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Efficiency-sizing the Armed Forces-IV

(This is the FOURTH in a series of articles on the DEFENCE BUDGET)

One of the major misdirections in our strategic evaluation has been the failure to properly define the Navy’s mission. The primary aim of the Navy must be to defend Pakistan’s coastline and the secondary aim would normally be to keep the sea lanes open. Given that India has a blue-water Navy with an overwhelming superiority in numbers and its vast coastline gives it physical land domination of the Indian Ocean with its inherent advantages of sea domination, we must re-define our secondary aim to reflect ground (sea?) reality and change it to that of denying India the free use of its sea lanes. Defending its sea lanes forces the Indian Navy to divert resources away from its primary aim which must be to blockade the Pakistani coastline, with Karachi as the major focus of its operations.

What are the resources we need to defend our coastline with particular emphasis on denying the enemy from blockading Karachi Port? This simple question must have a clear-cut military answer, not one steeped in tradition or emotion. We should be realistic and not aim to use Karachi Port for continuous operations of ocean-going vessels during wartime. With the Indian Navy in large numbers in the Indian Ocean but at a stand-off distance out of range of interdiction by Pakistani land-based aircraft, they can almost choke off commercial shipping from Karachi Port by throwing a “blockade screen” from the coast of Oman to the Indian coast. The only ships plying to Pakistani ports will be to and from Gulf Ports. To try and break this screen is possible but at unacceptable cost to men and material so the objective of keeping our sea lanes open as an exercise is only good in theory and that only partially. In actual practice we should cater for coastal vessels, utilizing “Roll-on Roll-off” ships, carrying vital cargo to and from Iranian, UAE and other friendly ports in the region. With Karachi, Pasni, Ormara, Gwadar, etc as the ports of call. As such what we really need is protection from Karachi in the East to Gwadar (and the mouth of the Gulf) in the West to a distance outwards of at least 200-300 nautical miles (nm) from the coast. This should be an enemy-free zone, both for interdiction from the air and the sea. Instead of putting all our logistics eggs in one Karachi basket we should have a number of transient points, making it more difficult for the Indian air and navy to interdict without taking heavy casualties in men and material. In sum it is imperative to re-locate the concentration of our wartime logistics away from Karachi. This will also ease congestion on the South-North highways and the only rail-link, both susceptible to disruption by enemy air action.

To accomplish our primary aim of defending the Pakistan coastline, what are the weapon platforms and equipment that we need? Land-based aircraft armed with Exocet/Harpoon-type missiles which will keep the Indian Navy at a safe distance away from the shores will be the primary requirement followed by a combination of fast missile-boats, torpedo-boats, minelayers and submarines. The arc of operations for these aircraft will have to ensure protection of the Gulf entrance so as to provide air cover to our coastal vessels. Full-fledged airfields must be made operational in the vicinity of the ports of Gwadar, Pasni or Ormara. To guard against sneak Indian incursions, a marine force is a requirement. We also need adequate anti-aircraft defences, particularly around vital installations. We cannot hope to completely accomplish our secondary aim of denying the Indians free use of the seaports and lanes, without submarines, their cost being equated against whether the secondary aim is critical to our war effort. Large surface vessels in this context will only be a vulnerable impediment instead of being an asset. During the 1971 war our Navy was mostly holed up in port being defended by the PAF, the PAF has better things to do. We must accept that the Indians have too many ports out of the operational range of our aircraft and naval vessels to interdict effectively. While the threat must always be there in order to force the Indians to apply extreme caution, we cannot try to attempt what is an impossible task, particularly by the use of surface ships. Given its vast depth and resource availability, the Indians will always have a distinct edge over us in the field of logistics, why should we try to match them on this count ? What is a critical requirement is to ensure that our own logistics is not disrupted by enemy interdiction. Constant movement of the quantum of cargo is necessary to keep both our economy and war machine going. The most famous and longest blockade imposed was that of the Confederacy South by the Unionist North in the American Civil War 1861-1865. During this time, many enterprising merchantmen made their fortunes slipping in vital supplies to the Southern ports through the Northern blockade (the romantic fiction stuff of Rhett Butler in “Gone with the Wind”). This was rather a flamboyant lot, no better than pirates, known politely as “blockade runners”, in fact they were glorified smugglers. A fair amount of smuggling goes on through our coastal areas from the Gulf. Despite attempts at interdiction by the Pakistan Navy, the PAF, Pakistan Coast Guards, Maritime Security Agency, Customs and Excise Staff, etc, our enterprising smugglers are most effective, almost second-to-none in the world. Their enterprise is quite visible in flourishing “Bara Bazaars” in the major urban areas of the country, on the way out the smuggling of our foodstuffs virtually feeds neighbouring countries. A considerable amount of Iranian POL is smuggled through the land route in Balochistan Province. Let us make this weakness in peacetime into a strength during war. This “expertise” can be put to good use during times of crisis and also emulated by our logistics people. Our public sector may not be as efficient as the “private” sector in the discipline of smuggling but given that the nation’s existence will be at stake, such an incentive is good enough to make patriots out of smugglers and smugglers out of patriots. Didn’t the Americans use the Sicilian Mafia successfully against the Germans in World War II? Inland from the ports, the same corollary that exists in land transportation to presently serve the smugglers well (the Double Cabinet Hi-Lux-type Pick-ups), can also serve to provide us with adequate surface transportation logistics during wartime.

The Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) must be fully in charge of the Pakistan coastline, this would include all the formations needed for its defence including air and land forces. This must be a clear statement of fact. Once the overall strategy is in place the Naval Chief needs to have his wartime HQ in Karachi or Ormara, etc in the vicinity of his battlefield rather than in Islamabad. The Maritime Security Agency (MSA) and the Pakistan Coast Guard should be merged into one unit, it can be called by some other nomenclature, with the land-based units rotated from the Army as has been conceptually suggested in an earlier article for Frontier Corps and Rangers. The aircraft designated for coastal defences must be available only to the PAF for employment elsewhere when not required for its primary aim of defending Pakistan’s coastline. Except for submarines, minesweepers, minelayers, fast missile boats and torpedo boats, all other naval vessels must be de-mobilized, they are best used only for fleet reviews and are a severe drain on the Defence Budget and the economy. The money thus saved can be used on a large number of fast missile boats, coastal-plying “Roll-on Roll-off” vessels as well as electronic, radar equipment and surface-to-air missiles of various kind. Karachi’s air defence units must directly be under the command of the Naval Chief.

No logic in the world can justify large surface naval vessels like cruisers, destroyers, frigates, etc in our military strategy or order of battle (ORBAT), given the existing naval realities these are frivolous toys of no military significance or consequence to any possible war effort. The deep-water French submarines which are useful mostly in the secondary aim, are in comparison of critical requirements a luxury that this country can ill afford given the critical state of the PAF as opposed to its Indian counterpart. The overall threat perception has further deteriorated because of the induction of force-multiplier Prithvi missiles and SU-30 MKs in the Indian offensive armoury. Let the band keep on playing, the economic tune must be to a different, more practical beat. Let us be realistic in our assessments and gear for a future war in a pragmatic fashion, breaking out of the mind-set of the ceremonial regalia that has afflicted our leaders with narrow vision as well as a ridiculous aspiration for self-glorification. The need of the hour is to cope with practical reality and economy of effort in keeping with the availability of resources. For the sake of this country the Navy must mobilize for war in pragmatic fashion, bringing in structural reforms through the whole service. Once upon a time Naval cadets used to spend their first six months in the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA). Some of the finest naval cadets were in the class of 1964, at least 3 or 4 have now reached the ruling naval hierarchy by dint of sheer professionalism. If PMA teaches you anything above all, it is to be pragmatic and innovative, they must apply this experience 33 years later to good effect for the Navy and the country.

Our senior naval planners have a vital job to do, let them choose the right tools and not remain a ceremonial anachronism of very little use to the country or for that matter their own self-respect as sailors of what can be an excellent and effective fighting machine.

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