The Gulf crisis – Some lessons, some opportunities
Mixed emotions dominated the past week with the start (and the quick end) of the Ground War, “the mother of all battles”, to quote Saddam Hussain. Pounded relentlessly by air and bereft of any motivation, Iraq’s vaunted army disintegrated in less than a 100 hours in the face of a fast moving Allied ground offensive. The lack of the Iraqi will to stand up and be counted at the moment of truth was shocking, white flags proliferated with unbelievable abandon, the images on TV of Iraqi PWs were deeply humiliating to all Muslims. All PWs share a common demeanour of utter helplessness, broken spirits and the scars of battle, the Iraqis, except that they wore uniforms, did not give the look of soldiers. Despite our condemnation of Saddam’s brutal occupation of Kuwait, one may feel sorry for the Iraqis in general for the misery and devastation visited on them but only utter contempt for the bankrupt Iraqi leadership which refused to realise that their people could not put up even a semblance of an opposition. Rhetoric can never substitute the deeper emotions of motivation needed to stiffen the resolve of any Armed Forces before they engage into battle.
The war ended the way it was expected to, even the actual planning and conduct of the Allied Ground offensive was no surprise (THE NATION, Feb 13, 1991), surprising was the fact that Allied moves, easily predictable even by armchair strategists like us, were not fathomable to the inept Iraqi generalship, mindset into fixed dispositions of the catastrophic kind. One of the flaws of dictatorship that contributes to its undoing is that advice given is what the Dictator wants to hear, argument results in loss of employment, the fear of life is a great incentive to the Iraqis to parrot their master’s desires, disaster force-multiplied by elimination of all possible emerging rivals (and anyone showing inclinations of military brilliance fell within that ambit). Bad decisions culminating in the destruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces, the economic devastation of his country and deaths and injuries to tens of thousands of his people makes Saddam Hussain fully culpable. The acceptance of Bush’s final ultimatum before the start of the Ground War could have been humiliating, it was a hundred times less shameful than the Ceasefire that Iraq literally begged to accede to barely six days later. The misstatement of facts (e.g. declaring “victory” in the face of outright defeat) are the ultimate falsehoods of dictatorship. If it was not so ignominious a defeat it would be bearable.
Aftermath of the Gulf War closes one tragic chapter but then opens up a world of opportunity for the people of this region (THE NATION Jan 15, 1991). Having opted for the wrong side, the Palestinians may yet win full independence and thus their aspirations for over half a century. The only way to a lasting peace in the Middle East is to have a permanent solution to the problems that has locked the troika of Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians into an endless, internecine and mindless conflict. The regional security arrangement envisaged must include Iran and Pakistan. This war has shown Turkey’s inclinations for a European identity rather than an Asian one, however, in support of our affections for Turkey, Pakistan must persevere with the strongest possible bilateral relations. Iran is necessary in any regional arrangement, Pakistan’s balances this arrangement nicely, with mutual benefits. It is now vital to have an economic and defence arrangement with Iran immediately. Given diverse ethnic, racial and other considerations a Union may well be counter-productive, better to have a loose Alliance of sorts, closely cooperating in matters of Defence, removing mutual tariffs for each other’s goods and commodities, a sort of a Common Market. Iran has shown great maturity and steadfastness, its principled stand should end its relative isolation from the free world. It has taken this crisis to make sure that moderates and pragmatists finally bring Iran in from the cold of the last decade.
Out of this misery and destruction looms an economic boom. The major contracts have already been given to US and its Allies in the western world, contracts cannot be fulfilled without recoursing to our large and hardworking labour force, our manpower potential is second to none. Lucrative sub-contracts for our Construction and Service companies will force-multiply the economic benefits. To give one example, we are quite adept at de-mining operations, it would be natural if the US Corps of Engineers sub-let this task to Pakistan Army’s Corps of Engineers.
Nawaz Sharif Government’s Sartaj Aziz-led privatisation effort and deregulation is well under way to straighten out economic aberrations, the momentum of removing governmental controls must be maintained. The private sector must play its dynamic role without unnecessary hindrance or counter-productive monitoring by bureaucratic fiat. The Government’s primary duty would be to protect Sartaj Aziz’s flanks so that vested interests within the bureaucracy cannot reverse the ongoing reforms, including relaxations of foreign exchange regulations and even the removal (in most cases) of import licences of items on the Free List.
Steps have also been taken to separate the Executive from the Judiciary, a must for democratic emancipation. Law and order situation in urban Sindh, which along with charges of corruption, brought down Ms Benazir is not much of a problem anywhere but in the rural areas criminal activity continues unabated. Bandits have a historical tendency to turn themselves into guerilla movements, the armed bands in the countryside pose a potential threat that must be eliminated without further delay. The Pakistan Army must be utilised to keep the dacoits on the run while getting a battle inoculation of sorts by constant rotation of troops.
Media speculations about promotions in the Armed Forces are counter-productive to the national interest. They may be labelled “creative” journalism, it is more pertinent as creation of sensationalism with or without motive. Selection Criteria may be a fit subject for debate, mention of personalities tends to erode the professionalism and discipline that our Armed Forces are presently imbued with. The choice of the Heads of the various Defence Services should be merit-based and founded in the supreme national interest. The major lesson of the Gulf crisis is the ability of dominant air power to paralyse the Command and Control functions. We may have paralysed our own Command and Control mechanism by inadequacies in our present organisational structure. Lip-service is given to UNIFIED COMMAND by having a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), it is common knowledge that he is a figurehead of an ineffective body whose only claim to fame is protocol duties and preparation of position papers of various kind, the routine job of a THINK TANK. How toothless a tiger JCSC is was shown to good effect by late Gen Zia who as COAS was nominally junior to the Chairman JCSC, General Sharif, when he took over power as Chief Martial Law Administrator. This farce persisted with Zia becoming President but remaining COAS till his death. Admiral Sirohey, the present Chairman, may be a good man, he had to be bailed out of becoming a political football in 1989 during Ms Benazir’s reign by a combination of the President and three Service Chiefs.
The Gulf Crisis should give revived impetus for total Inter-Service cooperation, hardly upto the required proficiency at this time despite flamboyant paper rhetoric to the contrary. The Chairman JCSC should have the same authority as that specified for the Chairman JCS in the USA, even if it is necessary to redesignate him as C-in-C Armed Forces (or Defence Services). The President (as in USA) remains the Supreme Commander. GHQ Pakistan should be the GHQ of all the three Services, not only of the Pakistan Army. As the Gulf War has shown, Central Command may be paralysed to our detriment for any number of reasons. To cater for breakdown of channels of communications, we must create SIX Commands, each capable of independently fighting large-scale battles, if a need so arises, viz (1) Northern Command including AK, Northern Areas and all areas within Chenab River and the Indus (2) Eastern Command between Chenab and the Ravi (3) Central Command south of Ravi but excluding Sukkur (4) Southern Command including Sukkur but excluding Karachi and the Coastal area (5) Coastal Command to include Karachi and Pakistan’s coastal areas and (6) Western Command to include all areas of Balochistan and NWFP bounded to the east by the Indus. Except for critical areas which we must defend in AK (two Corps), Lahore and Sialkot (one Corps each), Rahimyar Khan-Pano Aqil belt (one Corps) and Chor-Umerkot-Nabisar-Badin (one Corps), the rest of the Army should be grouped into Divisional and Brigade-sized Task Forces within respective Commands supported by commensurate Air Force elements as well as Artillery and Anti-Aircraft Divisions in addition to their integral supporting arms, e.g. artillery, armour etc. The Army and Air Force must be under command of the Naval effort in the Coastal Command.
Debate must be a thing of the past, the personality to head this new Command structure as C-in-C must have the confidence of the people of Pakistan, at this time there is no other alternative, the man selects himself by sheer merit, professionalism and his contribution to the cause of democracy in Pakistan. What is important is that this concept must be implemented without further delay, speculation will be counter-productive to the interests of Pakistan, the time of decision was yesterday.
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