The visit
After weeks of speculation, the White House confirmed in a cryptic announcement that US President Bill Clinton would visit Pakistan during his South Asia tour in the second half of March. Normally it would not make a difference but to be shut out during his South Asian tour in the present international security environment in the face of massive Indian propaganda blitz would have been a disaster of the greatest magnitude. The strong Indian lobby went to great lengths to have the visit cancelled, their failure made it so much more pleasurable for Pakistanis. That it signifies “legitimacy” of the present governance mode was claimed by the Chief Executive (CE) and denied by the US President himself. That the visit does convey legitimacy of sorts is undeniable but that the visit was not meant to do so is also undeniable. To understand the complexity of US-Pakistan relations one has to go over not only the past history but the present situation and what is to be expected in the future. Only then we can answer the question as to how both the US President and the Pakistani CE could be both right and wrong at the same time.
Whenever we examine the relationship between two States, we have to accept that different factors govern that relationship. The US has a right to pursue its national interests and objectives irrespective of Pakistan’s position on these, at the same time and by the same token, so has Pakistan. Then there are issues in which aspirations of both the States coincide. Most problems arise when the relationship is complicated by the dynamics of a relationship of the other State with a third State. US strategic goals and long-term interests in the world are clearly annunciated and as much as US detractors in Pakistan would like us to believe, are not Pakistan-specific. Similarly Pakistan’s interests and objectives are not US-specific as the anti-Pakistan lobby in the US and the world would like everyone to believe. Where Pakistan has a problem with the US and has been having for some time, is that US relationship with third countries in the region, more importantly India, is taken by Pakistan to be weighted against Pakistan despite Pakistan’s service as a loyal ally during the Cold War. Similarly US may have a problem with Pakistan’s approach to countries in the region, particularly Afghanistan and Iran. In the 60s the US had a major disagreement about our friendship with China, it is that very friendship that served as a stepping stone for Nixon’s historic opening to China, that in turn heralded the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union, helped no end by Pakistan’s bearing the brunt of Russian retribution as a front-line State in the Afghan war.
During the difficult years of the Cold War when India was more or less a Soviet ally, Pakistan was a cornerstone of US Policy, a stabilising force in the region. Even then nuclear non-proliferation concerns led the US to ostracise Pakistan and cease all aid in the 70s. Then a military dictator overthrew a democracy and became an international pariah on hanging an elected PM. If it had not been for Afghanistan, Pakistan would have remained out in the cold in deep isolation. In a pragmatic turnaround of policy to serve the greater US interest, Pakistan’s “sins” were put on hold and we became the front-line State for the west in the fight against communism. While Gen Zia had been scornful about refusing the paltry US$300 million offered as immediate relief by President Carter as “peanuts”, the fact remains that as reward for the tremendous effort we put in at great risk to our sovereignty, we ultimately got nothing more than “peanuts” and a handful of F-16s. Gen Zia and his colleagues failed Pakistan in not driving a harder bargain, even though our interests coincided. Today the Kalashnikov and the drugs culture, unrestricted illegal immigration and terrorism are all residuals of the Afghan war, what to talk of smugglers’ markets in every city and highways beyond repair because they were not designed to cater for the inordinate increase in heavy vehicles traffic. Most of the aid we got was debt and not grants, very little investment took place. The increased economic activity gave a false sense of prosperity and was only because of the dynamism of a burgeoning parallel black economy. Whereas Egypt got all its debts forgiven, Pakistan, which had more troops in pursuit of the Gulf War, got nothing. This failure to negotiate better terms is because those involved in the negotiations compromised the national interest (and security) to suit their own selfish motives. They sold out the nation so that they could be allowed to skim off CIA money meant for the Afghan War. When you sit down to bargain, you have to be clear about the bottom line, with friend and foe alike. Neither friend or foe will give you something that you do not drive a hard bargain for.
Kargil was both a diplomatic and information disaster and gave a unique opportunity for the Indians to tar and feather us. Militarily we inflicted severe casualties on the Indians, many times more than ours. Despite Indian hyperbole and rhetoric to paper over their setback in men and material, the severest casualty was that of morale. The Indian troops on the receiving end knew the truth. The BJP Government will never forgive Pakistan for that, for nationalists there is nothing more demeaning than what affects their manhood. Thereafter the Indian gameplan was clear, to isolate us in the world community and what better than to label us as a “terrorist State”. The Kathmandu hijack was either engineered by RAW as a “dirty tricks” ploy or was taken over mid-operation for one end only, to label Pakistan adversely. Before that Mian Nawaz Sharif had shot himself in the foot by trying to remove another Army Chief. What the Pakistan Army inherited was a country five miles to midnight, in deep economic, social and political crisis, with the administrative machinery having been politicised and corrupted into oblivion. Faced with external danger, the Army had to turn to the looming danger within leading to our possible disintegration as a sovereign State.
Unlike the period of the Cold War, when military regimes were the darlings of the western world, men in uniform at the helm of national affairs are not in fashion anymore. Nevertheless, the western democracies are not blind and they decided not to carry out an audit of the fire brigade (in this case the Army) while the fire brigade station (the nation) was itself burning. Having realised that proponents of democracy had brought the nation to ruin and its social fabric to virtual disintegration by institutionalising corruption, the western governments decided to give the CE’s new type of military rule (free press, civilian cabinet, no martial law administrator) a chance, provided a road map for restoration of democracy was spelt out. In this manner, the international community has tacitly “legitimised” military rule in Pakistan, this acceptance born out of the doctrine of necessity. The major reason for delaying the announcement of the visit would be personal security concerns for the US President, one must commend that Bill Clinton had the courage to go up against the assessment of the US Secret Service, for given Pakistan’s perceived insecurity ridden environment it is quite possible they did not give a “thumbs up”. Clinton took this decision not out of any personal reasons but only for the greater US interest in the region with respect to nuclear non-proliferation and signing of CTBT, control of terrorism, elimination of drugs and the wider stability of the region including Afghanistan. That is what pragmatism is all about and no amount of Indian propaganda would affect US primary concerns about how to pursue its own national interest.
President Clinton is not coming to Pakistan to read out the “riot act” to our military rulers as the Indians would have us believe (their fallback position to sabotaging the visit) but to express US fears on their issues of concern and have Pakistan’s first-hand response to them. Pakistan will have a unique opportunity to present its viewpoint at the highest level of the US administration. Our disparate national interests can be mutually accommodated and may not necessarily be in confrontation. As sovereign independent countries we need to understand and respect each other’s stance on various issues. While we can understand US economic aspirations in the billion plus Indian consumer population, these need to be adjusted to Pakistan’s concerns, mainly those problems stemming from being a long-term US ally in the region. We live in a very tough neighbourhood. A dialogue of equals is necessary and Pakistan will have home ground advantage in articulating its viewpoint effectively to someone who is a known friend of Pakistan. The visit had to take place, instead of indulging in euphoria over downing the Indians let’s do our own homework and make it useful for Pakistan.
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