Inculcating The 65 Spirit
The Armed Forces of Pakistan are many times bigger and far better equipped than those that went to war in September 1965, the then senior military hierarchy never seriously anticipated that any conflict would take place. Are the “khakis” of today as much prepared for war as their predecessors, do they have the same élan and enthusiasm that infected not only the rank and file but the whole population of Pakistan when Field Marshal Ayub Khan called the country to arms on the morning of 6th September? There is a qualitative difference in the spirit that coursed through the veins of those who were in uniform then and those who are in uniform now. However, one is quite confident that if when push comes to shove, the uniformed personnel will respond as they did in 1965 but whether the whole nation will stand united behind them as they did 38 years ago to the day will depend upon Gen Pervez Musharraf and the “democratic” road he chooses, whether he sustains the parliamentary process he has himself put into effect or he falls prey to the motivated who have enlisted “intellectuals” to advise a “Presidential System”? One may well ask what is the present system in all but name?
1965 was the last war we fought as the one nation that the Quaid created to fulfill the dream of the muslims of the South Asian sub-continent to have a separate identity on independence from the British. 1965 reflected the combined will of all the peoples populating the two halves of the whole of Pakistan, without exception. Battle was entered well knowing that we were fighting a numerically superior enemy, short shrift was given to any thought of that disadvantage. Outnumbered and outgunned, we captured territory from numerically superior enemy units in many battle areas outfighting the enemy to the point where had not one or two of their senior field commanders stood fast, retreat from critical areas was considered a serious option by Indian Army HQ. The Indian Armed Forces did not lack courage or commitment, they were simply stopped dead by the spirit that fired the Pakistani uniformed personnel. What we lacked in generalship was more than made up in initiative and enterprise at the junior leadership level. Today’s younger officers are certainly better educated militarily and more professional, the 1965 cadres more than made up in fervour, deep-rooted motivation and commitment.
We failed at both the strategic and tactical levels in 1971 despite the lessons learnt in 1965. A vicious parochialism that had barely been latent beneath the surface since 1947 led to the disintegration of the unity of the Army in East Pakistan in March 1971, culminating in the disaster on Dec 16, 1971. Our forces did not lack morale, the war in East Pakistan lacked morality, one cannot make war on one’s own people. All armies need the support of masses, in peace and during war, the major lesson learnt was that political issues cannot be settled by military means. The junior leadership performed as well as they did in 1965, that could not change the strategic and tactical errors made by us politically on the regional and domestic plane. The unmitigated disaster of 1971 would have destroyed the inherent fabric of many armies forever but where the spirit is strong, the will survive. The years from 1972 to 1977 saw many detractions from the primary role of the Armed Forces. 1977 saw us thrust again into a martial law situation, an Army cannot carry out military rule endlessly without debilitating effect on its character. Sometimes intervention becomes obligatory, anarchy was staring us in the face when Karachi was almost taken over by militants in the early 1990s. Before operations were handed back to Rangers and Police, the Army’s concerted action had resulted in the capture and elimination of many terrorists. In the late 1990s Kargil happened, elements of regular units of the Army were engaged in battle in an almost inaccessible mountainous area. The Indians, in a far position to fight a set-piece battle because of a better logistical access to the forbidding heights, took good advantage of the situation.
In December 1979, the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan. The US initially offered US$ 400 million worth of military aid, which was however spurned by Pakistan as inadequate for a “frontline State”. Finally recognizing the two-front threat to Pakistan, the US eventually put together a package of US$ 1.5 billion worth of military and economic aid in 1981, Pakistan went into the forefront of the Afghan freedom struggle. By 1989, the Soviet Union – having suffered heavy losses in men and material and unable to withstand the Jehad, withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. Under the Pressler Amendment, the US re-imposed an embargo on all economic and military aid to Pakistan. Conducting anti-dacoit operations in Sindh was an important challenge for the Army during this period, overtaken by Siachen Operations from 1984 onwards (it continues till today). One of the most inhospitable and inaccessible places on Earth, it is a matter of honour to be part of the “Siachen Brigade”. The only silver lining, if one can call it that, is that almost every young officer (and a fair percentage of soldiers) of the Army has been rotated through “Siachen duty”, a real-life battlefield inoculation where death stares you every moment in the face. Our commanders must have battlefield experience. There is no substitute to hearing shots fired in anger, the sound of a bullet is a great equalizer, it separates the men from the boys. Pervez Musharraf is the only surviving officer of the Army of 1965 (the last of the “Mohicans”). With very few officers left of 1971 vintage, this aspect will be of paramount importance for the COAS when he eventually chooses his successor. The President must be extremely sensitive to the perceptions among the population eroding the once overwhelming love and support for the Armed Forces. Whatever their rank, those who have lined their pockets, particularly in well-known real-estate scandals in Defence Housing Authority (DHA) Karachi and Lahore, must be publicly brought to task for the sake of the fair name and reputation of this Army. The acid test of accountability for the President will be whether (and when) he removes them from the hierarchical chain of this Army.
We faced a crisis of the greatest magnitude on Sep 11, 2001 (or 9/11 as it is popularly known). We may not have been at war but we were faced with destruction if Pervez Musharraf had not forced a U-turn in Pakistan’s Afghan rather bankrupt policies of almost three decades. The outstanding strategic decision has had far-reaching consequence for the nation. 9/11 was Musharraf’s finest moment and guarantees him history’s recognition as a saviour of the country at a very critical time.
But the domestic and geo-political crisis continues because we have learnt no lessons from history. Even though 1971 was the biggest crisis we faced (and failed) as a nation, a political crisis leading to a devastating military defeat, we face a far bigger test at this time, both as a nation and its Armed Forces. We need to inculcate the spirit of 65 to fight the enemy within, particularly those who are eroding the reputation of this army, some for personal gain, some simply because they can hang on to power on the Army’s coattails. If we are to accept corruption as routine, than we might as well cease to exist as a country. Inadvertently thrust into a political morass in 1999, we are today in far a more serious situation than in 1965 when we knew who the enemy was and what we needed to do to him. The President’s immediate pre-occupation is to devise a comprehensive exit strategy for the Army in a manner that the transition is conducive for democracy without detracting from any future central role in Pakistan for the Armed Forces.
Did you enjoy this post? Why not leave a comment below and continue the conversation, or subscribe to my feed and get articles like this delivered automatically to your feed reader.
Comments
No comments yet.
Leave a comment