The Shock Of Stalemate
For the first time in its entire history since 1948, Israel walked away from the battlefield without scoring an outright and convincing victory, in effect a stalemate. Israel has never fought a war with numerical superiority, this time the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was fought to a standstill by a force far less in numbers. Totally dominant in weapons and munitions on the ground, Israel’s Air Force ruled the skies unhindered, over 10000 sorties delivering tons of ordnance in the form of precision-guided bombs, and smart missiles alongwith heavy stuff like “daisy-cutters”, etc. 155 mm self-propelled guns constantly pounded Hezbollah positions, with direct tank fire on Hezbollah strong points from Merkawa tanks (MKs 1 & 2 with the regular 105 mm gun and MK 3 with the smooth barrel 120 mm gun). This tremendous concentrated firepower was followed by waves of mechanized infantry, they could not dislodge dedicated Hezbollah fighters. That failure shattered a myth built up carefully over the years, that the Arabs could not stand upto Israel’s military might. The IDF did achieve, through a UN Resolution a bufferzone of sorts, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army moving in between Israel’s border and the Litani River in South Lebanon to enforce the ceasefire. One doubts the Hezbollah will allow themselves to be disarmed.
The “Haganah” was created in 1921 to protect settlements (Kibbutzam). The “Irgun” faction led by Menachem Begin, who later became PM, separated to focus on terrorism. Haganah helped British forces put down the great Arab uprising from 1936 to 1939. The Jewish Brigade formed by the British during World War 2 fought in Italy, ultimately about 30000 Palestinian Jews took part in the war on different fronts. These combat hardened cadres returned to increase the Haganah field strength, its “strike” companies were called the “Palmach”. From 1945 to 1948, Haganah drew in soldiers as well as young displaced refugees from Europe (my friend, artilleryman Col David Yarkony joining as an 18-year old). The Haganah became the IDF at the birth of Israel in May 1948, all other militias were banned. After a brief struggle between the Haganah and the Irgun, the latter was also absorbed into the IDF. Fighting both conventional battles and as unconventional forces, the IDF succeeded in 1948 in defeating the Egyptian and Jordanian Armies, superior both in numbers and weaponry. This was possible only because of the combat experience and motivation inherent in the IDF. The Arab cause was not helped by the excesses of many small Arab irregulars indulging indiscriminately in murder, arson and loot.
By 1956, the first of the three all-out short wars till 1973, the IDF had become a lean, mean, fighting machine, the hard core being the motivated and hardened veterans of the Second World War and 1948. This value-added combat experience is vitally necessary for any fighting army (as opposed to a peacetime Army where other standards apply). The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was well executed, yet it relied heavily on support from the Maronites in the Lebanese Army and the Phalangist Militia. The Sabra and Chatilla massacres took place while the IDF stood by, one feels this marked the start of a downslide, the steady rot to IDF’s aura of invincibility peaking in South Lebanon this summer. Hezbollah absorbed tremendous attrition without breaking, it soon became clear that the IDF’s forte, “Close Quarter Battle” (CQB), the acid test for any army, had been lost over the years. A village called Bint Jbail, only 1-2 kms from the border was repeatedly taken by the Israelis but could not be held. With things going haywire the IDF Chief, Lt Gen Dan Halutz, an air force officer sent his Army Deputy, Lt Gen Moshe Kaplinsky to oversee (not replace) Northern Commander Lt Gen Udi Adam, a vote of “no confidence” in the field commander, bad for morale for soldiers fighting in the field. A tactical land battle on that scale should only be fought by Army officers, from the combat arms, infantry, armour or artillery. A preponderance of Air Force generals in the Command HQs cannot run a land war.
With 50 plus burnt-out armoured vehicles being towed back, at least 200 Israeli dead must have been the minimum count, with multiple more having battlefield injuries. That is a high price to pay for claiming 400-450 Hezbollah dead, mostly by bombs and artillery shells. The Hezbollah suffered grievous losses in key combat commanders and experienced personnel but those who took part in the fighting, a hard-core of 4000-5000, will emerge as battle-inoculated hardened cadres who can be fleshed out by the 10000 personnel “in reserve” in no time at all. Shaikh Hussan Nasrallah has been careful in being easy on the rhetoric even though he was quick to claim victory. One supposes if you have not lost to Israel, you have won.
Hezbollah used a combination of classic guerilla tactics, both in urban areas and elsewhere, using the broken ground of (mountains and fields) to good advantage. Armed mainly with AK-47s, anti-tank missiles (AT-3 Sagger, AT-4 Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel and the more modern AT-13 Memis and AT-14 Kornet), and new heavier, more effective rocket- propelled grenades (RPGs), alongwith anti-tank landmines and hand grenades, the Hezbollah copied the Viet Cong in operating in small groups relying heavily on tunnels to offset their inferior numbers weapons. Over 5000 Katyusha rockets were fired on northern Israel, extending from Haifa to Nahariya. The longer range Fajr rockets with ranges of 45 kms and more were not used, neither were Zelzal -1 & 2 (rockets) and Zelzal 3 (missiles) with longer ranges (beyond Tel – Aviv).
While the IDF Chief did not break the law, when he off-loaded shares in the Stock market 3 hours after two soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbollah, Lt Gen Dan Halutz broke a moral covenant. Alongwith battlefield blunders, this will probably cost him his job. He is best known for his callous comment when asked how he felt about bombing civilians during the “war of attrition” during 1970-71, “only a slight bump on the wing when I release the bomb!”. The first principle of selecting battle leaders is that is you do not appoint a man without good combat experience, those who have not heard a shot being fired in anger cover their inferiority complex ( to combat hardened soldiers) by resorting to bluster. There are many in this world who fight “battles” in their imagination, or with their mouth. The 5-man commission appointed to investigate Israel’s first military debacle in its history, will certainly find many shortcomings.
South Lebanon circa 2006 has ended the 50-year psychological domination that Israel had built up on its Second World War and 1948 veterans. Israel will not search for every opportunity to re-assert its “myth of invincibility”, for them it is a matter of life or death as a nation. The ceasefire will not hold, if anything the failure for the Hezbollah to disarm will be used as “casus belli” by Israel. This time around the war will be carefully planned and meticulously executed by the Israelis, the Hezbollah are not likely to sit on their laurels. Expect another war in the future, dear readers!
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