Changing of the guard
As the COAS Pakistan Army, Gen Waheed has borne a heavy burden for the past three years. In contrast to the “Coronation” of the past the simple ceremony on Thursday Jan 11, 1996 signifying changeover will be in keeping with the austere professional bent of both the retiring COAS and the appointee. Every time the old guard gives way to a new watch, besides the buck stopping firmly at the desk of the new incumbent there is anticipation and opportunity. In the case of the new COAS, expectations may have been raised beyond possible consummation. A world of opportunities have opened up to shape the Army according to a vision Gen Jahangir Karamat must have nurtured from the day he entered the portals of the Military Academy. There is general anticipation that the new COAS will firmly take up the challenge of opportunities and not become straitjacketed into the routine of day-to-day management.
Into the final stretch of his retirement in early 1992, Gen Waheed was thrust into an awesome responsibility on the untimely death of Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua. Before he could get his own team in place he had to rely on that of the late COAS. Unfortunately for Pakistan, this lot had their own collective particular “agenda”, the problem was that Asif Nawaz’s demise let loose their own individual demons of ambition. The irony of fate is that all of them lost out. This was a very sensitive period politically and the honourable, patriotic Gen Waheed came off worst in the political controversy that he was manipulated into despite his own best intentions. Having been stung by the political fallout for which he was ill-prepared as an upright soldier, he retreated into a professional shell while the politicians who benefited by default proceeded to take good advantage of his studied non-interference. However in concentrating on the Army and Army alone, Gen Waheed in his very dogged way did the one thing that had been missing for over a decade in the Army, merit in supersession to any other consideration became the only qualifier for further advancement. In three successive Annual Selection Boards, those who deserved promotion to higher rank were promoted and influence-peddling/favouritism that had become the touchstone for advancement since 1977 came to a dead-stop. Normally 70% of those to be promoted get their next rank based on their merit, it is the balance 30% where manipulations, personal preferences, etc occur, i.e. those who should be promoted are not and those who are not deserving, are. By insisting on merit for advancement alone, Gen Waheed has gone a long way in changing the officer demography of the Army, setting precedents for the beneficiaries of his policies. The chief beneficiary of the merit factor is the new COAS, Gen Jahangir Karamat. By a process of selection and weeding out, Gen Waheed has left his successor and to the Army a professionally competent hierarchy, leaving aside one or two aberrations, one slated for retirement on April 15, 1996 (just over three months away). Nothing became Gen Waheed more than his insistence on retirement on his given date rather than accept the temptation of extension. In departing with such grace, this straight-forward soldier has set a healthy precedent. Given that new COAS comes to his post on the basis of merit, he owes nothing to anybody except to the Army and the country. One may well ask, why has Gen Jahangir Karamat’s appointment been received with such acclaim within and outside the Army?
His reputation as a clear-cut professional soldier without the baggage of other considerations was certainly a factor, another reason was the relief that at least one of the aspirants did not make it. Thanks to the “generosity” of Gen Aslam Beg and late Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua (in succession) in the controversial promotion of one particular individual against the grain of merit by a process of promotion and demotion in the permutation and combination game of succession, the choice of the new COAS became that between good and evil. Even if one man with a penchant for chicanery slip through the sieve of detailed inspection, there is always a lurking danger for the Army and the country of the type that this country faced in the last few agonizing weeks before the name of the new COAS was made known. Since he would have become a victim of intrigue and conspiracy (as did Air Marshal Shafiq Haider in the PAF and Admiral Khalid Mir in the Navy) if the powers-that-be had succeeded in overcoming Gen Waheed’s indomitable will, Gen Jahangir Karamat would do well to heed the lessons and apply it during his incumbency so that such a situation should never ever arise again.
There is much to do to make the Army a professionally competent fighting machine. While we can certainly hold our own against India, that is not good enough. No defence can ever be successful without an inherent ability to inflict defeat on the enemy, we are also now faced with equipment deficiencies both in numbers and quality as our sources of supply dry up in the post-cold war era. While modernisation will remain a constant process of concern, the main thrust of the new COAS must be in motivation, re-organisation and training. His combat units must not be frittered away in non-combatant tasks, e.g. Horse and Cattle Shows, Jashn Melas , etc. His elevation to COAS will certainly motivate all ranks that job performance will matter more than influence, connections, malleability, etc but he must drive this point home. All professionals who seek to make the Army a superior fighting machine must be motivated that there will be no racial discrimination, political affiliation, nepotism, corruption, etc that such things have no place under a man who has himself successfully bucked the system. Gen Jahangir Karamat is lucky that despite pressure of the norm of the past decade, Gen Waheed not only did not promote some undeserving people, he also went onto retire some chronic cases during his tenure. Some may have been extremely unlucky to be caught up in painful circumstances but then destiny has its own course to follow. For the most part, appointments were filled by those qualified. For his efforts Gen Waheed suffered vicious bad-mouthing by those affected, including a spate of anonymous letters to the media, most of them orchestrated by the moving spirit of the despicable breed with a penchant for turning fiction into fact, the greatest anonymous letter writer in this century, a man without religion or honour. To his credit, the deeply sensitive Gen Waheed suffered this approbation in silence but kept focussed on his aim, to ensure that the Army’s hierarchy had no need for non-professional crutches. Gen Jahangir Karamat’s personality profile of “lone-bird” should stand him in good stead in warding off a flood of newly discovered “friends”, he would be well advised to keep the counsel of those only he must have come to trust in his lone sojourn to the top of the table.
The Army needs to be re-organised drastically for the 21st century, including locating of battle formations out of cities to new cantonments closer to their respective operational areas. Among other reforms, there is desperate need to re-structure infantry units and arming them with a better infantry weapon. For example, a tank regiment and an artillery regiment has three sub-units i.e. squadrons and battalions, with three sub-units each, why do infantry battalions have four rifle companies? Given the vast stretches we have to guard, command and control requirements mean that “three-up” does not make practical sense. Infantry battalions with three rifle companies each would translate into each Brigade having one extra battalion more (or each Infantry Division will have one more Brigade or each Corps will have one more Infantry Division). This would create between 2 or 3 Corps more from the existing manpower (provided of course we do away with those sacred cows called “batmen”). Let’s go one step further, why have an integral tank regiment with an infantry division when they would have better effectiveness as Armoured Brigades of 2 Armoured Regiments with two mechanised infantry battalions with each Corps. This would work out to an Armoured Division with every two Infantry Corps in addition to what we already possess. While one understands the reason for a Tank regiment with every Division, the strategic effectiveness as compared to perhaps four more Armoured Divisions within the same Budget supersedes any tactical requirement. Without going into details or even suggesting that such a “radical” suggestion be adopted, let us just say that only innovative thinking would allow us to get more “bang out of the buck”, remembering that we are a poor nation expected to defend ourselves against a far richer foe with far more manpower and resources. Our Army must be trained to fight a poor man’s war, we must create strategic deterrence from what we have. That change will be the prerogative of this COAS and the next, those who will take this Army into the 21st century.
The new COAS will have to work very hard to get the mindset of the senior officer corps away from retirement and benefits thereof. After April 1996, only one Lieutenant General will remain in the Army as a “nouveau” feudal with over thousands of acres acquired while in service. Materialism and a “wagon circle” mentality has eroded the concept of integrity to the institution first even though it may be at the cost of the reputation of the Army and at variance with the stated lofty ideals that everyone pays lip-service to. Regretfully, one must come to the conclusion that some people who pretend to be men of integrity are hypocrites who do the Army more harm by keeping quiet at the misdemeanours of their colleagues rather than prevent them from engaging in malfeasance. A great silent majority of the Army, overwhelmingly those who silently supported Jahangir Karamat (JK) for COAS, look at the Army as an honourable profession, upholding their honour is now JK’s prerogative. The COAS must curb the penchant of a very few despicable individuals towards chicanery and fraud at the expense of this long-suffering silent majority.
Gen Jahangir Karamat needs to have a vision for his command, a vision that transcends all other consideration except the supreme interest of the Army and the nation. While his predecessor went from one extreme of interfering in the political process and in the wake of the backlash to absolute non-interference, he should opt for a moderate course that makes it abundantly clear that non-interference does not mean a licence for malfeasance at the cost of the integrity of the country. The reputation of a professional soldier should not make him blind to corruption on the scale that the economy of the country is now up for “distress sale”. The new COAS has to take into account that national security is dependant upon a sound economy and a healthy political process that nurtures democracy. Presently democracy has been eroded in all but name. It is all very well to think in terms of western democracy but can we forget that as an Islamic State? History has ordained the Armed Forces are the ultimate guardians of the State and thus part of the governing process. Western democracy has checks and balances that do not allow the political process from being corrupted. Till we reach the sophistication of such modern States, the Army must remain responsible to ensure the continued sovereignty of the nation. Gen Jahangir Karamat’s professional self may not like this role, unfortunately he has very little choice but to Atlas-like take up also the burden of State as a part of his job description.
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