Fire-Fighting in Pakistan
With the worst in Wana seemingly over, Pakistanis were beginning to breathe easier a few weeks ago. The terrorist-guerillas were either killed or captured or were scattered and on the run. A spate of incidents in Balochistan were irritants certainly but not of any magnitude to cause alarm. If anything the lull itself bred a sense of unease, almost as if there was a storm brewing somewhere, a man-made “Tsunami” earmarked specifically for Pakistan. In a self-fulfilling prophecy we are today in the threshold of a full blown crisis, mainly because of what is happening in Sui, not too far as the crow flies from South Waziristan, south by southeast.
No country can afford to allow armed militants to run riot in any part of the State, the aggravation force-multiplied by the presence of foreign elements among the militants, and that also in a majority. The Pakistan Army has done a reasonable job in Wana in controlling the militancy. Most of the foreigners became State-less when they came to fight as Mujhahideen (freedom fighters) in a war (Afghanistan circa 1979-1992) where the winners ended up as losers. To go home would have meant certain death, a large number therefore settled down in the only haven they knew, married locally and raised families, leading a relatively peaceful life in a region where tribal customs dictate that the fugitive and the destitute must be given sanctuary. The US invasion of Afghanistan forced the Taliban who survived the rain of death from the skies to come flooding across the porous frontiers into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Alongwith the Taliban came hard-core remnants of the Al-Qaida, almost all Arabs (Saudis, Yemenis, etc among them), Chechnyans, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc. The tribals gave them refuge in keeping with tribal culture and tradition, the hospitality strengthened by their involvement in “Jihad” against the Soviets.
Far to the north in Gilgit the killing of Shia religious scholar Agha Ziauddin Rizvi is bound to have complex sectarian repercussions. Gilgit is destined to remain a smoldering powder keg unless we curb the sectarian militancy that has swept the area in the last half a dozen years.
As an Alouette-3 helicopter pilot with the Karakoram Highway (KKH) Flight of Army Aviation giving logistic support to the engineers of the Pakistan Army and the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) building the KKH, the utter backwardness, illiteracy and poverty was a shock in stark contrast to the rest of (then) West Pakistan, by itself in not too good a shape either. The Aga Khan Foundation has done wonders for the socio-economic uplift of the area, progress should not be put in jeopardy because of the narrow-mindedness of a few clerics who view progress directly linked to a decline in their influence. Illiteracy is fertile ground for demagoguery.
Somehow one is never free of the feeling that something is brewing in Karachi. While the trouble in Lyari is mostly inter-gang warfare over control of the lucrative drugs trade, the targetted murder of Anwar Bhaijan of Baloch Ittehad has grave implications. He was potent political leader of the area and his killing could invite retaliatory revenge attacks elsewhere in Karachi. Even at the best of times Karachi is a powder keg and unless the culprits are brought to book soon the conspiracy theorists will fan raw emotions to put Karachi back into the throes of civil strife. Eliminating the drug trade may require some effort but it can be done.
The Balochistan crisis has to be defused in priority and military operations can only be a last option. A canard was spread that a Capt Hammad of the Army was responsible for the rape of lady doctor. Denying this vehemently Capt Hammad said he was ready to take a DNA test and if the allegations against him were found to be false then those falsely accusing him should face the same punishment they were demanding for him. Since Nawab Akbar Bugti publicly named Capt Hammad, is he ready to face the consequences of false allegations? Like other feudals of his ilk, Akbar Bugti needs to inform the world time to time that he is still around and has nuisance value. Hell-bent on provoking a fight with the Army, he is invoking Baloch honour in an attempt to involve the whole Baloch population behind him. Where was his Baloch honour when the Army was used by then PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to install him as Governor Balochistan in place of late Bizenjo in 1973, who alongwith Sardar Ataullah Mengal who was Chief Minister then, were far more credible standard-bearers of Baloch honour. For a man who claims that nobody can move in his area without his knowing about it, Akbar Bugti denies through his teeth any knowledge about the attacks on Sui and the gas installation thereof, potentially sabotage that can cripple Pakistan’s economic growth for the near future. Avoiding the temptation to put a dead stop to irrational self-motivated behaviour, the law enforcement agencies (LEA) have to tread softly while carrying a big stick. Translation, send enough forces to protect Sui and installations thereof to prevent further attacks by misinformed tribals, but do not fire unless fired upon!
The civil and military hierarchy must take a long term view about internal strife. Given the firepower and air mobility available the Army could easily obliterate the Bugti tribals, national unity considerations dictate that instead of taking the initiative the LEAs must only react to hostile action, but when they do react it should be done swiftly and precisely, and only against those directly involved. Some lessons need to be learnt from 1973. My unit 44 Punjab (now 4 Sindh) was first into Balochistan, initially to install Bugti as Governor, then for counter-guerilla operations into Marri area. We suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit, learning quickly through bloody experience. During counter guerilla operations company commanders more than at any time have to lead from the front, and in such operations there is no fixed front. By reputation, the present military hierarchy in Balochistan from the Corps Comd downwards is known to be professional and competent, in any case one cannot teach tactics to the commanders on the ground. The luck of the draw seems to be with the Army and Pakistan, thank God there are no real-estate Napoleon Bonapartes around. The number of Defence Security Guards (DSG) Battalions in static role must be increased, not only in Sui but also in all other soft targets of industrial and commerce importance upto a radius of 150-200 miles. Frontier Scouts must do patrolling and picket duties on roads, they are best being dynamic. The regular units of the Army, both heliborne and ground mobile, can be kept in “Operational Reserve”. The Bugtis attacking the installations are not the enemy, they are misguided by those who want to profit politically – and financially. Those who are misguiding them are the real enemies, the State cannot remain hostage to their blackmail.
The State must have an adequately equipped internal security force. One cannot use either the Army or the paramilitary forces indefinitely in internal security roles. A well equipped fully air-mobile dedicated force has to be put together as a priority. Actions must be coordinated for internal fire-fighting, to cater for both local sensitivities and political considerations. Political solutions which involve compromises are always far better than military operations. Not to be used indiscriminately, once military operations are launched they should not be compromised by political double-think or it will be a failure. The name of the game is to continue with this policy, with a lot of carrots, not sparing the rod but using it wisely. One’s strategy must be that of a measured response.
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