Soviet hardliners botch their chance
In the dramatic development in the world geo-political scenario, President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union was briefly removed from power for 60 hours by communist conservatives, being kept under house arrest in his vacation dacha in the Crimea. Initially not much was known about the coup except that Gorbachev’s Vice President Gennaidy Yanayev, a known hardliner, took over as Acting President and as head of an Emergency Eight-Member Committee. Basically a nobody, he was reportedly the front man for the Defence Minister Yazov, the KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov and others of (and outside) the Committee. CNN news flashes LIVE from Moscow showed troops in large numbers in armoured vehicles taking up positions around the city but a lack of direction was apparent very early on. The Republics favoured the return of Gorbachev from the beginning and in Moscow itself, Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia and normally opposed to Gorbachev, holed out in the Russian Parliament as a symbol of defiance, asking for a general strike in Russia as a show of support to restore Gorbachev to the Presidency. The Soviet Union is a vast country and speculation was rife, the possibility of a bloody civil war loomed large over the future of this Superpower. With nuclear missiles in the Soviet armoury spread over the country, a Doomsday scenario was more than likely. The world stock markets showed their lack of confidence in the situation by taking a plunge downwards while investors headed for the safety of the US Dollar which rose steadily against all other world currencies, even the strong German Mark.
The world was plunged into an international crisis because of the Soviet Union’s domestic problems. Those who had been predicting Gorbachev’s removal for months were vindicated, looking back on it that was no real surprise, it was a logical outcome of the economic and political maelstrom in the USSR for the past few years that matters should come to a head. The real surprise was that in the face of open rumblings from within the Soviet civilian and military establishment, Gorbachev managed to balance on the tightrope for so long. Beset by the liberals led by the populist Boris Yeltsin, who protested that the reforms did not go far enough or fast enough, on the other hand were a whole bunch of die-hard communist conservatives who were appalled by his apparent heresy. Gorbachev was living on borrowed time while he tried to manoeuvre between the two opposing camps, trying to appease both the sides. His once-closest aides had gradually either left him or been removed. His great mistake was to move Glasnost (openness) ahead of Perestroika (economic reform), raising the aspirations of the people without being able to deliver on the promises made. The ideological problems were compounded by the Republics demanding outright independence or at the very least, autonomy. While the communists were alarmed at the attack on their ideological bastion, the separatist tendencies on the nationality issue, coming after the collapse of the Soviet Eastern Europe empire, shocked the nationalists and party faithful. Faced with the disintegration of the USSR, the spectre of what was happening in Eastern Europe on display in graphic detail, the coup by communist hard-liners was an event overdue in happening.
CNN’s coverage from within Moscow showed massive public opposition to the coup as crowds gathered outside the Russian Federation Building, surrounding it in the hundreds of thousands. Democracy’s aspirations were clearly manifest, Manezh Square in Moscow was eerily reminiscent of Tiennamen Square in Beijing in 1989. For a short time on the night of August 20, it seemed history was about to repeat itself, three people being killed. Though the situation was extremely delicate, little tension existed between the crowds and the military (the troops belonged to some of Soviet Union’s crack divisions). That this street detente would have lasted is another question, it required one trigger-happy soldier to set off a carnage. On the other hand, a large part of the Soviet Army is full of conscripts who were not expected to side with their more conservative leaders, some had already defected to the resistance. Boris Yeltsin’s overwhelming landslide in a direct vote in winning the Russian Presidency reflected in the crowds rallying to him, his stand against the coup confirmed that democracy was an idea that had come of age. In a sense Boris Yeltsin had given the kiss of death to his one-time patron, Gorbachev, by passing a decree a few weeks ago banning Communist Party activity within all public institutions in Russia. Alarmed hardline communists demanded that Gorbachev declare this decree illegal, his reluctance to do so may have precipitated the already unhappy communist party hardliners to overthrow the Government at the Centre. A day or so before the coup, one of Gorbachev’s close aide, Yakovlev, was expelled from the Communist party. This was a clear indicator that Gorbachev was losing control over the government apparatus, becoming a mere puppet in the hands of the party higher apparatchik, destined “to be purged at the next Party Congress in November”, in the words of Yakovlev. These prophetic words may have forced the coup leaders to attempt the overthrow much earlier.
The chill of the Cold War would have certainly set in if the coup had succeeded. While the communist conservatives blamed the Soviet Union’s decline as Superpower on Gorbachev’s wholesale abdication to the west, the US and allies perceive Gorbachev as an important factor in its pursuit of peace in President Bush’s New World Order. To that end, Gorbachev’s temporary fall had been viewed with great dismay and concern in the west, the US and other G-7 countries promptly suspended further economic aid. US policy-makers were caught flat-footed and scrambled to correct the imbalance. For those in the US Congress who have been echoing disquiet about the Soviet Union matching that expressed by their counterpart Soviet conservative hardliners about the US, this shows up the bankruptcy of conventional disarmament. In an article in February 1991 in THE NATION and GLOBE on US-Pakistan relations, “THE CROSSROADS OF FRIENDSHIP”, it was written that “If Gorbachev is overthrown, which is very likely, the whole geo-political situation may be upset to the disadvantage of US. While leaders play an extremely pivotal role in the nation’s destiny, it is never wise to base all long-term policies on the political fortunes of one man.” On the other hand, the ideas of democracy having proliferated, the resistance to the Soviet military monolith was unprecedented and unnerved the coup leaders. The US stands as the World’s dominant superpower but the Soviet arsenal is intact, the capacity for mayhem very much present. Long-term policies will have to be re-evaluated on more tangible and realistic foundations. Luckily for them, this event took place before the US seriously reduced its conventional forces. Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO remains very much as an intact entity. Many other US foreign policy initiatives very much still on the drawing boards will now obviously have to be revised in view of the experience.
The coup leaders seemed not have read Emil Luttwak’s book on “How to Stage a Coup”. The very fact that CNN could continue to broadcast live meant that they had no control over the media and communications. In a classic coup, the cutting off of all information by seizing media and communications is exceedingly important as an overwhelming display of force. Key leaders who can form a core of resistance have to be taken into custody immediately. Without these factors the Hardliners attempt was basically stillborn, faced with popular reaction in the streets, the whole game plan fell apart. The vaunted Soviet military is a celebrated monolith that reacts to definitive command, hesitancy as exhibited by the coup leaders was fatal for them. As is now apparent the coup had mainly KGB units as participant, the army’s show of force was undecided and therefore reluctant, in the lower ranks most were under the impression that it was a training exercise. Without the Army in the forefront, coups are basically short-lived. The failure to arrest Yeltsin and to act decisively meant too much reliance was placed on bluff. When the bluff was called by Yeltsin and his supporters, the coup leaders did not have the stomach for a fight. Murphy’s Law dogged the Gang of Eight and they soon came to grief.
Pakistanis were briefly disappointed at the fall of the democratic, reform-minded President Gorbachev but as a nation Pakistan could have conceivably come out much better if the coup had succeeded. In the post-Gulf crisis we were rapidly becoming the town outcasts. However, the new perceptions in the changing geo-political circumstances, may mean that Pakistan stands to regain its lost importance. While the hardliners had been opposing the abandoning of Najibullah in Afghanistan, Gorbachev’s internal pre-occupations in governing the Soviet Union prelude further support to Najibullah materially or morally. Without Soviet Union’s abstention in the Gulf crises, the US could never have risked the concentration of such large military forces in one area without an ally like Pakistan. Pakistan’s status as a once-reliable US ally will certainly be reviewed in a new light, the Pressler Amendment notwithstanding. In February 1991, THE NATION and GLOBE wrote, “In 1971 PM Chou En Lai of China eulogised Pakistan’s role to Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor to the US President Richard Nixon, in arranging the secret visit which led to the historic opening of relations between US and China, “do not forget the bridges that you have used”, Chou En Lai said, “you may have to use it again”. The changing of the Guard in Pakistan has thus come at a crucial time, US communications with one member of the power troika, Gen Beg, had broken down completely. As is usual when the interests of nations coincide, we may find that our 80s relationship with the US revived, if not in that same depth, maybe in a more mature, pragmatic manner. Pakistan has everything to gain and little to lose in this situation. As a nation we are sitting pretty, for a change in a no-loss situation instead of our usual no-win position in most causes. For Pakistan this is a new feeling, stranger things have been known to happen!
Gorbachev may have won this battle from the conservatives, he seems to have lost the war to Yeltsin and his reformists. From being a possible puppet in the hands of hardliners, he has become a possible puppet in the hands of liberals. That is a lame-duck in all senses of the word!
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