Defence of Pakistan
In the early hours of 6 September 1965, Indian land forces crossed the international border near Lahore, surprising the Pakistan Armed Forces. If it had not been for some forceful Brigade Commanders of 10 Infantry Division (defending the main approaches to Lahore) who had persuaded their Divisional Commander the night before to allow their units to occupy Forward Defended Localities (FDL) by first light on that fateful day, Gen G.N. Chaudhri, the Indian COAS, would well have been the host to his officers to his boastful invitation to “a chota peg in the Lahore Gymkhana” by the evening of that day. It was a day of surprises, the Indians surprised us, we surprised them by being surprised. Three decades later, given the events of the four months starting in May 1965, starting with the Rann of Katch, Operation Gibraltar (infiltration into Kashmir), Operation Grand Slam (cutting off Kashmir from the rest of India) and the fact that PAF had shot down some Indian aircraft over Chamb/Akhnur in the first week of September, why our defence hierarchy was surprised continues to remain a mystery. Our military leadership through the whole rank spectrum in 1965 and in 1971 were trained to fight the battles of World War I and the early battles of World War II. Luckily for us, despite sorry experience at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, the Indian leadership at the junior combat level was atrocious. The higher ratio of casualties officer to soldier attests to the fact that our junior leaders (today’s Divisional and Corps Commanders) were outstanding. Having learnt no lessons in 1965, but basking in self-created glory at the hierarchical level despite their strategic and tactical blunders covered over by the shedding of blood of our youth in the battlefield, we fought ourselves into abject defeat in 1971. In terms of strategy there can be nothing more amusing in history than the belief of our then strategists that the Defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. Instead of clearly stating that available forces were really meant for the defence of crucial areas in the West and could not be risked in the East, we were led down a garden path to this “Ripley’s Believe it Not” strategy. Hopefully, future strategy will not adopt Rip Van Winkle techniques of the past.
During the 70s, Pakistan’s defence services went into high gear as a concerted effort was made to improve the quality of military education of our senior officers through the broad spectrum of all disciplines. The Gulf War has shown that warfare has reached such high-tech levels that we will keep playing catch-up because of our limited resources. India has developed software into a US$5 billion business already, in this field we have definitely fallen behind. Because of the need to keep large standing defence forces we are hard put in the matter of resources to completely overcome the technological edge that is vital for defence needs. Any long-term strategy for our defence needs must take in relevant existing factors (1) the geographical layout and terrain (2) the enemy’s intentions and capabilities (3) our own existing defence preparedness and available resources and (4) likely help available from our allies and other friendly countries. Experience has shown that instead of going in for some complicated strategy we must stay with the KISS formula i.e. “Keep it Simple Stupid!” With regards to the last factor, the last three years have been spent in alienating our traditional allies in such fashion that their help becomes a matter of some doubt, available only as a dubious option.
For defence purposes Pakistan can be divided into five areas, geographically from North to South, viz (1) Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas (2) Punjab plains (3) Northern Desert (4) Southern Desert and (5) the Coast. The crucial aerial dimension must be treated as a separate front. Any war will thus take place over 6 fronts, for this we have to create six commands, each looking after a separate front. In accomplishing the mission, two more Commands, viz (1) a Strategic Reserve, spread in depth over Quetta and Peshawar, consisting of at least 3 armoured and 3 motorised divisions in a sort of a “Rapid Deployment Force” and (2) a Logistics Command based at Quetta, responsible for overall supply over mainly land routes during times of war.
The geographical layout of the country, a study of India’s war capabilities and previous experience points to the following possible Indian moves, viz (1) blockading of Karachi and Pakistan’s coastline (2) invasion of Sindh (3) attempt to sever Pakistan in the narrowest section from Rahimyar Khan to Daharki (4) the usual attempt to capture Lahore and/or Sialkot (5) inroads in Azad Kashmir sectors from Siachen down to Bhimber and (6) carry out heliborne attacks to capture nodal points to await link-up with a ground attack or in conjunction an air strike against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. Though it is possible, it is quite unlikely that India can bring maximum forces to bear on any one sector because of logistical limitations in concentrating forces either in the open desert or the Punjab plains. Concentrated force can be exerted in a combination eg. (1) invasion of Sindh and a (2) blockade of Karachi and Pakistan’s coastline.
It is time to revolutionise some basic concepts. Except for the mountainous Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas and the defences of Lahore along the BRB Camel infantry must be fully mobile. Trenches in the Desert and the Punjab plains have no longevity in the face of determined enemy onslaught, rather they are graves waiting to bury the occupying personnel alive as happened to the Iraqis in the Gulf War. Luckily for us, our liberal car import policy has ensured many thousands of Toyota Hi Luxes, Land Cruisers and Pajeros in the country, enough to equip our Armed Forces many tens of times over. Since it takes about a 100 of these vehicles to equip an infantry battalion, 900-1000 would be enough to make an infantry division motorized. The shortage of Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) notwithstanding soft vehicles can function as “battle taxis”. A peace-time logistics most ensure their presence at the right place at the right time, making it a treasonable offence not to make it available during wartime.
A major mistake has been made by putting in more than US$1 billion in three French submarines, for this we could have bought more than 200 missile torpedo boats, even 50 acting in conjunction with land-based aircraft having air-to-ship Exocet and Harpoon missiles, would give nightmares to any Indian naval designs against our coast. These submarines are supposed to interdict Indian shipping plying to their ports and thus close their logistics route via the sea. To start with, such an operation would need more than a dozen submarines, supported by high-tech electronic counter measures (ECMs) and capable of remaining long periods underwater. Even if we do succeed in stopping the Indian traffic, so what? India has enough supply reserves to outlast as many times over in a war of attrition, this billion dollar investment has neither tactical nor strategic relevance in the immediate battle, it has only “commission” value. Frankly it is money gone down the tube. The Coastal (or Maritime) Command should incorporate naval, air and land forces meant to defend the coast, with a mission to keep our coastline open up to the Gulf for supply by coastal vessels.
Where we are now really hurting is in the air. In keeping with some other rather stupid decisions of the 80s decade, we put all our options for air defence into the F-16 basket and as a result we have been left up the creek without a paddle in trying to obtain an alternative aerial fighting platform. We cannot afford the Mirage-5 2000s at the price on offer, it would economically bankrupt us. We have to look at other options, the best seems to be the SU-27 if we can get a secure supply line, perhaps the ones Chinese will make under licence from Russia. However, the decision to get the Mirage-IIIs upgraded by Sogem was an excellent one by the PAF. Khattak needs to be commended for standing upto the dubious charms of the lady of French extraction sponsored by influential friends. Having given way over the Pay TV issue to the powers that be, it is the least he could do, though one dare says he did leave in the lurch the poor Rear Admiral who made the instalment payment on his orders. Seriously, we cannot afford the Mirage-5 2000s but more than that we cannot afford to lose the race for air superiority.
When we have to face an enemy 5-6 times larger than us in number, weaponry and equipment, when we are faced with threat of Prithvi missiles that can attack any location in Pakistan, when we lack the strategic depth that the enemy has, etc the plans have to be aggressive as well as a combination of realistic and unorthodox tactics. We cannot wait for the enemy to breach our defences, we have to breach physically and psychologically theirs so as to gain strategic and tactical depth. In a sense we must make a hundred flowers bloom, launching small sub-units in deep penetration and destruction missions. These have to be supported on the ground. For that we need mobile forces, to break the crust of enemy’s defences we need to have them armoured. As such the forces in the Punjab Command (the Punjab Plains, north and south of Ravi), Desert Command (Rajasthan Desert opposite Multan-Daharki) and Southern Command (Thar Desert, down to Badin) must be armoured as well as motorised, capable of launching offensives on their own individual fronts deep into enemy territory.
Mobility and ingenuity have been the key to success throughout Muslim history, the infantry bearing the brunt of the enemy assault. Muslim artillery has always been devastatingly accurate in support. During one of the decisive battles of the western world, Muslim cavalry at Yarmuk proved decisive in inflicting defeat on the enemy. The fundamental premise of swift and decisive action must remain paramount in all our planning. Imaginative but pragmatic reorganisation of our Armed Forces is required to make war in the 21st century.
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