Drums and a trumpet
Credit must be given where credit is due for conceiving of a tactical situation and implementing it to strategic advantage. For the Mujahideen fighting impossible odds in the high mountain ranges of Kargil, withstanding air assaults and artillery barrages before engaging in hand to hand combat, no praise is good enough. They deserve far more for taking on odds much beyond their numbers or material. The Mujahideen have taken a heavy toll of the Indians and dominated the strategic “national highway” leading to Ladakh for as much as 35 kms. Day after day they continue to take heavy pounding, motivation keeps them hanging on to this piece of deadly real estate, internationalising the Kashmir dispute again with their blood. The Mujahideen are sitting on the Indian jugular in the area. By leaving this vital ground vacant for a long time, the Indian Army allowed the vacuum to be filled to their detriment — and then did the usual cover-up, failing to report their loss till it became a ground reality with negative consequences for at least three Indian Divisions in the area, not counting Siachen. Nobody occupies such positions without elaborate planning and motivation. As such, on the same token that one has contempt for the Indian military hierarchy for the breakdown in their channels of reporting and command, one has to commend those in the planning loop from the COAS downwards who had the vision and courage to plan and implement such a winner-takes-it-all operation. There are associated risks which must have been calculated.
It is unthinkable that permission was not sought from the civilian hierarchy in the person of the PM. Whether he comprehended the consequences or were they explained to the PM is a moot question. Such operations involve casualties, giving the military a strategic advantage, this in turn leads to political advantage and has international repercussions. Which is where the Foreign Office comes in, they seem to have been caught unprepared to deal with world opinion in understanding our point of view.
One believes that from the COAS downwards the principal players had (and have) their heart in the right place in the Kargil operation. For too long the world has not taken notice of the strife in Kashmir. The Line of Control (LOC) is an abstract border that has been violated in some strength by the Indians three times since 1971 (when not counting Siachen), on the other hand Mujahideen have been crossing over for the last 50 years, in more numbers since 1989 to support the internal revolt in Kashmir. Many casualties take place within Kashmir and along the LOC on almost a daily basis, the world’s response has been less than pathetic. For that matter so has been the response of successive governments in Pakistan, to escape the label of “terrorist state”, they have shown themselves weak-kneed in reaction, sometimes downright apologetic. For local public consumption they have kept up a chest beating drama, long on rhetoric and short on substance. This status-quo had to be changed before the Kashmiri question became a moribund question. By going for the Indian jugular in the area, our military hierarchy must have war-gamed the possible Indian responses. A calculated risk in the vital national interest, given political will and the economic potency to back that will, such an operation has to be commended.
The Army would not have allowed the Mujahideen to move or given the logistics cover without approval from the Government since it would also be criminally irresponsible for them to fail to appreciate that turning a tactical situation to strategic advantage would have negative political and international consequences far beyond their mandate. Such permission makes for a marked variance between the overt and the covert, since the PM is a professed “man of peace” who has taken substantial steps to bring Indo-Pak relations on even keel, at great political risk. George Fernandes, the Indian Defence Minister, has given a “conspiracy theory” of a rift between the government and the Army on the issue, this seems to be wishful thinking. The nation is united on the issue of Kashmir, the masses believe there has to be a positive solution to the problem and the ball is firmly in India’s court, unfortunately at a time of their general elections, making it an issue of political suicide if any Indian leader presently espouses compromise of any quantum on the Kashmir dispute. Having the whole nation behind them emotionally, our military planners would certainly have war gamed the consequences leading to all-out war, certainly one cannot expect them to have proceeded along lines which would label the ongoing exercise in Kargil as an “adventure”.
The Armed Forces are confident that they can stop any Indian adventure across our borders in its tracks, whether any Indian excursion is localised in Kargil or along the LOC in the rest of Kashmir or even the whole length of the international border. Even though inferior in numbers, both the Army and the Air Force have a qualitative edge, the potential to inflict considerable collateral damage to India in men and material. Moreover, the ensuing hot weather, at least till the middle of August is not conducive to a land war, naval warfare will become hazardous within a fortnight. Aerial incursions will get reply in kind, though more in numbers, the quality of both Indian airmen and flying machines are not upto the mark. As regards political will, despite grave differences with the government, the Opposition rallied for the National Assembly to give a unanimous resolution on Kashmir and Kargil, a significant vote of confidence in a government in which the Opposition has otherwise grave misgivings. Our weak spot is in the realm of the economy, coincidentally the Finance Minister spelt it out in the rendering of the Federal Budget in the National Assembly. Despite our adverse economic situation we have no option when the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the nation is in question. In the inept handling of the international media, our bureaucracy has shown no imagination while remaining jealous of its prerogatives. The government should have sent out teams of two/three or even individual editors/columnists to give the international media a point of view other than having the official credibility tested, internationally as well as locally either non-existent or at a low ebb.
The Indians are like a cornered cat in Kargil, they have to fight despite the lack of motivation and will on the part of their uniformed rank and file. For them to evict the Mujahideen is a “must situation”. Since the Mujahideen have hung tough and land/air war for the moment is not feasible, particularly in the face of the US giving a “thumbs down” on crossing the international borders, there are few options to the Indians. While it has international repercussions as an act of war, one believes that they may test out our Navy’s resolve by trying to quarantine or blockade our coastline as a quid pro quo to withdrawal of the Mujahideen from the dominating ground in Kargil. This would also be a test of world opinion as one does not believe that the Pakistan Navy will sit back and adopt a passive attitude in such an eventuality. Moreover, trying to squeeze us economically by such an overt means makes it an “act of war” that could escalate beyond India’s limited aims to have the Mujahideen vacate Kargil and humiliate us at the same time. They will be mistaken if they assume that in such circumstances Pakistan will not fight. Given all the factors an Indo-Pakistan war will invariably end in stalemate after tremendous collateral damage to the economy.
Clemenceau said “war is too important to be left to generals”. One may add that when higher rank has not smelt the cordite of battle and of death or seen the blood or the wounds of their soldiers they have an urgent need to prove their manhood, sometimes to the detriment of the interests of their nation. Miscalculation between personal ambition and the national interest may be true on both sides of the border. Presently it makes no sense for the Army to remain in WAPDA or for the COAS to give pep talks to the KESC. It is time to get them back to where they are needed most, the Army’s primary mission. Initiating the process of war, one has to gear up for war and meet the full consequences thereof. If a war is forced on the nation, it will certainly fight the war, but we must be prepared for it psychologically as well as physically. Since perception is nine-tenths of the law of realities, the military high command needs to be focussed only on one reality, the trumpet has sounded to fight for the survival of Pakistan. And if they have not prepared for such an eventuality then heads must roll and we should get in more mature heads that do not simply tap-dance to the sound of distant drums but will take into mature consequence those basic fundamentals that keep a nation dynamic and free in supersession to personal ambitions and/or motivations.
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