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The sixth of September (1965)

History is witness that the sixth of September symbolizes a day of heroism and sacrifice for Pakistan, the rank and file of the Pakistan Armed Forces paying the price for our freedom with their blood. When the very existence of the country depended upon their motivation and bravery, they stood up and were counted, many giving the supreme sacrifice of their lives. We eulogise their courage, without being generally aware of the chain of events that led to this near catastrophe for Pakistan. As has been the norm throughout history, obfuscation has been the order of the day to protect vested interest.

In keeping with their penchant to occupy and seize any territory wherever and whenever their neighbours’ vigil seems to be lax, Indians occupied a few desert posts in the Rann of Kutch clearly within Pakistan territory. Para-military skirmishes turned into regular troops facing off each other. In short order, Pakistani troops in May 1965 stormed the desert posts in the supposedly oil-rich region and expelled the Indians. Among those who conducted themselves above and beyond the call of duty were (then) Lt Nadir Parvez, now PML (N) stalwart and MNA. The Rann of Kutch was a stinging Indian defeat in the first-ever confrontation in strength of unit PLUS level after Asalong Mouza, when Indians were expelled from our side of the meandering Feni River in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 1962. Coming after India’s China debacle in 1962 the Rann of Kutch acted as a catalyst to a future all-out war in the region.

India started to prepare for a decisive blow against Pakistan during the three-month period June-August 1965. Indian PM Lal Bahadur Shastri went on record that “next time the battle will be on a time and place of India’s choosing”. While India was thus mobilising, Pakistani strategy seems to have been ambivalent inasfar that we expected war but were reluctant to give India any excuse. This was certainly not in keeping with the ambitious plan to re-take Kashmir, code-named Operation Gibraltar, conceived by a “Pindi Club” triumvirate consisting of so-called “Young Turks”, the Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik GOC 12 Div (responsible for Azad Kashmir) and the Director Military Operations (DMO) Brig Gul Hassan. As is appropriate for such operations very few were in the know of the plan to send infiltrators drawn from Azad Kashmir Regular Forces (AKRF) into Kashmir in fairly large groups, attack the Indian occupying forces and become nucleus of a large-scale uprising that would expel the Indians from the valley. In the enthusiasm of those who conceived the plan, major (and obvious) flaws were overlooked, the first being the assumption that after years of brutal Indian rule, the Kashmiri population would rise spontaneously to support the infiltrators. This led to the second and decisive flaw, the failure to plan logistical supply for the infiltrators once they were behind enemy lines. The British experience (Chindit Operations) in Burma in World War II had shown that logistics for operations behind enemy lines would have to depend upon air for some time. Without having air superiority this would be almost impossible, PAF lacking the capacity for sustained Special Operations Executive (SOE)-type night drops accurately in mountainous region. More by accident than by design, the PAF Chief came to know about the planned operations and he sought coordination briefings but came away less than satisfied about the scope and concept about the plan. Like most of the others in the military hierarchy he doubted that India, smarting over Rann of Kutch, would not declare all-out war, using the incursions as a pretext. He asked his staff to quietly prepare for war. Despite the overwhelming evidence about Indian preparations, Mr. Bhutto and the Foreign Office on the other hand convinced President Ayub Khan that the Indians would confine their counter-operations to the Cease-Fire Lines (CFLs) in Kashmir and not cross the international border. While GHQ did initiate some moves to shore up Pakistan’s defences e.g. cadets at the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) were hurried through shortened terms to fill critical officer deficiencies, forward defences at Lahore and Sialkot were reconnoitered and in some cases temporarily occupied, overwhelming evidence points to the most critical flaw in Pakistan’s strategy, providing a heaven-made pretext for an enemy known to be mobilising for war. At the same time no thought was given to shore up defences in East Pakistan where a Division minus composed of 53 Brigade at Comilla and 107 Brigade at Jessore supported by a squadron of F-86s and a few naval vessels were supposed to defend half the country! The amazing “defence of the East is in the West” concept had unfortunate psychological repercussions for the continued integrity of the country. By now the Indians were playing a waiting game though they were certainly surprised at the size and level of infiltrator crossings. Their own invasion plans (centered at capturing Lahore and Sialkot) were put off schedule by a few weeks while they mopped up the infiltrators, who, despite some initial success, were worn down both by the lack of logistics support and the supposed spontaneous uprising of their brethren. Operation Gibraltar was a Russian-Roulette type of gamble in keeping with Tariq’s burning of his boats after landing at the rock of Gibraltar. Our youth was sent into a cauldron to die without taking into consideration that two decades of Indian brutality had demoralised the Kashmiri population so that while support was forthcoming, it was not to the level required. There is a continuing conspiracy of silence here where we refuse to accept facts as they stare us in the face and lack the courage to ask who is responsible for the flower of our youth lying in nameless graves in the Kashmir Valley and mountain sides?

Operation “Grand Slam”, the plan to take Akhnur and thus isolate Kashmir from India, had been re-hashed for years before being finally readied for implementation. Surprisingly this task was given to GOC 12 Div (the rationale used was that this was his area). Abandoning the conduct of operations of the infiltrators, Maj Gen Malik moved from his static HQ at Murree (with responsibility stretching from Leh to Akhnur) to his Tactical HQ (GSO-1 and ADC) at Kharian. Troops for “Grand Slam” were also drawn from 7 Division (10 Brigade and 13 Lancers) brought in from Peshawar. 102 Brigade (commanded by Brig Zafar Ali Khan) supported by 13 Lancers and 11 Cav quickly overcame enemy opposition upto the River Tawi with great elan. However beyond Tawi the leading troops (28 Baluch and 9 Punjab) found the going harder, CO 9 Punjab was among the first wounded by enemy shelling as the unit advanced up the valley. GOC 12 Div went to HQ I Corps Artillery with his Rover Jeep only so as to use their communications with GHQ and/or his field command (12 Div had World War II vintage British sets, the troops from 7 Div had modern US origin equipment). Brig Amjad Choudhry, Comd HQ I Corps Artillery, was out visiting his units so GOC 12 Div was temporarily incommunicado for almost 24 hours from morning on 01 Sept 65. This lack of communications, command and control resulted in such lack of information and confusion (HQ 15 Div congratulated HQ 7 Div on 01 Sept for taking Chamb whereas this was news to the 12 Div’s attacking 102 Bde) that GHQ ordered GOC 12 Div to return to his original static command at Murree and hand over to GOC 7 Div, Maj Gen A.M. Yahya Khan. Brig Khurshid Rabbani, then Col Staff 7 Div, is a living eye-witness who says Yahya Khan was reluctant to take over so as to avoid changing horses in midstream but when it became clear that Gen Musa, the C-in-C, who had flown into the operation area with Brig Bilgrami, was right in insisting about the immediate changeover (Akhnur’s capture slated on 01 Sept was already way off schedule), he took over on midday 02 Sept. There is a school of thought that still believes that Akhtar Malik was deprived of command just when Akhnur’s fall was imminent because (1) GHQ wanted to boost Yahya, Ayub Khan’s supposed favourite, with the actual victory and (2) Akhtar Malik was a Qadiani. On the other hand his detractors believe that by remaining incommunicado at a critical period (away from his Tactical HQ and even his ADC) and by delaying the handing over he lost valuable time and momentum which could never be made up. There is always the ridiculous, dark hints about a deep-laid Qadiani conspiracy to drag us into war over Kashmir (though it is true that the debacle within Kashmir in 1965 put back the Kashmiri independence movement almost two decades). About one thing there is no doubt, it was the considered opinion among the so-called intellectual bureaucrats, of which Bhutto was the political mentor, that the Army could only be brought to heel if it was defeated in the battlefield (somehow one gets the same feeling today). This conspiracy theory is further given credence by Bhutto’s sudden (and still unexplained) flu in the face of the Polish Resolution later in 1971 and miraculous recovery once the Pakistan Army surrendered in East Pakistan on December 16, 1971.

The Indian Army crossed the international frontier in the early hours on Sept 6, 1965. Nowhere were our defences in any shape. Brigade Commanders in Lahore like Brig Aftab believed war was so imminent that he asked GOC 10 Div Maj Gen Sarfraz on the evening of 05 Sept 1965 to be replaced if he was not given permission to deploy his troops in the forward defensive localities of Lahore (FDLs) immediately (Maj Aziz Bhatti, Nishan-e-Haider obtaining Shahadat at Burki along BRB). Similarly Maj Gen Hamid’s ragtag 11 Div (raised in haste) was moving to its FDLs along the BRB canal from Bedian to Kasur (IE Bengal repulsing repeated Indian attacks from early morning 06 Sept along UBDC where it meets BRB at Bedian). After an initial setback at Sialkot, the troops turned the tables on the invading Indians, (then) Brig Abdul Ali Malik (Akhtar Malik’s younger brother) stood like a rock at Pasrur. In the desert (then) Brig K.M. Azhar’s Desert Hawks captured a lot of Indian territory in sustained operations. With proper plans already laid out the PAF immediately gained air ascendancy over the battlefield by a superb performance. Blissfully unaware of anything till operations commenced in earnest, the Navy made a symbolic raid at Dwarka. Air superiority as well as a tremendous artillery performance put the Indian offensive into disarray. Pakistan infantry and armour which came into contact with the enemy fought extremely well at the unit, company/squadron and platoon/troop levels. Gen G.N. Chaudhri’s invitation to the Indian Army officers to have a “chota peg” in Lahore Gymkhana on the evening of September 6, 1965 could not materialise. Faulty strategy and disastrous implementation was more than made up by others on the tactical plane, paid for in blood by rank and file from generals down to the common soldiers. This is the heritage the country must never lose, the ability of our soldiers to rise above and beyond the call of duty for the sake of the country. Churchill’s words can be paraphrased (with apologies) for our heroes of 6 September 1965, “never in Pakistan’s history has so much been depended upon by so many on so few.”

GOC 12 Div had his static HQ at Murree and was responsible for forward defended localities (FDLs) stretching from Leh to Bhimber. Furthermore he was already hard pressed coordinating the infiltrators since he had sent them into Kashmir in the first place. He should never have been put in ad-hoc command of Grand Slam’s mobile operations, particularly because he was without an HQ and troops under command were drawn mainly from other formations. This was further compounded by the fact that his Tactical HQ had World War II vintage British radios while troops under his command had modern American equipment. The net result was that both operations suffered due to lack of command and control, exacerbated by bad communications. In the Gibraltar sector, the infiltrators were soon without supply and except for very brave air-drops carried out by the PAF they were largely abandoned to their fate while focus of attention shifted to Chamb and Akhnur.

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