Silent war, deafening peace
Vietnam was the first real war of the electronic age, the images of battle and destruction flitting daily across the media screens. The fierce patriotism among the US public eventually softened because of the demands of humanity and an anti-war movement snowballed. Percentage-wise, the death and destruction factor in Afghanistan far exceeded the slaughter and devastation in Vietnam but in contrast actual combat in Afghanistan was seldom recorded as in Vietnam by either side. The horrifying war was thus mostly engraved in the mass psyche by the endless columns of refugees pouring into Pakistan and the bloodily wounded, mostly the extremely young or the very old, innocent non-combatants either caught in the deadly crossfire of a free-fire battle zone or the trap of mines and booby traps spread indiscriminately along the escape routes. The many towns and villages destroyed and the gaping wounds of the maimed are silent witnesses of the carnage inflicted by the Soviets and their surrogate Afghan allies, the graves of the many dead standing as quiet sentinels, articulating the brutal realities of war without quarter.
Economically weakened and diplomatically isolated Pakistan stood alone in 1989, a solitary ideological obstacle to the age-old Tsarist warm water dreams, the Indian Ocean only an assault-force helicopter ride away. As the flotsam of war floated across the porous international borders, Pakistan had to cope with a multi-faceted political, economic and military crisis. In the first desperate months, the primary military mission was to lay the foundation of a long unrelenting guerilla campaign, to contain, re-group and organise the Afghan groups and factions whose revulsion for each other mostly was only exceeded by their hatred for the intruders. With the political hierarchy of Pakistan out in the cold because of martial law, the Armed Forces hardly equipped economically or diplomatically to handle the crisis, the resistance within Afghanistan had to be perforce Pakistan’s first line of defence. The free world’s initial response was half-hearted and lukewarm, symbolized by US President Carter offer of a paltry US $ 300 million in aid to cope with the economic and military fallout of the Soviet incursion (“peanuts”, to quote late Gen Zia). In an ab-initio stage of preparation when events overtook nascent plans, Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency was mandated by the Government of Pakistan (GOP) to cope with military operations in the field, for the sake of diplomatic nuances, ISI’s conduct of the guerilla war was not to be officially publicised or accepted.
The Reagan Presidency articulated that the interests of the United States coincided with that of Pakistan, massive material and monetary aid soon began to flow into Pakistan, taking off some of the economic load of the war. The CIA and ISI began to work closely to rid Afghanistan of its Soviet occupiers, the ultimate ideological objectives were never the same (and could never be). The human toll that ensued, the blood, sweat, tears and toil were mostly absorbed by the personnel of the Pakistan Army on deputation to the ISI, an epic struggle of a third world intelligence agency conducting a silent war against the massive resources of a Superpower. The CIA remained associated with the war by proxy, responsible for consolidating the information flow, training and logistics in support of the guerilla campaign. While one may disagree with ISI perceptions on any number of issues (and the feeling is probably mutual), particularly when the institution is unwittingly used on the basis of the old regimental tie by unscrupulous and greedy elements for personal vendetta or vested interest, history will record that the Afghanistan decade remains ISI’s finest hour. To go into a cauldron of death for another country, albeit for a greater cause, without hope of recognition of one’s bravery and sacrifice requires a very superior motivation, it cannot be eulogised in mere words. Those invisible soldiers are our unsung heroes, how many must have perished within Afghanistan, lying in unmarked graves in desolate places, far away from their kith and kin. Where have all the flowers gone? In the process of accomplishing their mission of ridding Afghanistan of the Soviets, these selfless Pakistani servicemen far exceeded their mandate and served as catalysts in the ultimate destruction of a Superpower. Afghans have given an extremely high human cost but then they were fighting for their own country.
Afghans are hardly enjoying the fruits of their victory, the bloodletting has not ceased with the so-called peace. In a cumulative development, having won the silent war waged by the ISI, Pakistan is now in serious danger of losing the peace. The conduct of the war was in the hands of military professionals but before the immediate post-war period was over, non-combatants became involved, putting into jeopardy a decade of sacrifice, the end result is that the internecine conflict continues unabated. The Sovietized Afghans are happily billeted in Kabul and probably laughing their heads off. CE Montague had rightly said, “war hath no fury like a non-combatant.” Afghanistan has historically been a country of many small cantons, each region ruled by disparate chieftains, fiercely independent but owing their loyalty in a tenuous way to the “Amir” of Kabul. These chieftains were substituted by local heroes as the war equalized the various levels of society, people like Engineers Ahmad Shah Masood and Gulbaddin Hekmatyar becoming the new warlords. The sum total of ethnic and religious diversity has been a fractious society that is deeply suspicious of each other, polarised further by pro and anti-Soviet inclinations. Both the United States and Pakistan exceeded by far their most optimistic objectives in Afghanistan. For the United States, the collapse of USSR was hardly foreseen and heralded the end victory of the Cold War, ending their first priority policy post-World War II given to the containing of communism. For Pakistan, Afghanistan did not become an end victory by itself, the historical vision of a natural land route to Central Asia was revived. In a 180-degree sea-change, the western priority has changed to blocking the much feared Islamic fundamentalist resurgence. Suddenly, a region of policy convergence has become a potential area of conflict, yesterday’s allies becoming potential enemies of the future.
That Iran seems to be lining up with the developing nexus of US, Russian and Indian interests of attempting to revive the old Khorasan region in the North of Afghanistan should be of great concern to us. Most of the cultivable areas, dams, power stations etc are in the north, partition would mean the death-knell of the impoverished South, blocking all routes to and from Central Asia, putting paid to all plans to revive the historical linkages. With steadfast vocal and material support for the Soviets in the Afghan war, India should have been persona non grata in Kabul with the Mujahideen, in fact it seems to be back in their good graces, it has re-established its Indian Airlines air-link Delhi-Kabul, initiating a free flow of agent provocateurs (of the RAW type) to exploit the volatile situation. Despite the geo-political opportunities present, PIA is restraining itself from a Kabul link because of crass economic reasons.
The Afghanistan Accord, a superb though incomplete document, was arrived at in Peshawar in May 1992 by the Mujahideen factions themselves. Given ISI’s working knowledge of the Afghan mentality, ISI must have used its influence with the factions to funnel their ideas towards, rather than dictate, a consensus. The Accord was fatally flawed in one crucial respect, a clause precluding any of the factions from using Pakistani soil for any anti-government-in-Kabul campaign in the future, was excluded. It has been reliably ascertained that the ISI’s advice was sidelined by the gnomes of the Foreign Office. As the disparate factions eventually fall apart, (Moulvi Khalis of one of the factions is already back in Peshawar), the non-inclusion thereof will come to haunt us in the future.
There is a deafening peace presently in Kabul, punctuated by falling rockets and the staccato of machine gun fire, Afghanistan remains a killing field. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi handed over the Presidency after the expiry of the first two months as mandated in the Peshawar Accord only after Pakistani prompting. Burhanuddin Rabbani of the JI is presently the President for four months and Ustad Fareed of the HIA (Gulbaddin Hekmatyar) is the PM, the immediate authority lies in the hands of anyone who can hold a gun. Rashid Dostum, the commander of the powerful Uzbek Militia, who switched sides from Najibullah in January, is a warlord in the real sense and principal strongman ally of the Defence Minister, Ahmed Shah Masood, the Tajik JI leader whose struggle was the only portion of the Afghan war romanticized by the West. Most of Afghan’s Airforce had evacuated pre-Najib’s downfall to Mazar-i-Sharif, Rashid Dostum’s stronghold. Hekmatyar on the other hand controls the large Shindand Airforce base and a fairly large area in the south. Various factions of the 9-party alliance are demanding a share of power far more than what they actually deserve according to proportion, e.g Wahdat’s demand of 25% is much in excess of reality, yet for the sake of overall Afghan unity the other factions are willing to consider conceding this.
We must immediately take a number of steps to redeem the situation before it damages the long-term national interests of Pakistan. Elements of the ISI of the level of Lt Cols and Majors who have remained in the field in Afghanistan and have influence and credibility with the Mujahideen leaders because of association during battle must be immediately re-inducted into the post-war process and effective contacts with Rashid Dostum established so that he is not used as a focal point in designs that his posture is will affect Pakistan adversely. Hekmatyar must be counselled that his posture is damaging Afghan unity and would endanger Islamic interests, in Pakistan the Jamaat-i-Islami’s short-sighted slogan-mongering are sabotaging the Pakistan gains of the last decade, they must be restrained. Responsible patriotism requires that our intellectuals not become the origin of unverified sensationalism, they must rise above themselves (and personal affiliations) in the greater national interest. The manipulations of vested interest in the drawing rooms should not destroy the victory won on the battlefield after a long struggle and tremendous sacrifice. The epitaph for our men who gave the supreme sacrifice in Afghanistan must not be, “we died to win the war, but those who lived lost the peace!”
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