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Prejudice and myopia

Of all the races in Pakistan, the ethnic Sindhi feels the most dispossessed, followed closely by new Sindhis. Whereas the ethnic Sindhis had greeted the new Sindhis or Mohajirs (term here denoting Urdu-speaking refugees from India) with open arms in 1947 and less effusively in 1971, the violent Mohajir reaction in the urban majority areas of Sindh to the ill-advised imposition of the Sindhi Language Bill in July 1972 alarmed the Sindhis, they never expected the normally submissive Mohajir community to react. The Sindhis also became alive to the fact that though they were basically a majority they were becoming an endangered species in the major towns of their own Province in which demographically speaking they were already a minority. Despite that fine urban-rural democratic balance, the PPP Provincial Government of “Talented Cousin” Mumtaz Bhutto rubbed in the Sindhi edge of that electoral authority despite the fact of substantial Mohajir presence in the PPP. Successor Mustafa Jatoi’s general evenhandedness notwithstanding, the ethnicity of Sindhis came on very strong during the 1972-77 period. While the Mohajir elders went on accepting their “Karma” with some semblance of equanimity, the student community became the core of resentment that was built up against the blatant discrimination and outright humiliation meted out to the Mohajirs.

The fall of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977 and his subsequent execution in 1979 alienated the ethnic Sindhis from the Martial Law Regime, taken by them as representative of Punjabi rule with the Mohajirs as their natural allies. It was now their turn to feel discriminated against. Dictatorship ensured that Establishment-created pliable politicians remained fashionable in the period upto 1988, having no electoral base they cut no ice with either the ethnic Sindhis or the broad mass of Mohajirs, striving unsuccessfully to please both the sides. In 1983, the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) became an all-out Sindhi effort to break loose from the shackles of the Martial Law, its failure meant that some of the younger cadres went underground and became hard-line Sindhi secessionists. Subsequently in 1985, the Bushra Zaidi incident became an occasion for outright revolt of the broad mass of Mohajirs, the combination of the daily humiliation they had to suffer at the hand of Pathan transportation coupled with the perceived Sindhi discrimination against them being too much to bear any further. This mass protest was intelligently harnessed by the student leaders of the mid-70s and channelised into a potent political entity called the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM).

Prejudice is usually born out of myopia and selfishness. The rise of MQM created its own dynamics among the ethnic Sindhis, who saw this as an establishment ploy to contain their genuine political grievances, a sort of a political breakwater. Whereas the early Mohajir uprising was strictly directed against the Pathans who owned the Yellow Mini-buses (Yellow devils) transportation mode, the ultimate opponent remained the sons-of the soil ethnic Sindhis. The severe polarisation drew in the blue-collar Punjabis unwillingly and by default into an alliance with the Pathans. The Punjabi-Pukhtoon Ittehad (PPI) was thus formed, making an eternal triangle of sorts. Jeay Sindh, the extremist Sindhi Party, capitalized on the PPP being left out in the political cold, becoming the nucleus for revolt against the Martial Law Regime and those whom they considered their surrogate allies, the MQM. In the political vacuum created by Martial Law as well as a self-defence mechanism, these ethnic parties rapidly gained ground as well as militancy in the major urban areas of Sindh. PPP, which had a large number of Sindhis and Mohajirs in its ranks was reduced to becoming a Sindhi party by default in the Province of Sindh, Mohajirs crossing over in droves to the MQM which they began to see as the standard bearer of their grievances.

In the urban areas the lines were clearly drawn, this was not so in the countryside. The PPP itself had split with respected Mustafa Jatoi leaving the party to make the NPP. Historically, Sindhi politics has been based around 12 leading families divided almost evenly into two or three groups, each family following a pragmatic tradition of having a presence in all the parties, thus remaining in the portals of power, dividing the cake among themselves without a care for the rest of the populace except occasional lip-service rhetoric. The new political dynamics coupled with motivated intercession by RAW caused more permutations and combinations to come to the fore, resulting in a breakdown of sorts in the existing balance of power. This was further complicated by the dacoit situation. While dacoits are not a new phenomenon to Sindh, in the last decade they have cast off the traditional protection of the Waderas and in a shifting of roles reversed the situation by forcing the Waderas to seek dacoit “protection”, making the Sindhi countryside hostage in their embrace. The net result was that in the last 3 years the lawlessness has resulted in not a single family of interior Sindh sleeping out in the open as is their norm during the warm seasons, rather they barricaded themselves to escape the human terrors of the night. This insecurity permeated into the major urban areas, closely followed by the dacoits themselves looking for easy pickings, particularly in kidnappings of the rich city elite and their sons. Highwaymen have traditionally turned to the romance of political camouflage to cover their crass monetary ambitions and it was no surprise that hardened dacoits having no political inclination whatsoever gave credence to the Sindhi secessionist movement as lawlessness turned almost into an insurrection. In this they were given material and moral support by RAW. The combined activity of RAW-trained Al-Zulfikar and Jeay Sindh terrorists with the dacoits made interior Sindh into a rural cauldron into which the Army was called in with the aim of restoring peace and the writ of the Provincial Government.

Operations in the countryside may be difficult, this environment is more suited to the army’s normal capabilities of conducting warfare than in urban areas. However, internal security operations preclude turning the countryside into a free-fire zone as would be during wartime, this is further complicated by the fact that the dacoits have armed themselves with modern weapons and have built up a sophisticated logistics system that is dependant upon a population living mostly in fear of retribution. The greatest problem is that the civil administrative machinery has completely broken down, with the Sindh police becoming badly compromised by the dacoits. Since the families of most civilian bureaucrats and police constables live in villages, they are always under threat of vengeance. However, because of the largesse distributed by the dacoits, the collaboration has been mostly willing, this vicious greed has turned the guardians of justice into criminals. One cannot eradicate this corruption from among the Administration, the corrupt have to be removed from positions of power and brought to task, whatever the level. At the moment accountability is an absolute farce, a former senior Police official who was hand-in-glove with criminal elements in Sindh, has been “punished” by being given a sensitive appointment in Islamabad, free to live off his ill-gotten gains and pursue his personal vendettas. With the administrative set-up and law enforcement agencies a part and parcel of the law and order problem, the army has gone in virtually blind into the countryside.

Despite this potent handicap the Pakistan Army has conducted the operations in interior Sindh superbly. Though the Bhalwal incident derailed the operations for some time, by swiftly removing the GOC and the errant military hierarchy the COAS turned a bad situation on its head, setting an unheard of marker for accountability, one which has given the Army immense credibility with the population. With fresh leadership at the major general level, committedly sincere with reliance on mature and positive action than given to rhetoric, the army has launched a series of extremely successful operations in which notorious dacoits have been killed or captured. There can never be any substitute for positive leadership, by shunning Prima Donnas and opting for straight soldiering qualities, the COAS has made a choice of senior officers to be the field commanders that the country and the Army can be proud of. Our Infantry Corps in Sindh is well served by the incumbent generals, in both the urban and rural areas. Excellent use has been made of available intelligence while denying the same intelligence to the dacoits or the freedom of movement they enjoyed. Vast areas of interior Sindh that had become so dacoit-infested that normal road and rail travel was not considered safe or possible anymore have now become terror-free. The major successes achieved in the rural areas are just the tip of the iceberg, there is still a lot of ground to cover before the Army can control the dacoity menace, at least for the time being. It is hardly possible to completely eradicate the dacoits from the countryside, given the fact that a vast number have had time to reach sanctuaries, mostly in urban areas. The urban sanctuaries are being now relentlessly sought out by the Comd Corps Reserve in coordination with the two upper-Sindh GOCs. The roots of the Jeay Sindh and Al-Zulfiqar terrorists will also take time to be dug out, the many years of neglect had made almost every Sindhi feel alienated and thus supportive by default to an anti-Pakistani stance in varying extent. By being scrupulously fair and avoiding civilian casualties or indiscriminate destruction, the Pakistan Army first earned grudging respect from the rural Sindhis and then built up their confidence, people have begun to sleep outside their houses and take up cudgels against the marauding dacoits. The realisation has set in that the Army is sincere in eradicating crime and terrorism from both the urban and rural areas simultaneously without fear or favour. The Bhalwal incident served to show that the Army was sensitive to self-accountability and also adamant in being scrupulously fair, though one daresays the errant influential will still get away because of family connections. The lack of vested discrimination inculcated by the COAS in the rank and file of the Army has inspired hope among the ethnic Sindhis as well as their latent patriotism. The result is that the net information inflow has increased considerably, by itself creating a new dynamics that can be a base to build upon. There may not be light at the end of the tunnel as yet but there is a whisper of wind that evokes much hope!

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