• Home
• Video
• Books by Ikram Sehgal
• About

Council for Defence and National Security – Formalizing unofficial watchdog mechanism

For the past 50 years we have been engaged in the search for a system that will make this country governable. That the forces inimical to our survival as a country label us as a “failed state” only adds salt to our wounds, more so because this motivated piece of disinformation is meant to give truth to that lie. Despite all our vicissitudes we are manpower-rich and resource-rich, Pakistan remains very much a dynamic, potentially prosperous country, with resilience enough to survive the likes of the Zardari duo who mercilessly looted this country and are directly responsible for the financial emergency that we are passing through. That the loot was engineered in the name of democracy under the cover of the Constitution only underscores the necessity of a definitive check and balance in the system. Trying to put in place such a mechanism has been an inexact science based on such selfish motives that any sincere effort to make positive corrections in the system release fears and raises doubts about the motives.

The Parliamentary system envisaged by our founding fathers was soon taken over lock, stock and barrel by the British-trained organised civilian corps of bureaucrats, first Ghulam Mohammad and then Iskander Mirza ruling the roost through manipulating of politicians behind the facade of democratic rule. In recognition (or rather as a sop to) the other “organised force” in the country, the serving Commander-in-Chief was taken in as Defence Minister in a “democratic” government. By 1958 democracy had become a bad joke, the mess providing a window of opportunity for the “other” organised force to impose the first martial law. The Presidential system that followed was simply a civilianized extension of the Martial Law regime and was in turn replaced by another Martial Law in 1969. The break-up of the country in 1971 saw an extension of the Martial Law till an interim Constitution led to the 1973 Constitution, a complete document that was emasculated by its own author by significant amendments except that this time the military became an equal partner. Instead of resorting to Martial Law, Article 58(2)B was available to the incumbent President to take out elected governments. An informal “Troika” came into existence comprising the President, PM and the COAS. It was generally thought that the COAS was more equal than the others but this depended not only on his personality and circumstances but also the combination thereof at any given point of time. Whether the application of Article 58(2)B was right or wrong depended upon the judgment of the solitary person of the President. In essence like Article 58(2)B was envisaged to stave off Martial Law, we badly needed another mechanism to ward off misuse of Article 58(2)B.

Systems and rules are respectively as good or bad as the people who run and implement them. Unfortunate experience has shown that the elite involved with governance in Pakistan over the years have been primarily motivated by personal ambition, greed and the hunger for power rather than the supreme interests of the country. No inherent check and balance in the system controls the pendulum from swinging to extremes. A monitoring mechanism in the form of collective decision-making was needed that would keep the ruling elite within the parameters that could have prevented the Zardaris from not only taking the country to the cleaners but continuing to thumb their noses with impunity at the failure of the system to hold them accountable. A system for accountability has been long overdue, an instrument at the highest level formalising the informal role of the President and the Armed Forces Chiefs in not only decision-making about important issues facing the country but also dissuading the elected government from riding roughshod or circumventing the very Constitution it drew its authority from. Late President Ziaul Haq envisaged this as a National Security Council (NSC) but his aim in trying to form such a Council were hardly altruistic and he fell back on the bludgeon of Article 58(2)B, used to good effect by his civilian successors, both rightly and wrongly. In 1981 the then Bangladesh Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen H.M. Ershad had proposed such an NSC mechanism in Bangladesh to President Sattar, assassinated President Gen Ziaur Rahman’s successor, but to no avail. The ensuing economic and political mess left Ershad with no alternative but to impose Martial Law. There is a school of thought that believes that formation of a super watchdog body like the NSC involves the Armed Forces into the controversy of politics. What use are the Armed Forces if there is no country left to defend? Whereas Martial Law did not remove the last three elected governments, could the President use his powers without the support of the Army? We are deluding ourselves if we do not accept the public perception that conforms to the reality that in a Muslim country the Army will always have a say in the affairs of State, better to institutionalise this process within the parameters of the Constitution. In Pakistan, Article 58(2)B does not act as the buffer it was originally envisaged. Instead of the informal “Troika” comprising only the President, the PM and the COAS, an expanded forum of a 10 members Council would debate and counsel on important national issues. That the proposed forum is being labelled as an “advisory body” is simply unnecessary semantics that should be discarded in favour of presenting the truth as it is. A spade should be called a spade!

The Council for Defence and National Security (CDNS) is a tongue twister that inculcates the original concept of a National Security Council, providing a pragmatic check and balance mechanism whose absence led to the derailment of whichever government was in place. Instead of the “Turkish Model” of having the military have a say in important matters in State affairs or the other extreme of the “Indonesian Golkar Model” or the “Burmese State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)” in which the military becomes the State, we may have finally hit upon the ideal combination to protect us in the future from Zardari-type governance. The economy is so intertwined with national security, it is important for the heads of the Services to be associated at the formulation of policy considerations. Martial Law always envisaged accountability, not governance, invariably the military soon forget that accountability was the raison d’etre for their interference and got bogged down in governance which was neither their mandate nor within their capability. As an advisory body chaired by the President, if the CDNS can successfully monitor the mechanism of accountability, it would have succeeded beyond any measure. Anybody who thinks that accountability can be carried out by the FIA should have his (or her) head examined, the present process has got FIA personnel laughing all the way to the bank. The heart of their integrity having been eroded by politicisation, the result has been unbridled corruption. Except making FIA personnel who have replaced the previous ones (or have survived) much richer, their commitment is a figment of our imagination. The entire FIA staff lock, stock and barrel (the 10% or so innocents included as acceptable casualties should be sent home), inducting in Armed Forces personnel in rotation for short stints in a revamped FIA in the same manner as is done for the Anti-Narcotics Task Force (ANTF). Article 245 of the Constitution should be invoked to hand over the accountability process to the Armed Forces in order to apprehend, investigate, interrogate and prosecute suspects in front of Tribunals specially constituted in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The formation of the CDNS set in motion rumours about the elections being held at all. The formation of CDNS should have better come along with the Caretakers on Nov 5, 1996 or later under the aegis of an elected government but atrocious timing notwithstanding, one has no reason to doubt the credibility of the Presidential initiative. The effectiveness of the CDNS in ensuring meaningful accountability will force-multiply the potential of democratic governance. This is an important milestone in the 50th year of our existence, one that should certainly help in elongating our existence beyond the period being mandated by a bunch of pessimists who have eyes only for a hint of dark clouds and miss out the silver lining.

Did you enjoy this post? Why not leave a comment below and continue the conversation, or subscribe to my feed and get articles like this delivered automatically to your feed reader.