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Likely War Scenario

If the US-led Coalition fails to scare Saddam out of Iraq by the sheer build up of forces on his doorstep, bluff will become a reality! Before the moonless period sets in on March 2, a barrage of about 3000 cruise missiles launched in a space of 48 hours by ships and aircraft will hit Iraqi command and control centres, radars and communications sites, suspected chemical and biological warfare production centres, Scud missile sites, Republican Guard concentrations, Baath Socialist Party HQs, etc.

Concentric attacks on the same targets as well as troop concentrations by B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers, F-14, F-18, etc fighter bombers and Predator unmanned aircraft will follow. The generally flat terrain north beyond Kirkuk is mountainous. South of Baghdad there is undulating desert upto the Saudi borders with flat irrigated land to the running northwest on a southeast axis along the Tigris and the Euphrates upto Basra and Kuwait. Between An-Nasiryah and Basra, the area is marshy. Karbala, with tragic connotations for Muslims, may well be a battleground. West of Baghdad there is undulating territory upto Syria and Jordan, generally flat land east of Baghdad right upto the Shattl-e-Arab river border with Iran. Around March 2 three columns will thrust northwards from Kuwait. Armour of the US 3rd Infantry Division will lead off northwest on the more direct route to Baghdad crossing a series of combat Engineer-built bridges across the Tigris and the Euphrates. Possibly led by the British Armored Brigade (the Desert Rats), one column will do a wide hook across the open desert to either capture An-Nasiryah or link-up with a bridgehead created by US 18th Airborne Corps (mainly 101st Airborne Division as the 82nd is partly engaged in Afghanistan) para-dropping ahead of the racing columns to seize bridges and airfields to receive armour vehicles and supply thereof (shades of Arnhem, “a bridge too far”). A US Marine Brigade will move overland in coordination with a sea-borne Marine Brigade to assault Iraq’s major port city of Basra. From the North the armoured spearhead of US 4th Infantry Division will roll down from Turkey through the mountainous range (held mostly by rebel Kurds) towards the Iraqi stronghold of Kirkuk. Special Operations Groups (SOGs) from the CIA, US Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines and the British and Australian SAS, etc will slip in /be para-dropped to (1) secure Iraqi oilfields before they can be self-destructed and (2) generally cause mayhem. Israeli commandos will certainly be among those operating west of Baghdad to forestall Scud-missile launches (a la 1991) towards Israel. A major paradrop is also likely west of Baghdad to seize a major airbase, probably Habbaniyah, to act as an air bridgehead, i.e. unless Jordan gives a military corridor (quite unlikely) given that King Abdullah’s head lies uneasy wearing the Jordanian Crown).

US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation before the UN Security Council was compelling enough to conclude that Iraq was not fully cooperating with the UN inspectors in disarming with a reason and was thus not in compliance with UN Resolution. No “smoking gun” but enough to partly convince the wavering that US would be justified in taking punitive action even without a UN resolution. The actual fighting will find France certainly on board while Germany, the major nay-saying holdout in the European Union, is already cooperating by allowing unrestricted use of its facilities for logistics.  Notwithstanding anything really dramatic, like Saddam heading off into sudden exile, the war clock is ticking.

These factors were considered in planning the war, viz (1) the climate and topography in the area of likely operations (2) the size, deployment and effectiveness of the Iraqi war machine (3) the troops and war equipment that the US (and its allies) can commit to battle (4) Iraq’s nuclear, chemical (Powell’s evidence on this was quite damning) and biological potential (5) post-war considerations and intentions thereof (most important for muslim countries) and (6) crucially, if somewhere the offensive bogs down there are no strategic reserves, this could necessitate the use of tactical nuclear weapons. With Saddam Hussain’s exit the Coalition could install an interim government “a la Karzai”, the Catch-22 is violent Arab street backlash may well destabilize the neighbouring monarchies or (at least) make their existence, alongwith other “controlled” democracies like Syria and Egypt, precarious. Unless neighbouring Muslim countries are part of the coalition forces occupying Iraq, there could be a permanent US-muslim divide. Iraq’s oil reserves may remain hostage indefinitely to recoup war expenditures and the recurring cost of occupation of Iraq thereof.

With out-of-date barely serviceable aircraft, Iraqi air force is hopelessly out-classed by Coalition airpower, the modern high-tech of precision guided missiles (PGMs) included. Analysts believe that because of their supposedly low morale and their out-dated weapons and equipment regular army units will be brushed aside or surrender en masse, the only real resistance coming from loyalists in and around Baghdad. The brunt of the resistance is expected by western analysts to be borne by the Republican Guard (the Special Republican Guard Division and four Republican Guard Divisions deployed around Baghdad). Failing their onslaught on Iran and forced to withdraw, the Iraqis fought hard defending own territory, this must be taken into account. Military operations cannot be planned on wishful thinking. Iraq’s regular Army consists of 3 armoured divisions (2 each with armoured brigades and 1 mechanized brigade, about 250 tanks), 3 mechanized divisions (each with 2 mechanized brigades and 1 armoured brigade with about 60 – 70 tanks) and 16-17 infantry divisions (50 tanks each) arrayed in layered defences with Baghdad as the vital ground. One armoured and 2 mechanized divisions face south towards Kuwait and Basra while one armoured and one mechanized division defend Kirkuk area. The infantry divisions are formed into five corps, one corps defending Basra and two facing south with An Nasiryah as the pivot. Kirkuk area has one corps and another is west of Baghdad, each has one armoured and mechanized brigade. One armoured and two lorried infantry divisions make up the corps strength strategic reserve in the vicinity of Baghdad. A myriad number of special forces and intelligence units over-lap in the perimeter protecting Saddam and his family.

During the Gulf War Iraqi command and control over formations and units was knocked out on Day One, Iraq’s only strategy will be to avoid open-country battles and fight in urban areas with decentralized command so as to counter loss of communications. The US gameplan will be to race the 300 miles to Baghdad from three directions to forestall Saddam’s use of chemical or biological weapons (Israeli Army dictum, “when in danger the enemy’s hill is the safest place”) as a last resort on Coalition troop concentrations or even his own civilian population to impede the speed of the military thrust. The Coalition will follow Liddell Hart’s “Indirect Strategy and Deep Penetration” and only invest Baghdad and Basra. The combat clothes for nuclear and CBR warfare are not designed for the war to exceed the mid-April start of hot weather when the warm winds start to blow. Then why not attack now, immediately? The military build-up is not complete and with Hajj only days away, any action now would inflame even neutral muslim passions. Subjected to chemical or biological warfare attacks, the Coalition could well retaliate with nuclear weapons, inflicting enormous civilian casualties. Obviously Saddam’s military strategy will be to make the war drag on and by fighting in built-up areas inflict enough casualties to exacerbate US domestic and international public opinion against the war. Not missing this time slot is crucial to the US plan to wage war, Baghdad must be captured within March or early April. That is programmed as a “distinct possibility”, it falls into the category of a “calculated risk”.

(This article is partially based on a background briefing given by former NATO Commander Retired US General Wesley Clark).

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