Let the truth come out
For over 50 years the rulers of India have operated on the theory that if you repeat a lie often enough, it will eventually be believed to be the truth. This goes back 5000 years in line with Kautaliya’s Arthasasthra. Kargil has been a high point of sorts in the colouring of facts, focussing on public perception as a finessed art the Indians have turned a crippling battlefield defeat into a resounding victory. The illusion created by India has been picked up as reality by the western media and the Indians themselves have been carried away by their own lies e.g. Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar appearing in a repeated TV AD talking about Indian forces now having the capacity of imposing hegemony in the region. The reality is that 1,000 to 1,200 men held up the better part of six Indian infantry divisions for over 45 days despite being pounded by over 500 artillery pieces and on the receiving end of more than 15-20 aircraft sorties on a daily basis. And then a majority lived to walk away from the battleground having inflicted casualties many times their own strength! However day in and day out, the Indian TVs, Doordarshan, ZeeTV, Star TV, TV Asia, etc churn out blatantly false propaganda, one has become sick listening to such a litany of lies.
As the dust settles over Kargil, some truths are emerging in Pakistan which were not discernible earlier due to “the fog of war”. These need to be addressed so that lessons can be learnt from an event where despite the fact that our finest did us proud militarily, we ended up being humiliated diplomatically and on the receiving end of the cutting edge of information. Without going into who was over the Line of Control (LOC) and who was not, what constitutes no-man’s land and aggressive patrolling thereof, the question arises as to who were “on board”, to quote the COAS Gen Pervez Musharraf, and from when?
Operations along the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir normally do not involve the government on a day to day basis unless it concerns troops from either side breaching the CFL or an inordinate upsurge of artillery shelling on our civilian population. Siachen has become a routine event despite it being a deadly affair for the last 15 years on the highest, coldest battleground in the world. A tenure of duty in Siachen is taken as a prized posting for our officer corps who volunteer in droves to get real-life combat experience in extreme conditions. From the top-most appointment to that of a young subaltern there is a long, enthusiastic and impatient waiting list. The necessity for exploitation in the Kargil operation seems to have arisen when it was discovered the Indians remained oblivious for an extended period of time, whether Mujahideen solely or Mujahideen forces beefed up and backed up by regulars of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI). It was incumbent upon our army hierarchy to inform superior civilian authority before we embarked further about possible Indian reaction to the threat to their lines of communication (L of C) to Ladakh and Siachen, containing the best part of two Indian Divisions. Government had to be brought “on board” because diplomatic and media nuances had to be taken care of. There is a grey area here that led to disaster and finger-pointing thereof.
As conceived Kargil was a brilliant military plan, succeeding in turning a tactical situation to strategic advantage. Unfortunately we criminally neglected to put in place vital ingredients, giving professionals in the diplomatic field no warning as well as not allowing private sector in the media to get into the act as the Indians have done on a broad front. We were wrong-footed from May 28 onwards when 2 Indian aircraft were downed on our side of the line. Unfortunately when the objective is to make “heroes” out of one’s cronies and hog all the glory, the selection of aim disintegrates into mismanagement rather than the maintenance of. The smell of cordite and battlefield casualties is a necessary ingredient for superior rank, the lack of it propels small men of high rank into misadventure as they seek the personal glory and sense of battlefield achievement that even most of our young officers possess after their Siachen tenure. What to talk about the government being “on board” it is doubtful whether the rest of the army hierarchy knew the nature and depth of involvement that almost brought the country to war. One believes that most of the Corps Commanders were oblivious of the chain of events enabling them to lead their commands into fighting a war with due preparation. This could not happen even in “Alice in Wonderland” that a country was on the verge of descending unwittingly into war while 33,000 of its Army’s critical middle-rank hierarchy was away reading meters for WAPDA. Kargil was certainly a window of opportunity, but the Army’s deputation in WAPDA in strength throughout the crisis makes one shudder as to what were the priorities set by the General Staff in the face of a near war situation?
Mian Nawaz Sharif has always propagated and opted for a route of peace with India in solving the Kashmir dispute. Having selected this aim, in direct contrast to the militant view, the PM has taken a considerable pounding from friend and foe alike over the whole gamut of the emotional Kashmir situation. Therefore, one must express strong exception to the insinuation and perception taking hold that he was “on board” when in fact he was almost the last one in the upper reaches to know. For the sake of posterity let us sift fact from fiction lest this deliberate misinformation is contrived to be the truth as it does in such cases with amazing regularity whenever people manoeuvre to escape responsibility by passing the buck. The PM has firmly believed that the economic emancipation of the people of Pakistan (and South Asia) is only possible if there is lasting peace with India, that this peace is only possible on a long-term priority if there is an amicable settlement of the core issue of Kashmir. When this aim was selected and maintained at great political risk given the emotions of our masses, then it is out of character for the PM to have associated himself with allowing any adventure that would not only scuttle the peace process but would isolate us diplomatically. With India having severe losses in men and morale, this cannot be kept forever under a “Bollywood” wraps, incessantly and stridently claiming victory in the face of defeat, truth will come out. In the meantime Indian propaganda has snatched victory from defeat. Similarly withdrawal of our forces from Kargil is a tangible event that has been a severe morale dampener for us and needs careful analysis. Not the first time we have snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. However, in all fairness, whatever motives one can assume about those individuals who sent the flower of our youth to their lonely deaths on snowy heights and deep ravines, the bringing of Kashmir up to world centre stage as a nuclear flashpoint, their bloody sacrifice may not have been in vain.
The cost to the nation has been very high. Above all, it has undercut the PM’s image as a man of peace, coming right on the heels of the “bus diplomacy” it short-changed his credibility as a negotiator. One may criticise many aspects of Mian Nawaz Sharif’s rule, he ate humble pie for the Washington accord to pull someone else’s chestnuts out of the fire for the sake of the country, even to the peril of his reputation and political career. The COAS is a good professional soldier having excellent command, staff and instructional experience, as a man of honour he should accept responsibility for his actions because he was the one calling the shots and no one else. Whether the government decides to keep him or not or whether he chooses himself to resign is another matter, a matter of not only honour but of character that recognises the wasted valour of our brave young men who gave the ultimate sacrifice on the heights of Kargil
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