• Home
• Video
• Books by Ikram Sehgal
• About

Reverse Swing

Major riots broke out in East Pakistan because of the Tashkent accord between India and Pakistan in January 1966. Bengalis vehemently and vociferously protested the perceived sell-out of Pakistan’s interests to India after the 1965 war. Instead of returning to the cantonments from the borders on the signing of the Tashkent Declaration, troops (mainly from the East Bengal Regiment) were rushed in “aid of civil power” to many of the major cities of East Pakistan, Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, etc. Alpha Company 2E Bengal, then commanded by Maj (later Lt Gen, COAS Bangladesh Army and President of Bangladesh) H M Ershad, with 2/Lt (later Lt Gen, COAS Bangladesh Army) ASM Nasim as his Company Officer, was sent from Jessore Cantonment to Khulna. Detached from Bravo Company I was sent ahead with a wireless jeep to Khulna as Liaison Officer (LO) attached with Deputy Commissioner Khulna, Mr Mohammad Idris (Nasim’s father), (then) DIG (later IG) Police Mr AKM Habibur Rahman (father-in-law of my good friend Anwar Karim) was the Police Chief. Tense confrontations took place with unruly mobs all over the Province. It is an irony of fate that in comparison protests in West Pakistan over Tashkent were muted, if at all. It was only when the (then) Foreign Minister late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto left the Cabinet several months later that Tashkent was raised by him as political bogey.

In 1965 and 1971, Pakistan was not capable of fighting a two-front war with the militarily bankrupt “the defence of the East lies in the West” concept. Even though this was never accepted publicly, East Pakistan was already given up as a lost cause in the Pakistani military mind. A false perception was given by labeling 14 Div (with one additional Brigade) as a “Corps”, and the so-called Corps was further given the title of “Eastern Command”. With 90% of the Armed Forces in  West  Pakistan after 1965,  we were not fooling our East Pakistani brothers as to the priority given with respect to their security. At best we were fooling ourselves in West Pakistan. Sovereign Bangladesh presently has seven well trained infantry divisions, two independent infantry brigades and an armour brigade. Given that nearly 90% of its borders are shared with India (only 10% or less with Burma), one may well ask, against whom do the Bangladeshis need this firepower? Whenever a Bangladeshi gun is fired in anger, the bullet will hit an Indian.

By 1971 tremendous economic disparity existed between the two wings of Pakistan, West Pakistan had become rapidly industrialized, East Pakistan was almost bereft of development funds. East Pakistanis had only a fraction of the manpower content in the civil bureaucracy and the Armed Forces. The Farakka issue was not given due priority by Pakistan because of consequent possible water problems it would face in West Pakistan in implementing the Indus Basin Treaty. Gen Yahya Khan tried to bring about some parity in both civil and military matters between 1969 and 1971 but it was too little too late. Politically the situation had become extremely charged after the Agartala Conspiracy Case collapsed against Shaikh Mujib, this was reflected in the 1970 elections. Widespread resentment turned into violent hatred after the night of 25 Mar 1971. Even die-hard patriotic elements who did not want the separation now wanted out of the Federation. For India this was a God-sent opportunity, a set-piece situation was carefully tailor-made to deliver a humiliating military defeat on Pakistan.

We have now again come a full circle, the State of Bangladesh having many more problems with India than Pakistan ever did when Bangladesh was “East Pakistan”. There are now frequent border clashes between BSF and BDR.  There is great concern in India about Bangladeshi settlers in Assam, Meghalaya, etc, there is also deepening apprehension at what India perceives to be rising “Islamism”. Bangladesh is standing right in the way of India’s access to its resource-rich Eastern States, many of whom have been in violent revolt for over five decades. India’s proposal to have access corridor to Assam through Bangladesh has been quite forcefully turned down. Unlike East Pakistan Province pre-1971, the economic boom is very visible in the streets of Dhaka and other cities. There is a world of difference between 1971 and 2006. In place of virulent animosity and hatred there is genuine love and affection between the two wings of former Pakistan, trade is on the increase. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh are self-confident, sovereign muslim nations, with foreign and economic policies are more or less a mirror of each other, no issues vitiate the atmosphere between the two nations. If we remove tariff barriers and visa requirements, we could well be back to what Pakistan should have been like pre-1971. What was better for India to contend with, Pakistan as it was in 1971 or Pakistan and Bangladesh as they are today? India’s major tactical victory in 1971 is now looking more and more as a major strategic blunder.

In early May 1998, India carried out a major nuclear test at Pokhran in Rajasthan. While all weapons need field-testing, the Pokhran blasts was more of a “Hundutva” Pakistan-specific political statement by the BJP Government rather than a military necessity. For a few weeks Pakistani masses were badly demoralized, bellicose statements emanating from Delhi rubbed in the perception Pakistan being overwhelme without even fighting a conventional war! The Indian nuclear explosions allowed Pakistan to come out of the nuclear closet, after all how can anyone in the world not concede to any nation the right of self-defence. For a short term propaganda gain India gave away a major strategic advantage. Another major tactical victory became a strategic blunder.

The recent US-India nuclear deal gives India a great tactical advantage geo-politically. It is not every day that a Superpower comes wooing a developing country, riding roughshod over their own oft-stated principles of not doing business with any nation not conforming to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India is very much respected in the comity of nations for its non-aligned status, it’s functioning democracy gives it a moral stature of some consequence. While it relies heavily on the Soviets (and now Russia) for its conventional arms, it also had easy access to similar arms and equipment from the West. Economically it enjoys most favoured nation status from both sides of the divide. It’s nuclear program is accepted as a fait accompli by the nuclear nations, and arouses respect in the developing world. It’s rapprochement with its great neighbor China was very much on track, a comprehensive border accord only weeks and months away. All signs point to India as upwardly mobile, and to their credit they have done it virtually on their own. While one can understand US compulsions to have India as a policeman for the region and an anti-dote to China, India as a rising economic and military power would still have reached Superpower status sooner or later. This deal officially makes India an ally. The US Congress will now proceed to take India to the cleaners as it does with every “ally”, raking every conceivable issue over the coals. This actually may give India enough excuse to pull out of the deal, but in world perceptions, especially that of China’s, the damage has been done. Over the years India’s foreign policy has been very mature and extremely successful. While 1971 is understandable for any number of emotional reasons emanating from 1947, the other two initiatives should have been better thought out, given that each major tactical success has seen (or is likely to see) a reverse swing of fortunes.

Did you enjoy this post? Why not leave a comment below and continue the conversation, or subscribe to my feed and get articles like this delivered automatically to your feed reader.