Operation clean-up First term review
The Pakistan Army was mandated by the PM in May 1992, on the “advice” of the Sindh Government, to restore the rule of law in the Province of Sindh, a six-month period was given. In actual implementation political considerations effectively circumscribed the Army’s actions to controlling the criminal activity that was rampant in the Province but to ignore the prime raison d’etre for that activity. It was administratively expedient to have the Army support the tottering Sindh Government by propping up the civil administration, the even-handedness that the Army proposed went against the grain of the Sindh Government. The present incumbents only wanted the Army to rid the Province of their political enemies (and problematical friends) while they went about their business of distributing favours, plots, etc.
Having launched the Army into the void, all the other power centres conveniently faded out of the picture including the Government controlled media, particularly PTV. The Army soon became rudely aware that it was left to accomplish its mission on its own while holding its credibility together as best it could, necessary support from the other organs of the State was unavailable. The situation seems to have been deliberately engineered on the one hand to (1) cow down the Opposition (and recalcitrants among vocal friendlies such as the MQM) by the sheer might of the Army’s force and on the other to (2) emasculate the Army’s potential as an accountability monitor by getting embroiled in a no-win situation quagmire. In normal parlance, this is known as the “two birds with one stone” ploy.
The urban area Operations in Karachi will be recorded as one of Pakistan Army’s finest hours, not so much in what they could have accomplished (given a freer hand) but in exercising restraint and not doing what they could have done in the face of inflammatory rhetoric that acted as a grave provocation, set loose a bloodbath and as such an unending blood cycle. A part of the MQM had become wholly militant and even criminally motivated, out of control of the MQM hierarchy (or even with their fearful consent). Commensurate immaturity on the part of the military leadership would have meant national disaster, foremost in their minds were the lessons learnt from Operation Blue Star, the Indian Army’s storming of the Sikh’s holiest shrine, the Golden Temple, the immediate bloody solution created multifold long-term insoluble problems. As such the Army strictly followed the teaching of Sun Tzu, “far better to win a battle without bloodying swords”, unquote. Whether exercising maturity or discretion (as the better part of valour) the militants did not physically oppose the Army and all immediate objectives were secured without firing a single shot. Given the sorry history of the sub-continent and adjacent regions in this respect, this remarkable fire control must be some sort of a record in establishing the rule of law in an urban area. Six months later that milestone remains intact, a far cry from the modus operandi (and the subsequent disaster) in East Pakistan.
This new found military sophistication could only be possible because of a more confident, better educated and self-effacing leadership. Turning the disaster of the Bhalwal incident into an advantage, the COAS moved swiftly to make it an exercise of accountability by removing the GOC involved as well as his concerned Brigade Commanders, this acted like a tonic, all ranks down the line taking that as a major indicator the COAS meant business. It also inspired credibility vis-a-vis the Army’s action among the masses. All senior officers except for the Corps Commander (he hardly has a choice) have strictly avoided social contact, their non-involvement with local citizens has minimised normal accusations of bias. By concentrating on the task at hand, Task Force Karachi has been able to score impressive gains in the pure statistics of urban crime, car snatchings/liftings down from a maximum of 30-40 a day to an average of 3-4 a day, kidnappings down from half a dozen a day to one maybe in a month or so and so on. As the Army has acted to curb crime, their frustration level has increased because the source of most of the problems has been revealed, a mixture of administrative weakness, inefficiency and corruption. In a city of maybe 9-11 million people, there are only 15 magistrates to handle day-to-day urban problems, most of them remain absent or sick. Out of the crimes committed, the police have managed to solve only 8%, out of those arrested 80% have been granted bail, mostly on sureties which have been found fake afterwards. Almost incapable of solving crimes, the police in many cases had perpetrated them at the behest of their administrative and political masters or had gone into business on their own. Car snatchings were mostly police-assisted or condoned, those cars recovered were disposed of on a “Supardari” racket in which even the close administrative aides of the CM are known to have been involved (over 250 have been recovered from the Supardaris). As the Army probed deeper into crimes they kept coming to a recurring and horrifying conclusion, those responsible for the most crimes occupied key positions within the Sindh Government machinery, most criminals were harboured and supported by them.
The Army’s targets, among others, were (and are) those MQM activists believed to have become rogue. Those sought for cleverly exploited the opportunity and gave a wrong perception that the targets included the whole MQM hierarchy and thus by extension the Mohajir Community. This canard was egged on by the criminal elements within the Sindh Government machinery. As much as the Bhalwal incident was a horrifying episode, the outrageous Jinnahpur question became a media liability which the Un-Godly exploited to the hilt. MQM dissidents, the Haqeeqi-types were used as a Trojan Horse by the Army to secure their immediate objectives without bloodshed and they were dropped almost immediately like hot potatoes but it did undercut the Army’s credibility with the public at large as these gentlemen were of the type that the Army was supposed to neutralise. It did set off an unfortunate misconception of sorts among the Mohajir Community in general about the Army’s intentions. The MQM hierarchy had jumped the gun by going underground, now they have to find a face-saving gesture to come out of the cold and resume the genuine leadership of their electorate so that the continuing vacuum is not exploited by adventurers and self-seekers. Task Force Karachi has moved in a deliberate phase-wise manner but there has been method in their seeming madness.
In the rural areas, the Army’s success has been more clear cut because the tactical missions were well defined the targets were the countryside dacoits and more identifiable. There always remained a semblance of law and order in the urban areas, in contrast there was complete breakdown thereof in the Sindh interior and so the results have been immediate and spectacular. Hard-bitten dacoits who did not heed discretion and head for safer pastures have been hunted down relentlessly. In the process, the Army may have suffered casualties (the officer-men ratio being extremely high is an indication of the best army tradition of its younger leaders leading from the front) but has inflicted lasting damage to the dacoit system that operated on civil and police connivance with the local wadera and thus ran a State within a State, the whole countryside had fallen into their evil hands and the populace endlessly terrorised. Most of the hard-core criminals may have escaped because of the lack of surprise and help of their patrons but as they are getting caught and giving confessional statements their involvement with known political figures, high ranking civil and police officials, etc are increasingly coming to light. A DIG Police went to the extent of paying homage at the crowning of the “King” of dacoits, a horrifying commentary to what depths responsible officials in Sindh had descended to and why they along with their political mentors considered themselves Untouchables. A comprehensive list has been prepared by the Army based on verifiable evidence, it has such political luminaries in it that the Provincial Government may well collapse. A distorted version of the sacred list of Untouchables has appeared in the media, obviously to undercut the credibility of the actual list and to create a pre-emptive hue and cry. The backbone of the dacoits has hardly been broken, the principle of upholding the rule of law demands that the Army faces upto its convictions in the national interest and does not spare anyone, no individual is above the law whatever his status or influence. Unless the Untouchables are brought to justice the situation will slide back to the same state of virtual lawlessness. This action can only add to the major national gains already made inasfar that ethnic Sindhis have regained their trust in the impartiality of the Army and welcomed them with open arms. Ask the common villager whether he now sleeps easy or in dread, forget the rhetoric inside the Assemblies. This has been a major development in the reintegration of the estranged Sindhi community back into the Pakistani mainstream.
The Army’s report card in Sindh for the First Term is well above average, it could have been outstanding if the other power centres had cooperated but then some of them in Sindh, including the police, are themselves part of the problem. The COAS asked the Federal Government recently that the Army be relieved of its responsibilities in Sindh having accomplished the narrowly defined mission given within the restricted parameters. The COAS may also have been concerned about exposing the Army’s rank and file to extended periods of Internal Security (IS) duties, prolonged exposure to wordly temptations have overcome uniformed personnel before, it also cuts into their operational effectiveness. The COAS has emphasized that IS duties should be gradually taken over by the Rangers and the freshly recruited police forces. The COAS’ concerns notwithstanding, the integrity of the country remains in danger from within and the Federal Government did well in extending the period for three months, even that is too less a time given the enormity of the task involved.
As the Army delves deeper into the mess created by years of administrative malfeasance and involvement in major crimes, the Federal Government may well have to look for drastic solutions to stabilise the rule of law in Sindh, there are no quick fixes. One suggestion would be to impose Governor’s rule in the Province for a three years period. At the moment Mr Muzzafar Hussain Shah is propped up artificially. The Pakistan Army has done an excellent job in the prevailing circumstances but it does not have the means of bringing in the socio-economic and administrative reforms that are needed to strengthen the bedrock of society and thus maintain the credibility of the rule of law. The measured actions of Operation Clean-Up speak extremely well of the Army and has shown that some institutions continue to survive as islands of credibility in Pakistan.
Did you enjoy this post? Why not leave a comment below and continue the conversation, or subscribe to my feed and get articles like this delivered automatically to your feed reader.
Comments
No comments yet.
Leave a comment