cool.” With positive reactions flowing in from within the country and from outside, even the Indians gave grudging acceptance. Pervez Musharraf clearly achieved his “vital ground”, credibility in the comity of nations, quite something for any Pakistani leader.
