The sixth of September
The bloody nose that the Indians got in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 punched a time clock setting off a series of explosions culminating in the major detonation on September 6. Planners on both sides became engaged in virtual reality exercises that eventually led to an all out bloody conflict. Strong evidence suggests that, humbled badly in the Rann and already smarting at its 1962 drubbing at the hands of China, the Indian Army had planned a set-piece major offensive to destroy Pakistan soon after the rainy weather in July/August. The Indians were fully prepared to expect “infiltration” into Kashmir after mid-August, though not in such numbers or scale. The early launching of “Operation Gibraltar” on 6 Aug 65, the elongation of the mopping-up of operations in Indian Occupied Kashmir and heavy rains in the Punjab in mid-August delayed their offensive from being launched as had been meticulously planned by them for the last week of August. From the Pakistani side, the then Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmad and the then GOC 12 Div, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the Pindi Club Group (so named because they would meet informally over drinks almost every other evening) were the “young Turks” who combined to convince President Field Marshal Ayub Khan on three crucial counts, the first two being viz (1) large scale “infiltration” into Indian Occupied Kashmir would provoke an uprising that would free Kashmir (WRONG) and (2) the Indians would not launch an offensive across the international border (WRONG). While the C-in-C and his Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) disagreed with this Assessment, the Foreign Office further convinced the President on the third and most vital point (3) if the Indians did cross the international border, the Chinese would militarily support Pakistan (also WRONG). Thus did “Operation Gibraltar” come into being, theoretically brilliant in conception but long on hope and for almost everything else, including the key question of operational management. A well conceived GHQ plan was dusted off and updated as Operation “Grand Slam”, the offensive to take Akhnur (and more vitally Akhnur Bridge) was envisaged, to slam the door to Kashmir shut in the faces of the Indian forces which would be tied down fighting the freedom fighters within the Kashmir valley.
“Gibraltar” was criminally faulty in implementation. Enough time was not given to prepare the Kashmiris within Occupied territory physically and mentally. Except for the nucleus of a few trained personnel, every one of the six Task Forces was without adequate military training and/or experience. One is also very curious as to how the Army Commander, Indian Western Command, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, should have independently come to the conclusion, as far back as June 1965 that Pakistan would send “infiltrators” into Kashmir (maybe an angel told him!). That any commander, particularly one given his personality profile, would act independently of hard intelligence (as he asserts) is almost unbelievable. The Indian COAS held a conference with the Occupied Kashmir Government at Srinagar on 01 August about deployment of para-military forces on the Cease-Fireline (CFL) so as to free regular troops for “mopping up” operations. Within 48 hours i.e on 03 Aug 65, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh had sent detailed instructions to the Indian troops in Occupied Kashmir to be prepared to eliminate possible infiltrators”. Thus 72 hours before the start of Operation Gibraltar, the Indians at the highest level somehow knew about possible infiltration but were not alarmed by it as they anticipated it much later than Aug 6, 1965 and probably on a much smaller scale. “Come into my trap, said the Spider to the Fly”! Something smells here, almost as if Pakistan was willingly led by the nose into an elaborately planned trap, a “casus belli” that would justify a subsequent Indian attack across the international border to finish Pakistan once and for all.
The “fog of war” covers a lot of secrets, we have failed to acknowledge the brave young men of the “light brigade”, who despite their limitations, performed above and beyond the call of duty. Many of them died lonely deaths and lie in unmarked graves, unsung and forgotten, all over Kashmir. Betrayed even before they crossed into Kashmir, without adequate logistics, virtually as cannon fodder, they pressed home attacks over such a wide front in so courageous a manner that they tied down the Indians far beyond the expectations of the Indian commanders and definitely disrupted their plan of invading Pakistan at the time of their choosing, if not a place of their choosing as promised by the Indian PM Lal Bahadur Shastri after the Rann of Kutch. To contain the “infiltration routes” into the valley the Indians attacked and captured the crucial Hajipir Pass on 27/28 August, why did 12 Div not foresee or cater for this eventuality? In the hoopla about Chamb nobody seems to remember this major setback. With the supply routes to the freedom fighters within Kashmir partially blocked, PAF Chief Air Marshal Nur Khan, who came to know about “Gibraltar” by accident rather than design, personally flew supply sorties in C-130s. With the launching of “Grand Slam”, the “casus belli” that the Indians needed for world opinion, the involvement of regular Pakistani troops was now a fact of life. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh was now close to launching his long delayed offensive in the Punjab. However September 1, 1965, the start date of “Grand Slam”, put his plans again off balance as his troops battled to contain the Pakistani offensive. GHQ Rawalpindi had belatedly come to the conclusion that GOC 12 Div was over-extended from Kargil to Chamb (the loss of Hajipir Pass was a major disaster). Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik was now wearing 3 hats, viz (1) Command and control of “Operation Gibraltar” i.e Coordinating guerilla operations inside Occupied Kashmir (2) as GOC 12 Div looking after the whole of Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas and (3) command and control of “Operation Grand Slam”. His base was in Murree, his Tac HQ near Kharian and because of antiquated communications he was himself incommunicado till he started using the command net of HQ Artillery 1 Corps. Something had to give in this mind-boggling command structure and we started losing ground all along the CFL, the loss of Hajipir Pass was a major blow. In his book “Back to the Pavilion,” Lt Gen Attiqur Rahman, who took over from Malik as GOC 12 Div soon after the war, recounts that when he requested Malik who as Director General Military Training, was doing a critique of the war, as to how many “war tasks” 12 Div had completed under his command, the answer was very little. Off course, it is ridiculous to suggest that since Malik was a Qadiani, he was part of a bigger Qadiani conspiracy to damage the Kashmir cause irretrievably. However one is not so sure about Bhutto, given his long term plan to cut the Pakistan army down to size, accomplish in 1971. Since majority of troops in action belonged to 7 Div, the GOC 7 Div, Maj Gen Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, took over. To cover obvious flaws and weaknesses in 12 Div’s over-extended commitments (Stephen Leacock’s hero, jumping on his horse and galloping off in all directions), the “changeover” at midday on 2 Sept has deliberately and very cleverly been made into a controversy, contrary to (and to conceal) the actual facts. Late at night in the evening of 3 Sept the Indian COAS gave the “go ahead” for the invasion of Pakistan. In view of the critical situation developing for the Indians in the vicinity of Akhnur Bridge, the plan to invade Pakistan was brought up by 24 hours from 7 Sept 65 to 6 Sept 65, the result was that instead of a coordinated and simultaneous attack on Lahore and Sialkot, the attack on the Shakargarh salient was delayed by a crucial 24 hours because of the logistical delay in moving the Indian 1st Armoured Division into its concentration area near Samba.
GHQ had been lulled by the glib-talking, persuasive Foreign Office duo, Minister and Secretary that Indian Forces would not cross the international border and when GOC 10 Div, Maj Gen Sarfraz, asked C-in-C Gen Musa on 3 Sept to move forward into battle locations he was prevented from doing so as “it would provoke the Indians.” It was only the insistence of one of his Brigade Commander, Brig (later Lt Gen) Aftab Ahmad, that he relented late on 5 Sept and allowed limited move forward the same night i.e on 5 Sept. When the Indian attack came the next morning, it achieved complete tactical surprise, however there were enough Pakistani troops streaming into the Forward Defended Localities (FDLs) to surprise the Indians in their turn. Cocksure about achieving complete surprise and total success, Gen Chaudhri invited his officers to partake “a chota peg” with him in the Lahore Gymkhana the same evening (6 Sept 65). Obviously the Indians had been assured that Pakistan would be caught completely off guard and they did not expect any resistance. In some cases their move forward was almost a “flag march” until they were given a rude shock by being fired upon.
Under-prepared and almost overwhelmed by sheer weight of men and material, all along the front troops of 10 Div fought back with great spirit and tenacity. Despite relentless attacks the actual line held. By 1000 hrs the PAF was in action assisting the ground troops and severely damaging the Indian offensive potential by effectively destroying tanks, vehicles, communication centres, etc. Our artillery was no less devastating, committing havoc on enemy troop concentrations. By the evening of 6 Sept it was clear that while the Indians still had plenty in hand the will to fight had gone out of them and they were in virtual disarray. One of the GOCs of the attacking troops, Maj Gen Narajan Prasad was removed from command on 8 Sep. By the evening of 6 Sept PAF had raided the forward Indian Air Force (IAF) airfields at Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Ambala, etc and inflicted such heavy damage that the IAF could not give any further effective support to the Indian ground forces. By the evening of 7 Sept 65, the PAF was exercising almost total control of the air over the battlefield, but that is another long story.
The Indians claim that having eliminated the “freedom fighters” in Kashmir in 1965 and forcing Pakistan to stop the offensive in Chamb/Jaurian they actually won the war. That is patently untrue. The Indian plan to invade Pakistan, once we were involved in Kashmir, was a cynical, ruthless strategy designed to cut off and destroy Pakistan while warding off censure from world public opinion or intercession by our so-called allies. It was a “honey trap” that we blundered into but almost pulled it off. Throwing the fighters into Kashmir was not a calculated risk, it was a gamble that backfired because of reasons other than planning, however it did upset the Indian war aims and timing. The Mujahideen were pawns in a bigger game and simply thrown in at the deep end of the cauldron as bait but their courage and tenacity upset the conspirators’ well-laid plans. A fair number died in Indian jails, some may even now be in captivity. Whatever it was, their sacrifice set the Kashmir cause back by almost two decades.
Despite relative smaller numbers, the Pakistan Armed Forces fought back tenaciously. In cold military terms 6 Sept can be said to be a stalemate, that we did not allow the Indian to accomplish their well-laid war aims counts as an outright win for Pakistan. The Indian juggernaut was taken on by our Armed Forces on 6 Sept and fought to a standstill, that is victory by any name!
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