National Security Strategy – Part 1
National security is divided into state security and societal security. The former is based on territorial security, the latter centred on identity. Globalisation has led to vanishing frontiers and, thus, weakening of territorial security, with identities far more exposed and threatened. The new currency of national security is economics. A weak economy means poverty and misery for the people.
Countries do not aim to conquer lands in today’s world but to dominate and control markets. Most of today’s wars or regional conflicts have all been about oil, the backbone for a very strong economy. Moreover, powerful countries are able to dictate terms in the economic context and every country has to adapt as best as it can to be able to survive and compete. A strong economy means greater productivity, with all sectors given the necessary thrust to usher in economic prosperity as well as social equality for the masses.
Certainly holding enough potential for articulating sound and effective economic policies, the PML-N leadership must ensure strict adherence to transparency for all business transactions in the public sector. The lurking danger is that if ‘friends’ of the political hierarchy’s inner circle get involved in taking over ownership or transacting public sector business the public perception will be unfavourable. Even if the intention and consequent results are good, it will give rise to the ‘robber baro’ syndrome.
The way certain formidable institutions were privatised created doubts. The insatiable greed of the robber barons makes them callous when dealing with human beings. That is the fundamental flaw where good governance becomes bad, giving importance to material assets over human lives. With growth and industrialisation closely linked, pragmatic measures are required to initiate macroeconomic reforms. Once considered the exclusive preserve of the state, ‘services’ have been privatised or semi-privatised or a corporate model created for them to function more effectively like a private entity.
The media is increasingly becoming a vital part of national security, being divided into three concentric spheres. In the centre are concepts and values that are accepted without question – the ‘sphere of consensus’. The ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ comprises arguments contained within particular parameters. Legitimacy is decided by institutions and bodies, which determine when and what ‘change’ is approved. Outside of this is the ‘sphere of deviancy’, to where people and issues unworthy of serious consideration are relegated.
The media’s influence is today greater because the ‘media reality’ has gained ground from conventional reality, especially in political life. The problem is made especially serious because there is evidence that media persons and/or institutions can influence governance, which compromises national security. The names of all those in the media who have benefitted from state funds or the largesse of the rulers must be made public property. There is also need for some type of media monitoring.
The national aim envisages an economically strong Pakistan, free of foreign debt and tax evasion, consisting of a balanced economy with strength and self-sufficiency in industrial, consumer and agriculture products. On the psychological front, it envisages all ethnic groups, sects and religious groups living in harmony and an atmosphere of flexibility and mutual respect. On the social side, it conceives of minimum class tensions, social justice and a system of meritocracy. On the military front, the defence services must be capable of effectively deterring external aggression and dealing with internal security problems – but only as a last resort.
The strategic vision must necessarily include: (1) Domestic and foreign interests, goals and objectives vital to the national security of Pakistan; (2) foreign policy, the commitments thereof and the minimum defense necessary to deter aggression, to implement the country’s security objectives by political, economic, military, and other elements of national power; (3) the potential and capability to carry out the national security strategy and support its implementation. Quite simply put, the strategic vision entails taking stock of the situation to correctly evaluate what we are, setting out a clear intent of what we want to be and formulating a cohesive road map with the consensus of all the stakeholders on how to get there.
National aims (conditions in future) envisage a stable political system ensuring grassroots participation and genuine devolution of power, and political continuity that guarantees law and order and encourages economic activity optimising the potential of the country in all spheres of life. They also envisage balanced civil-military relations with the superiority of civilian authority, as well as a united effort in all state activities and decision-making including the conduct of foreign policy, intelligence gathering, administrative/economic/financial decision-making effectively eliminating state within state type agencies or agencies whose tasks are duplicated by other agencies.
A national security strategy must serve five primary purposes: (1) communicating strategic vision to both the executive and parliament, and thus legitimising the rationale for resources. Both parliament and the executive, as the elements of national power, need a common understanding of the strategic environment and the administration’s intent as a starting point for future dialogue; (2) communicating the same common vision to the citizens of the country, the intelligentsia and masses alike; (3) communicating coherence and farsightedness in the security policies of the government – which all citizens fully support; (4) documenting a strategy where none exists. We must have the ability to forge consensus among these competing views on direction, priorities and pace; and (5) contribute in substance and presentation to the overall agenda of the chief executive of the government. What follows is an interactive, interagency process to resolve differences and approve the final document.
The canvas encompassing national security politics, the environment, ideology, economics and the media. The national interests (continuing ends) obtained from the strategic vision envisage the preservation of Pakistan’s integrity as a sovereign Islamic democratic state in a hostile regional environment. They also visualise guarding the country’s economic, territorial and ideological boundaries without making loud claims or indulging in rhetoric. While national power has to be expressed in an integrated strategy, each region will have certain tactical situations to be handled separately but within the overall framework of the national security strategy. The present modus operandi of ‘adhocism and/or containment’ must be replaced by a policy of ‘engagement and enlargement’.
The three national security goals are: (a) enhancing our security; (b) promoting prosperity at home; and (c) promoting democracy – under which all of the government’s efforts to advance Pakistan’s interests would be integrated. The problem with laying down a national security strategy is that its simple aims and objectives are mostly overwhelmed by rhetoric.
Straitjacketed by fixed mindsets and unable to think out of the box in crafting a real road map, we resort to ‘adhoc’ and/or ‘containment’ measures, reacting and fire-fighting instead of adhering to a well-crafted comprehensive policy.
(Based on excerpts from lectures at the NDU, Islamabad, PAF Air War College, Karachi and PN Naval War College, Lahore, over the years)
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