Econergising the khakis
In the brink of entering the 21st century, Pakistan has to take concrete steps to galvanize its Armed Forces out of its 19th century syndrome and put into effect a realistic economics of scale that will permit pragmatic modernisation without bankrupting an already frail economy. When Jahangir Karamat took over as COAS and then Acting Chairman JCSC there was real hope that this brilliant professional soldier, one of the finest professionals ever produced by the Pakistan Army, would effect meaningful reform. The politico-economic environment prevalent in the country coupled with his personal hesitation in effecting meaningful change buried that pious hope. A man may have the vision and may have the intent, he also has to have the courage to take decisions that upsets the routine. Without dynamic initiatives, routine takes over the individual and bad keeps on becoming worse. Macro-decisions are required in place of micro-ones, since it is General Pervez Musharraf’s Karma to take the Armed Forces into the 21st Century, the hard decisions are his to make. One believes he has the stomach to take such heat.
For God’s sake let us rid this Army of batmen. Nowhere was this concept prevalent except in the British Asian sub-continent, it has persisted since independence. The salary of a male servant ranges between Rs 2500 to Rs 3500 p.m. along with meals at this time. Give the officer a sliding scale from Rs 2500 p.m. in three to four slabs upto Rs 4000 p.m. By taking away batmen from officers and JCOs, the Army will save upto 50,000-60,000 soldiers, that amounts to more than three infantry divisions with its full complement of supporting arms and services. Since a soldier costs upto Rs 15000 p.m. for upkeep including salary, ration, pensions, etc, one third of such cost could be saved.
We are not a colonial Army anymore, the day of the Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) has been over for 50 years. For some odd reason we persist with this though everyone in the Army knows that this class is not required in an army where a direct contact is necessary between officer and men, unlike an imperial army where a Viceroy Commissioned Officer (VCO) as a buffer was a necessity. This is not meant to take away the good work done by JCOs over the years. To avoid heart-burning, it is proposed that all Naib-Subedars be made Second Lieutenants and Subedars Lieutenants, with Subedar Major becoming Captains. The service length should be confirmed to thirty years and those crossing that limit retired. In future good NCOs (and even privates) found fit to become officers should be sent to a special training company in the Pakistan Military Academy for a year to learn such subjects as language and etiquette that they would require to become officers and gentlemen. After all quite a few short commissioned officers (six months in PMA post-1965 are now reaching 3 star rank). The JCO class is a huge financial drain on the Army for no cost-effective reason whatsoever except the continuation of status quo. Just take off the ribbon on the JCO’s shoulder flaps and bring the Armed Forces into the 21st Century, away from 19th Century moorings.
The Armed Forces must target the Services next and make them cost-effective. These include medical and engineering services. Modern hospitals are housed in one building, ours are spread over acres in many buildings. This is expensive and inefficient. Moreover, very few doctors treat patients as their right, on the contrary it is almost a “favour” given to “destitutes”. It is true that we have a core of dedicated medical professionals but these are few and far between. On the pattern of the Armed Forces Institute of Cardiology (AFIC), hospitals must be under one roof. Free treatment must only be available to soldiers upto the most of Senior NCOs, beyond that there must be a shared cost tag to medical treatment i.e. 25% must be borne by the serving and free for retired personnel patients so that there is some control over expensive medicine. A policy must be devised that ensures maximum patients are looked after at the unit level and specialist service has a price. The other major problem is the Housing and related Military Engineering Services (MES). This breeds in-built corruption which drains maximum expenditure for the minimum quality of services. Units and fixed establishment could be directly allocated funds for maintenance and up-keep while married officers can be allocated a fixed sum on an annual basis for their houses rather than relying on MES for painting, plumbing, electrical services, etc. This will be both cost effective and economical. Similarly EME and Ordnance need to be drastically reformed. At the moment the different types of vehicles exceeds our wildest imagination, it is a disgrace. Other than rapid standardisation, the allocation of front line vehicles needs to be rationalised. Peace-time units and fixed urban establishments do not need four-wheel drives, fighting units do. And yet, all the non-combatants have first right on spanking new vehicles. There has to be a thorough re-allocation of priorities. On the pattern of Army Housing Scheme, a “vehicle scheme” should be started so that officers upto the rank of Captain get two-wheelers, Majors and Lt Cols cars upto 800 cc, Col and Brigadiers 1000 cc, while rank senior to that should have over 1300 cc on this scheme. Staff car drivers should be allocated only to one-star rank and above.
Nobody has really looked at the number of warehouses containing derelict equipment. One is right outside the country’s capital, Vehicle Supply Department (VSD), Golra. These must be got rid of, they are a drain on our scarce resources. We have a virtual army of men employed under the Head “Civilians Paid out of Defence Estimates.” The number of men in DSG (Defence Services Guards, responsible for guarding fixed Establishments) is a national disgrace. The bureaucratic answer is we pay only Rs 2000-2500 p.m. to these men, in all they cost the Government of Pakistan Rs 10000-12000 when you add up all their allowances, rights and prerequisites. It would be far cheaper to have private security companies do the same task on a cost-effective basis.
We need to close down unnecessary institutions. Necessary ones like the Command and General Staff at Quetta and the National Defence College at Islamabad are understandable. For the size of the Air Force and the Navy, the Air Force War College and the Naval War College makes no sense at all, it is an expense in self-delusion. We should send outstanding officers to USA, China and UK, etc it will be far cheaper and they will get exposed to much more modern concepts and techniques. Similarly the Army has to rationalise its institution, why not amalgamate the institutions like the Armoured Corps Centre and the Armour School, the Artillery Centre and the Artillery School and so on?
Above all we need to centralise our existing cantonments to our operational role. While troops quartering in both the cities of Sialkot and Lahore are necessary because of the proximity of the border, the bulk can be shifted closer to their operational areas. The land vacated is quite expensive may be sold for enough price to pay for land and housing for the new cantonments. At the moment troops and civilians are inexorably mixed and at the same time the housing is, in some cases, more than 150 years old. The amount of money that is used for maintenance purposes presently is enough to build new housing, badly needed for our rank and file. At the moment things are very much haphazard.
The Tables of Organisation and Equipment (Ts of O&E) needs to be rationalised for the needs of the 21st Century. Obviously this can hardly be discussed in the print media but those are different roles assigned for holding infantry divisions in defence the mountains and the plains of Punjab from that of the formations meant for offensive requirements in the mountains and the plains. At the moment our TO&Es are standard for all areas with changes only in some. As the Siachen experience has shown we have to be adaptable and innovative, without being cost-effective and without losing efficiency.
There are many areas of cost-cutting one can address without undermining the potency of our Armed Forces. What it needs is some training for our officers in better economic management and responsibility for budget planning and implementation thereof. We must economically energise the Defence Services if we are to maintain a credible fighting force in the 21st Century.
Did you enjoy this post? Why not leave a comment below and continue the conversation, or subscribe to my feed and get articles like this delivered automatically to your feed reader.
Comments
No comments yet.
Leave a comment