Raiwind, we have a problem!
Those who have been privileged to have been taught by the former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) Gen (Retd) Jahangir Karamat in the Command and Staff College, Quetta, know him to be an eloquent speaker. However, he is also a very reserved person, not given either to small talk or levity. He chooses his remarks with care. In an address to the Naval War College on Oct 4, 1998, he (in his own words) “did not mince words” when describing the situation Pakistan is now placed in, particularly with respect to the internal situation and the decision-making process that has led us pell-mell into dire straits. Within 48 hours thereafter, after a couple of meetings with the PM, Gen Karamat “resigned”, three months preparatory to his retirement on Jan 7, 1999 and was succeeded by the third-in-line in seniority, Lt Gen Pervez Musharraf Comd 1 Corps. Musharraf superseded two course mates from 29 PMA Lt Gens Ali Kuli Khan, CGS and Khalid Nawaz, QMG. Even in normal circumstances superseding of these two illustrious general officers, given that nothing much separates the three on merit, would have raised eyebrows, the circumstances here borders on the abnormal. In the real-life movie “Apollo-13”, when the US spaceship develops a series of problems that turns critical, the spaceship commander very laconically informs his base in Houston, Texas “Houston, we have a problem!” Since everyone knows that all decision-making emanates from the patriarch of the Sharif family, it is only right that all Pakistanis collectively turn to the Sharif Homebase, “Raiwind, we have a problem!”
The decision-making process is hardly institutionalised or for that matter democratic. While it speaks very well of the Sharif brethren to give devoted respect to their father and to seek his advice about all the important issues, they hardly have the right to surrender the democratic mandate given to them by the people to the veto of one man. The Sharif patriarch and his geriatric inner circle are arch-conservatives, the person really calling the shots (instead of the PM) is too far right of the vast middle ground that is really Pakistan. The first symbolic public exposure of this farce was when, instead of consulting the cabinet or even his senior party colleagues, or for that matter taking into account the feelings of the smaller Provinces, President Tarar was presented as a fait-accompli, shoved down their democratic throats to be more precise. However credit must be given to the government for sensing the mood of the populace and diluting the offending clauses in CA-15.
The inability of the PM’s cabinet colleagues (or rather their impotency) in not staying by their conscience and standing up to him on issues that trouble their conscience contributes to ill-considered decision-making by the PM. At the very apex of democratic power, the Federal (and/or Provincial) Cabinets provide the forum for consultation, debate and discussion, not as a rubber-stamp for decisions thrust on them. One or the other cabinet colleagues of the PM may have expressed his and/or her reservations from time to time, for the most part they have acquiesced meekly, knowing that the Sharifs do not take kindly to opposition in any form.
It was a foregone conclusion that the PM and his close colleagues would eventually turn to confrontation with the Army. Mian Nawaz Sharif has not had a happy relationship with any of the four Chiefs of Army Staff he has been privileged to serve with. Let us see if the fifth COAS is an exception, and if so at what cost to the Army as an institution? Mian Nawaz Sharif fell out with Gen Beg, leading to unsubstantiated rumours of an imminent coup till Beg’s retirement in August 1991. One contributing reason for dissatisfaction being the COAS’ reluctance to use the Army to “chase shadows” in Karachi. Soon after the launch of Operation Clean-up in Karachi in 1992, relations worsened with Beg’s successor Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua, who reportedly refused to accept a BMW given to him as a gift. By late 1992, rumours of another imminent coup were circulating, Gen Asif Nawaz’s death in early January 1993 only gave a temporary respite, the “agenda” to remove Mian Nawaz Sharif as PM was fulfilled by another mentor, then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (GIK). Temporarily reprieved by the Supreme Court, the PM was forced to resign (along with GIK) in July 1993 by the then COAS Gen Waheed Kakar. This started a lifelong Sharif animosity for Waheed Kakar despite the fact that Kakar himself tried to be fair in insisting that both GIK (his mentor) and Mian Nawaz Sharif go. In fairness it must be said that Waheed Kakar, belonging to a true-blood PML family, was averse to Mian Nawaz Sharif’s fondness for ANP and may have thus inadvertently contributed to prejudicing the relationship. The trio of President Leghari, Chief Justice Supreme Court Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and Gen Jahangir Karamat benefited Mian Nawaz Sharif by the sacking of Benazir the second time as PM in late 1996. All three are now gone.
Gen Jahangir Karamat has always been the perfect example of an officer and a gentleman. He was by far the most professional Chief that the Pakistan Army ever had, he rose by sheer dint of merit, being the senior-most in line, he was very rightly first obliged for promotion by President Leghari. He brought great maturity to his post and raised the public image of the Army. Not the least of his deeds was to support the government as a matter of principle over the judiciary crisis in late 1997. If either of the two Benazir/Zardari favourites had come to power, Mian Nawaz Sharif would never have become PM (Benazir for that matter would not have lasted long either).
Without taking anything away from the new COAS Gen Pervez Musharraf, who is an above par professional soldier, rising to the rank of Lt Gen on sheer merit, he has superseded comrades equal if not better than him, both excellent professional soldiers of pedigreed military lineage. In the case of the senior-most officer in the Army Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan there is a deep sense of deja vu, 40 years to the day, his illustrious father, an outstanding professional soldier, Lt Gen Habibullah Khan was prematurely retired to allow Gen Musa to eventually become C-in-C despite Gen Habibullah being the obvious choice (head and shoulders above) on merit. Ali Kuli was not chosen as COAS because of any demerits, his problems stem from the facts of his obvious merits, that he is perhaps the finest human being one has been privileged to know, that this Sandhurst-educated soldier (belonging to one of NWFP’s finest families and affluent thereof in his own right), has remained a professional career soldier throughout his service, a most humble and gracious person with tremendous strength of character, a God-fearing Muslim who prays five times a day without wearing Islam on his sleeves. Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan is a strong personality who brings lustre and respect to an Army that badly needs it. It is unfortunate for this country that he seems to have come short in the Sharif perception.
Gen Pervez Musharraf has his work cut out for him as COAS, the most powerful post in Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif’s “victory” notwithstanding. The seat of the COAS endows awesome responsibility on a person, loyalty first to the country and then to the Army, before that to any one individual. Can the new COAS isolate the Army from the deteriorating internal and external situation that his predecessor spoke of that led to his “resignation”? Will he be able to control the young Turks who will tend to believe the “Observer” stories about corruption and thus demand accountability? Will he be able to stop the erosion of his own authority in Cardinal’s club of Corps Commanders as they start being approached directly to ensure their loyalty? Will he be able to set the same standards of uprightness, competence and integrity of that of his immediate predecessor, a set of principle that led Gen Karamat to resign rather than accept the situation? And what are his own personal views about the sorry impasse that the present government has brought us into, internally and externally? Will he be able to separate, like Gen Karamat, conscience from responsibility in the final analysis?
And what about the “Giant-Killer” himself? Twice he has rid himself of recalcitrant COAS, will it go to Mian Nawaz Sharif’s head that he is Omnipotent? The best advice one can give to his handlers is to remember that whenever a Roman General entered Rome in triumph after his conquests, riding in a chariot and being acclaimed by the Roman world, an old man would stand next to the general, whispering in his ears “remember Caesar, thou art mortal!”
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