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Combating urban terrorism

Agents of the British SAS (commandos) killed 3 suspected IRA gunmen in the streets of Gibraltar in 1988. The reasons given by the British Government for this “elimination with extreme prejudice” was the apprehension that the trio were about to set off an explosive-laden car, later found to be speculation. Very recently, the International Court of Justice (at the Hague) gave a verdict against the Gibraltar killing (far away from Northern Ireland) as grossly violating human rights, arousing reaction from the British Government and the public in support of the SAS action. Since the British Government happens to be one of the original draftees of the Human Rights Convention (and usually very vocal about human rights in third countries), there is a surprising discrepancy between theory and reality. Therefore Northern Ireland example is a good role model to understand why even holier-than-thou countries, acutely sensitive to human rights, rarely seem to practice at home what they preach to the world at large when society as they perceive it is endangered by terrorism.

No civilized society can afford to stand by and allow urban guerilla warfare to be waged in its streets, the problem arises in the escalating level of response that is considered enough to contain the terrorism. A friend of mine in the LEAs maintains that the only way to counter terror is by terror. The Superpowers followed the same balancing act in a far different canvas in the practice of nuclear detente, “Mutually Assured Destruction” or MAD. In combating urban terrorism, psychological warfare is used to alienate the population from terrorists but this is a double-edged weapon that may well backfire if not accompanied by socio-economic measures. In Northern Ireland, British SAS undercover agents instilled a balance of terror among the urban population rivalling that of IRA gunmen, safe havens among the urban population therefore became that much scarce. The British Government always followed a two track “carrot and stick” policy, containing social, political and economic initiatives for the people of Northern Ireland. While the Sinn Fein represents the vast majority of the voting Catholic populace, the IRA gunmen have been reduced over the last decade or so to a hard core of less than 100 terrorists, who nevertheless have been successful in keeping the peace process in Northern Ireland hostage. The only reason that the Irish are now sitting at the negotiating table is because the LEAs have maintained their tough attitude, the hardcore terrorists have been decimated to the stage that they have had to give way to the politicians to settle the matter through peaceful negotiations.

Like in Northern Ireland, where IRA gunmen had logistical supply and moral support from their kindred brethren in USA and countries of Europe as well as (for different reasons), former COMECON countries, Libya, etc urban terrorists in Karachi have had material support from outside Karachi, within and outside Pakistan, mainly from India’s RAW which is intent on destabilizing Karachi to take the pressure off Kashmir. When the MQM militants went underground, a number of them crossed over into India, irrefutable proof exists about RAW’s involvement, mainly from detailed confessions which have been independently corroborated.

There is fundamental difference between political activism, militancy and terrorism. When political activism reaches a point of frustration, elements that lose patience turn to violent protest that disrupts civil life and thus stable government. Today in Bangladesh we see a classic case of political activism turn to militancy to voice their mass protest. However this is far removed from the stage of urban terrorism in vogue in Karachi. Unfortunately while reserving for themselves their democratic right to protest, street mobs tend to violently oppose the democratic right of others not to protest, a classic case of double standards. When peaceful protest turns violent to obtain objectives, democracy’s principles are violated in the name of upholding the principles. At the same time, one cannot condone the extraordinary use of force by the Administration that may by itself provoke violent protest, even punishment for murder is scaled down if it takes place due to grave provocation. While not really a norm of a civilized and democratic society, political militancy that forsakes the use of weapons to enforce its aim and objectives remains within acceptable parameters, as in Bangladesh.

The next stage of political militancy is urban terrorism graduating into full scale urban guerilla warfare leading to anarchy. This level of escalation involves street power using weapons to enforce political will. While almost all the political parties had armed militants in Karachi, immersed in activities that not only bordered on the criminal but went way beyond that fail-safe line, MQM’s militants were affected more than others because Operation Clean Up targeted them solely in urban areas while going after dacoits of all ilk in rural areas. At the same time, by arming, training and unleashing the dissident MQM (H) faction, the government of the day, Mian Nawaz Sharif’s, themselves became culpable of fomenting urban terrorism. While MQM’s initial reaction was discreetly to go to ground, a full-scale war developed in the nether world that laid the foundations of the urban guerilla warfare that is destroying Karachi. As the MQM’s militants went underground, some of them crossed over into India where they were quickly taken over by RAW. By coincidence the return of these trained cadres owing loyalties to a different master coincided with the withdrawal of the Army on Nov 30, 1994, i.e. the winding down of Operation Clean Up, the result was a well coordinated classic urban guerilla campaign that had no relation to politics because in contrast, its aims and objectives were singularly to foment anarchy.

When Gen Babar, the Federal Interior Minister, took over direct responsibility for Sindh’s law enforcement, the various agencies were involved in a confused, uncoordinated response to terrorism that clearly lacked resolve and application. Moreover, the large scale encirclement operations became a PR disaster. When the Rangers handed over those who had been cleared to the police for release, despite their innocence heavy “ransoms” were taken by the police for their freedom. For every criminal militant that was nabbed, frustrated reaction claimed more recruits to the urban terrorism cause, thus for every Farooq Dada shot dead many more potential Farooq Dadas were created. In early July 1995, the Federal Government went into a major level of escalation in their campaign to root out urban guerilla warfare. The first step was to completely ban the use of cellular telephones in Karachi and the use of radios by certain civic agencies which had been infiltrated. This completely disrupted the communications infrastructure of the urban guerrillas and forced them to move more often (thus exposing their whereabouts) with almost no coordination. The rest is history in the making as the government has had spectacular success in the virtual decimation of the urban guerilla hard-core. Given that even the British Government and its much vaunted SAS took over two decades to beat the militant IRA to the peace table, Gen Babar’s success in disrupting the terrorist network in so short a time deserves praise. While the methods used may be debatable, i.e. restoring the balance of terror by a well-planned psychological warfare (psy-war) that was meant as such, the end justifies the means. Needless to say, Gen Babar has become a much vilified figure among the Mohajir majority in Karachi who are loath to even hear his name. On the other hand, having no political ambition himself but resolved to perform a thankless task as the hatchet-man of this Administration, the Federal Interior Minister has many admirers in the great silent majority all over Pakistan. Posterity will credit him with rooting out urban terrorism in Karachi when all analysts had decreed that it had spun out of control.

There is a time and place for a hatchet man, in Karachi this requirement will cease in several weeks or even a few months. The initiative then passes to Ms Benazir who, much more than the other politicians in Pakistan, has the capacity to make such political compromises as may be necessary to deal with the vast peaceful majority within the Mohajir Community. The Mohajirs must be brought back into the political mainstream. What is needed is a comprehensive social, political and economic package. Ultimately, there has to be a balanced arrangement in the urban areas of Sindh represented mainly by the MQM and the rural areas which is the domain of the PPP. Some give and take has been visible over 10 rounds of talks between the PPP and MQM negotiating teams, interspread with shows of strength by either side. The focussed campaign against urban terrorism has freed the MQM majority from becoming hostages to the blackmail of their own criminal militants. Gradually, over the months, the strikes have changed back to the tack of political militancy as opposed to urban guerilla warfare. That makes for a situation tailor-made for political statesmanship on either side.

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