Coping With Disaster
The TV images from New Orleans were unreal. Was this really happening? And in the first world? With ample warnings days before Hurricane Katrina actually hit the US Gulf Coast, why were effective steps not taken to anticipate the impending disaster? Why was relief not pre-positioned, why was a possible law and order problem overlooked, particularly when a million residents had evacuated the city by road? Problems compounded in the affected cities because of the breakdown of the city’s dykes, causing flooding, destruction of electricity and sewerage facilities, lack of potable water and medical facilities, etc further aggravated by looting by armed gangs and the administration’s inability to remove corpses. Far beyond the capabilities of the States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, the Federal relief effort did not go into full gear until riding a severe tide of criticism from friend and foe alike US President George Bush belatedly visited the affected area 5 days after the storm. His “political damage control” effort included calling the Federal relief response “unacceptable”.
Trying to pre-empt the bi-partisan mounting criticism, the President visited the storm affected area again 3 days later. Even after 9-10 days relief had not reached survivors marooned on their houses or in downtown buildings. Army and National Guard units took over policing with orders to “shoot-to-kill” looters on sight, with rescue helicopters filling the sky some order seemed emerging out of chaos. The deep South is hard-core Republican country, the delayed response will have a profound effect on future State and US Congressional elections, voters are notoriously unforgiving of those who are not there for them during their time of need. The material loss is replaceable, the human cost and trauma thereof will have adverse political fallout for the Republican Party.
On Friday Nov 13, 1970 the worst cyclone in the history of the region hit (then) East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Very much like New Orleans, for days no one was ready to believe the scale of the disaster. Flying out to the Bay of Bengal 2-3 days later on persistent reports of massive casualties, the rivers flowing into the ocean seemed clogged by the carcasses of animals and debris. Nobody believed us when we said these were corpses of human beings, in their thousands and thousands. The Islands of Hatiya and Sandwip lost part of their population, Bhola and Manpura (and tens on smaller Islands and coastal areas like Kuakata, etc) were swept almost clean of humans, animals and houses. A conservative estimate believed more than 300000 people to have perished. Except for the odd cement structure and the occasional tree, a giant lawn-mower cum road-roller seemed to have wiped the area clean. With additional two Alouette-3 helicopters sent in a C-130 from Chaklala, the two MI-8s of the Logistic Flight (Log Flt) Eastern Command flew extensive rescue and relief missions. Starting before the crack of dawn, we flew 9 to 10 hours daily in the affected areas till well after dusk had set in. Our Flight Commander, Maj (later Brig) Tirmizi was magnificent, his constant encouragement and cool handling kept the helicopter pilots flying well “above and beyond the call of duty”, far beyond normal endurance limits.
Joined by a dozen Soviet, Saudi, British and US helicopter teams, we were the only means of succour and transportation in the affected areas, other than slow-moving launches, small boats, barges, etc. Despite our Herculean effort and that of thousands of troops, civil administrators and volunteers on the ground, the task was way beyond us, the presence of foreign helicopters highlighting our inadequacies. Why were more helicopters not sent from West Pakistan? Those missing helicopters became symbolic of the frustration of being ignored among the masses in East Pakistan. The Federal Government remained distant, seemingly cold and unfeeling in Islamabad. The perception of little or no relief set the stage for far reaching adverse consequences. The cyclone brought the anti-Pakistan antagonism building up over the years to a head, in such circumstances it was sheer madness to go through with the scheduled November 30 elections. The political result was a foregone conclusion, a massive protest against the Federation as it existed then, it later became a mandate against the very continuity of Pakistan as a nation.
Forgive me for digressing on a personal note, if my younger (and only) sister Shahnaz (Azimuddin Ahmed) had not heard from me by 6 pm she would wait anxiously gazing southwards from the rooftop of her in-laws’ house, 3A Purana Paltan, Dhaka. Only after I come in low overhead after dusk and dipped the rotors of the Aloutte-3 helicopter sideways as recognition she would go down to tend to her two small children. Look at fate, thirty four years later because of a sister’s prayers for her brother’s safe return I am living to tell the tale while my beloved sister died in an unfortunate medical accident in 1977 in Dhaka and lies buried in Bonani graveyard.
Whether it comes with a warning or is a surprise, coping with any kind of disaster, whether natural or man-made, does not differ in essentials. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are common for both. First and foremost we must pre-position supplies, particularly potable water, meals ready to eat (MRE), medical requisites, blankets, tents, etc. One may include containerized field ambulance units ready to match up with earmarked doctors. For mass evacuation, vehicles must be earmarked as well as possible destinations. Flooding being commonplace in most disasters, collapsible flat-bottom boats with outboard motors and submersible generators and pumps should also be stored. Lightly armed troops trained to handle both disaster relief and law and order must be earmarked, carrying only vitally necessary equipment to avoid being over-burdened. Civilian personnel to supervise and administer relief efforts, medical staff, communications personnel, engineers with heavy earth-moving equipment and cranes, as well as containerized communication units must be clearly earmarked. “Disaster Mobilization Plans” as well as “Disaster Relief Plans” for each area have to be coordinated and dovetailed with Provincial and Federal Plans. Sufficient Reserve Funds, activated only during an emergency, must be kept aside.
Lessons can be learnt from the initial failure of the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to respond swiftly and adequately. A majority of the affectees being coloured, race has become an issue as the reason for the delayed reaction. Handled by politicians relief effort can become politicized as Tsunami’s aftermath has shown in Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Indonesia etc. To keep it apolitical, the command structure should flow directly from the President, a permanent “Crisis Management Agency” being established under the Chairman Joint Services Committee (CJSC) for effective coordination of ground, air and naval resources in support of the effort of the civil administration. The Ministry of Finance must devise an SOP to address post-disaster issues. People will be without jobs, without food and shelter, their children will be without schools, continuing medical care will be needed and rehabilitation thereof, etc, etc. The short, medium and long-term economic consequences and remedial measures thereof have to be worked out, each disaster will have different dynamics.
The most powerful nation on Earth has been given a body blow despite adequate warning because the Federal Government kept hoping for the best. Third world countries must invariably plan for the worst or suffer far worse consequences if the relief effort mounted is too little, too late.
Did you enjoy this post? Why not leave a comment below and continue the conversation, or subscribe to my feed and get articles like this delivered automatically to your feed reader.
Comments
No comments yet.
Leave a comment