Chairman JCSC
When Gen Jehangir Karamat assumed the charge of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in January 1996 he was easily the most professional soldier in Pakistan’s history who made it to that post, suitably both on merit and seniority. Assuming additionally the post of retiring Chairman JCSC on Nov. 08, 1997, the COAS follows in the illustrious footsteps of three fine professional soldiers, Generals Sharif, Iqbal Khan and Shamim Alam. Despite being upright and deserving, even these three could not establish the writ of their superior rank because of circumstances beyond their control, the reasons differing in all three cases. Some good officers from the other Services did make it to Chairman JCSC, they did not have the requisite knowledge and experience besides professional competence to command predominantly ground forces in the military machine and/or to dominate their nominal subordinate, the COAS.
To be or not to be, that is the question the new Chairman JCSC must answer on behalf of his new appointment in the next few months. Jehangir Karamat has an excellent opportunity to take the Pakistan Armed Forces into the 21st Century as a modern, responsive and efficient fighting machine. As Chairman JCSC and concurrently COAS, he can (and must) reform, reorganize and re-structure the entire Armed Forces along lines suited to modern warfare. He has to break the mindset of the 19th Century that keeps us mired in tactical and strategic concepts of an unreal world. If our military manpower did not inherently have a high percentage of dedicated professionals, we would be a pushover for any adventurer, let alone our traditional enemy.
Certainly there is a need for an integrated higher command as justified by General Sharif in his important paper in 1975 that led to the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC). Both in 1965 and 1971, there was a criminal lack of coordination between the three Services, whenever there was inter-action the results were spectacular. A very thoroughly professional person Gen Sharif’s priority was far different from the aims of the then late PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who wanted to create a buffer between himself and the Army, whose pre-eminence in national politics he felt he had reduced psychologically by changing the nomenclature of its Chief from Commander in Chief (C-in-C) to Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in 1971. This manipulation did not work in practice. General Sharif was appointed the first Chairman JCSC in 1976, in July 1977 his nominal subordinate late General Ziaul Haq, then COAS, did a successful coup de etat against the PM, becoming Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). In a mind-boggling subsequent development Ziaul Haq became President and was Sharif’s boss but Sharif remained Chairman JCSC and was Ziaul Haq’s boss, at least on paper. In the mass perception the JCSC became a redundant HQ, an unnecessary white elephant, soon after its inception. By his inaction and ineptitude, the last Chairman JCSC made that perception of redundancy come true.
Any long-term strategy for our defence needs must take in relevant existing factors: (1) the geographical layout and terrain (2) the enemy’s intentions and capabilities, (3) our own existing defence preparedness and available resources, and (4) likely help available from our allies and other friendly countries. Experience has shown that instead of going in for some complicated strategy we must stay with the KISS formula, i.e. “Keep it Simple, Stupid!” For defence purposes, Pakistan can be divided into five areas, geographically from North to South, viz (1) Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, (2) Punjab plains, (3) Northern Desert, (4) Southern Desert and (5) the Coast. The crucial aerial dimension must be treated as a separate front. Any war will thus take place over six fronts. For this we have to create six Commands, each looking after a separate front. In accomplishing the mission, two more Commands, viz (1) a Strategic Reserve, spread in depth over Quetta and Peshawar, consisting of at least three armoured and three motorised divisions in a sort of a “Rapid Deployment Force”, and (2) a Logistics Command based at Quetta, responsible for overall supply over mainly land routes during times of war. The geographical layout of the country, a study of India’s war capabilities and previous experience points to the following possible Indian moves, viz (1) blockading of Karachi and Pakistan’s coastline, (2) invasion of Sindh, (3) attempt to sever Pakistan in the narrowest section from Rahimyar Khan to Daharki, (4) the usual attempt to capture Lahore and/or Sialkot, (5) inroads in Azad Kashmir sectors from Siachen down to Bhimber, and (6) carrying out heliborne attacks to capture nodal points to await link-up with a ground attack or in conjunction of an air strike against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. Though it is possible, it is quite unlikely that India can bring maximum forces to bear on any one sector because of logistical limitations in concentrating forces either in the open desert or the Punjab plains. Concentrated force can be exerted in a combination, e.g. (1) invasion of Sindh and (2) a blockade of Karachi and Pakistan’s coastline.
In the field of maritime warfare, there is only one possible mission for our Navy, viz, to ensure logistics continuity. Any hope to keep Karachi port open for any operations except military would not only be futile but fanciful. However, despite its blue-water capability, Indian Navy cannot come less than 200 miles away from our coastline, the Exocet ensures that. Instead of keeping open a sea-lane to Karachi, the Navy should aim to keep the area along the coastline from Aden to the mouth of the Persian Gulf open for merchant shipping. This can be done by a combination of smaller surface ships, submarines, missile boats and land-based aircraft, forcing the Indian Navy to come close to the coastline and thus become vulnerable. We should obtain missile boats in dozens in contrast to the few that we presently have.
The primary aim of the PAF must be to gain air superiority over the battlefield, the secondary aims must include destruction of the enemy’s vital military installations and giving Close Air Support (CAS) to our land and the sea forces. Economic targets are important but are a distant third unless vital to the enemy’s immediate war effort. Proliferation of enemy numbers and quality enhancement of enemy fighter aircraft dictates that unless we induct in a minimum of 100 aircraft of the Mirage-2000s/SU-30 MK type and soon, we will face a major crisis in time of war, being hard to put to stabilize our air posture over the battlefield despite our obvious quality edge in manpower. A major logistics organisation must organize receipt of all types of cargo at Quetta from the designated seaports (including Turkish ports), mobilising own and hired transport (previously contracted for) to bring these supplies to Quetta via Iran (Zahidan) and Afghanistan (Chaman), break bulk at Quetta according to the need and dispatch as per the requirement to each front. Reciprocally, we can keep our exports going so as to earn vitally needed foreign exchange.
Mobility must be focussed around concentrated armour formations. The tank regiment should be taken away from the Infantry Divisions and organized into at least three to four Armoured Divisions from the existing inventory. The anti-tank capability of the Divisional Recce and Support Battalion as well as that integral to each of the nine infantry battalions must be upgraded in lieu. Troops must be designated to each sector as required, e.g., Azad Kashmir (AK) should have more Divisional Headquarters for effective command and control. Similarly infantry battalions across the Army (except in fixed defences such as AK) must be made smaller, three rifle companies instead of four for the same. Each of the four Land commands should be able to fight independent battles with committed air support provided from airbases integral to it. A Command may have one or three Corps, composition has to be according to the terrain and enemy dispositions. Similarly the Tables of Organization and Equipment (Ts of O & E) should vary according to the requirement of the particular COMMAND. The Army’s Strategic Reserve should have at least three armoured and three motorized divisions.
Standardization of arms and equipment is very necessary through the three Services, while duplication of administrative effort must be avoided. That should be the major peacetime role for a Special Task Force in the JCSC. As regards the overall commanders. The Chairman, outstanding Air Force and Naval service officers will be brilliant enough to command such a force, but that will only be very occasionally. Can we afford to take that chance? The Chairman JCSC must necessarily be someone from the Army, it is very much in keeping with reality. The air battle and the war at sea are important but not as important as the vital battle on land. In the presence of CHQ, do we need a large JCSC HQ and a separate Chairman? I do not think so. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) should concurrently act as the Chairman of the JCS Committee, with a small tactical HQ with senior officers from the three Services as an inherent part of GHQ, not as an attachment. The COAS could perhaps have a Vice COAS to help him absorb the routine load of work but he should be in clear Command of the Committee.
Much can be accomplished at little cost by imaginative but pragmatic reorganization of our Armed Forces. The essence of leadership is to have the courage to enact change, the ability to be a non-conformist in the face of routine, particularly when the stakes are high. The present Chiefs of the Navy and the Air Force are excellent professionals, so the new Chairman has the necessary human tools. Will he also have the courage to break the traditional mould and use it for the good of the Armed Forces and the country?
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