The Chinook Factor – 2
Purchase and maintenance of a helicopter-heavy aviation fleet is certainly an expensive proposition. Brig (Retd) Sher Khan, who disagrees with me and says that this expense is not really required, belongs to a select group of army aviation engineers with good flying experience, most of it test-flying the fixed wing tail-wheel two-seater L-19 (or 0-1 in Army nomenclature). He has also commanded an aviation base repair workshop. In the 1960s and 1970s the sturdy L-19s formed the core of the Army Aviation fleet, doing duties of command and control, reconnaissance, observation, artillery fire control, communications, liaison, medical evacuation etc. It was also the basic trainer aircraft. When US Military Aid-to-Pakistan (MAP) stopped during the September 1965 war, Pakistan Army’s “Aviation Engineering” utilised stocks of spares in the Ordinance Depots to “build” new aircraft.
Relative to today’s far more experienced Army Aviation pilots, my flying experience in the mountains of Azad Kashmir, NWFP and Northern areas was extremely short, but it was intense. The image one carries from 1969 and 1970 is that without helicopters it was impossible to reach a sizeable population of our poorest citizens who lived in the mountains. The 1970 East Pakistan cyclone only reinforced the conviction that wherever the physical communications network is weak or even non-existent, which it is in most remote areas, a strong aviation effort is a necessity. The presence of helicopters and many of them, is a necessity even doing normal times, it is certainly not a luxury unless it is misused as a luxury. In crisis of the magnitude of the 1970 cyclone or the 1974 floods or the 2005 earthquake etc, etc, the immediate availability of helicopters is a dire necessity. The first flush of the earthquake required not only evacuation of casualties and getting relief supplies to the affected, combined search, medical and rescue teams had to be airlifted to diverse places to provide succour to the dispersed population in the mountains.
One frequently sees TV images of urban areas like Muzaffarabad, Balakot, Bagh, etc, the stark reality not seen so frequently was the greater rural tragedy unfolding many times more in the high mountains, the areas the army was desperately trying to reach by air, by vehicles and on foot. Despite 70 plus heavy-lift choppers operating continuously above and beyond the fail-safe limits of both men and machines, a sizeable population went with little, or even no relief for sometime. Brig Sher Khan should inter-act with those in uniform on the ground in the affected areas. Most injured casualties had broken bones, if not treated within a few days gangrene sets in. If the gangrene spreads, the individuals die. The only answer is amputation of the affected part, that is if doctors and medical facilities are at hand. And how do you get the doctors there, or the injured back to a medical facility?
A sizeable population is very susceptible to our road and (where possible) rail functioning without hindrance. During a cyclone, flood or an earthquake, the very first casualty is usually the physical communications network, bridges destroyed, roads and rail lines swept away, landslides blocking roads, telephone lines down, etc. Sher Khan still seems not to have been part of the relief effort that Army Aviation is invariably called upon to do almost every year, if nothing else the pre-winter forward dumping of supplies for the civil population in the high mountains. No helicopter pilot worth his salt involved in relief operations and exposed to the human debris of such an environment or such disasters would react with studied callousness about human life. Regretfully people dealing with machines lose the touch of dealing with living beings. Why do officers from the infantry, armoured corps, artillery and engineers have more “feel” for manpower?
The number of fixed wing and helicopters suggested by me in “The Chinook Factor” (about 65 helicopters, 21 fixed wing aircraft) would cost less for purchase and maintenance of between 3 to 5 F-16s at today’s cost. The PAF needs F-16s as a credible deterrent to protect not only the sovereignty of the nation but also the life and liberty of its citizens, in that order. Wars do not come every year, but a natural calamity does happen every other year, can we not put aside a fraction of our budget to protect the lives of our citizens from such internal dangers? For a cash-strapped country like Pakistan refurbished aircraft are always more cost effective than those new.
The PAF conserves flying hours to save engine/airframe time, that is how they have kept the Mirages and F-16s going that also curtails the annual running and maintenance cost. The use of simulators would be useful, pilots still need to fly a minimum number of hours every month to keep themselves current. Israel keeps its aircraft, mechanical transport and equipment virtually in mothballs to conserve their life for actual action. Their first-line transport is even kept off the wheels, jacked up on bricks. When Maj Gen Abraham Mendler, Commanding Israel’s Armoured Forces in the Sinai in October 1973, was killed in his tank, the milometer on his retrofitted Sherman tank showed less than 100 miles driven.
One must use aircraft for command, control and liaison only when there are no other alternate means. During 1965, most senior officers air-traveled by L-19s, in 1971 Maj Gen Iftikhar Janjua was killed when the OH-13S (Sioux) light helicopter he was traveling in was attacked. The problem is that helicopters, particularly in civilian use, have become glorified air taxis. Given our geographical conditions, aircraft are necessary for good governance but fixed wing aircraft only where road transport cannot be used, use of helicopters is expensive in ferrying passengers. Strict economy measures must ensure that flying hours, particularly helicopter hours, are not wasted in the presence of other alternates. Training requirements can be dove-tailed wherever possible with operational necessities for economy of effort.
A helicopter-heavy aviation fleet can only be operated and maintained by those who can, i.e. in our case the Army Aviation. There is no question of riding roughshod over civil administration, one should not mix up the concept of democracy and good governance with the necessity of relief and rehabilitation. A visit to the earthquake affected areas even 14 to 21 days after would have found the civil infra-structure non-existent. This is not strange in such a catastrophe, it also happened very recently in the greatest nation on this Earth, in New Orleans the US President had to call in the Armed Forces to take over from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), who simply could not cope with the magnitude of the disaster.
US $ 150 million for purchase and a recurring annual running and maintenance expense of Rs 150-200 crore at maximum will not sink Pakistan as per the fears of Sher Khan! Would you rather spend this amount or have thousands and thousands of lives on the nation’s conscience? Greater accommodation and sympathy is a must for the poorest of the poor, perennially subject to catastrophe, misery, privation and death on a regular basis, relief must reach them in the shortest possible time in the small window of opportunity available.
The US Chinooks were symbolic of the relief effort but it was Pakistan Army’s pilots and machines who formed the core of the magnificent international effort far above and beyond the call of duty. A helicopter-heavy aviation fleet may be expensive to maintain but it is a must, the recurring human cost of not having such an aviation fleet is far too expensive for us to morally sustain.
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