The army in Sindh
That the forces of disorder have created a state of insurrection in the Province of Sindh is an established fact. That the Army would be eventually used to restore the rule of law was also never in question, what is the moot point is whether the Army may not be already too late to rectify the situation. Part of the problem has arisen from the fact that political leaders have lacked courage in taking tough decisions because they were reluctant to upset the political apple-cart, part of the delay has been because the army hierarchy have been understandably hesitant to deal with the situation till the political process had clearly failed and instead of being hamstrung by diverse and vested political requirements they would be free to implement the rule of law in Sindh. Normally Aid to Civil Power is taken to mean that the jurisdiction of civil administration remains paramount, in this case the army has been (very correctly) holding out that there should be no interference by Civil Power once the cleansing process had commenced. Given that the law enforcing agencies and judicial process have been hopelessly compromised in Sindh (relatively in relation to other Provinces) due to corruption, intimidation, vested interest, etc the army hierarchy did not want that having arrested the recalcitrants for criminal prosecution, their efforts would be frustrated at that altar.
The breakdown of law and order has been total, in this cauldron of crime one finds that Indian-trained separatists have been jostling for notice with plain dacoits and kidnappers. After the MRD movement of 1983, armed confrontation with law enforcement agencies (LEAs), previously unthinkable in Sindh, has become increasingly frequent. In vast rural areas of the interior, the law of the jungle has now encroached into civilized society. To complement the erosion of humanity, the major cities of Sindh have also turned into a jungle held to ransom by the lawless.
The great challenge before the Army can be best described in what must have been the MISSION given to the COAS by the Government of Pakistan (GOP), restore the rule of law in the Province of Sindh as soon as possible. In that MISSION is the unspoken fear, failure would irreparably harm the unity of the Federation. To tackle the challenge one must find answers to many questions, one of which may be, is the Army already too late? Have the forces of disorder gained so much material, moral and psychological preponderance that the Army’s tactical success may still end in strategic failure? Can the Army shake itself free from the artificially created political leadership and not become (or seem to be) the enforcers of their excesses? Will the Army be able to remain genuinely impartial in bringing to book all those perpetuating disorder, regardless of what may be their political affiliation? Has the army worked out the level of force to be used, how it is to be applied and when it should cease? Has some arrangement been made to simultaneously carry on the political dialogue on a dual-track policy? And many others, last but not the least, is the army hierarchy clear about its MISSION? The answers to these questions will depend upon the number of factors that are of relevance to the Army in particular and to the Sindh situation in general.
The first factor concerns the present Army leadership, its professionalism and commitment to accomplish any task assigned to them. The present generation of military leaders are more professional than their predecessors, this was easily achieved once the “patronage” policy practiced by the late Gen Zia was discarded and the merit-based system that was being sparingly used in practice was revived. Gen Beg did manage a modicum of credibility in the promotion process during his tenure as COAS but even he faltered in the selecting of at least one man to be major general who was clearly lacking moral fibre and character, the promotion made in defiance of irrefutable evidence. The present COAS has re-asserted the respectability for merit inherent in any fair system and the Promotion Board last March saw the promotion of those who deserved their elevation, mainly because they were men of spotless character with above professional capabilities. The level of professionalism was raised once the system became fair, affecting positively the leadership at all levels.
Commander 5 Corps, Lt Gen Nasir Akhtar, is an old Sindh hand, having served as COS 5 Corps before commanding an infantry division in the same Corps. Reputed to be logical and articulate, he is believed to be a source of inspiration to his subordinates. To the world at large he exudes quiet confidence, this will be an invaluable asset in the hard times ahead. His experience and expertise is force-multiplied by his close association to the COAS, Gen Asif Nawaz, who had earlier commanded 5 Corps and is himself respected as a “Sindh specialist”. The Corps Commander faces a tough challenge in the choice of his Divisional/Task Force Commanders. These have necessarily to be officers of great ability and character, any weakness in that region will reflect upon the execution of the orders assigned.
A clear plan of action can only be possible if sound intelligence is available. While the Military Intelligence (MI) and ISI will provide a great depth of material, the civilian intelligence agencies within the Province whether they be Federal or Provincial, must report to the Task Force HQ of 5 Corps directly. The areas of responsibility of the subordinate commanders must be clearly defined and within those areas, they must have freedom of action and access to the same level of information available to HQ 5 Corps. This means that an effective system of speedy collation, dissemination and distribution of intelligence information that leads to speedy action and operates strictly on a “need to know” basis (so as to control possible leaks) must be put into place. One way is to completely isolate all ranks of the Task Force from the social life of the Province and a 60-day rotation of field units from the operational area back to their home base so that the MISSION is not compromised by personal failings. A reputation for trying to gatecrash New Year’s parties is extremely demeaning for officers of major general’s rank. The influence of liquor has historically been used by the enemy to loosen tongues. (Kautalya Book II Section 160 and 161).
According to the media, two infantry brigades and one SSG battalion have been sent to Sindh to beef up the available forces. If these reports are true, this is woefully inadequate. While the actual quantum of forces to be used is the prerogative of the army hierarchy, the only way to ensure quick success is by bringing to bear overwhelming force immediately and apply it where necessary judiciously. If the forces used are spread thin, it will encourage the recalcitrants to take up armed opposition, in time the resistance will increase in the face of slow build-up of forces. While not exactly the same analogy, the creeping build-up of US forces in Vietnam was an unmitigated disaster as it elongated the war until it became a morass. Before launching Operation BLUE STAR in 1984, India had moved as much as five divisions to the vicinity of the Golden Temple and Amritsar, Operation BLUE FOX (one wishes that the word “BLUE” had been avoided) may not have need of such quantum of forces but certainly much more is required than is being reported in the media.
The key to success will lie in strict impartiality. If the Army makes threatening moves only in the rural areas of the interior of Sindh and deals with urban terrorists of various political leanings with kid gloves, it will alienate the ethnic Sindhis. Eventual political success will lie in the perception of even-handedness in the minds of the people of rural and urban Sindh, without regard for their ethnicity. The objectives must be extremely well targeted so that there are minimum effects on innocents. The Army should have identified the recalcitrants all over the Province by now and must make simultaneous moves to apprehend them. The will of the Army to enforce the rule of law will be especially tested in the major urban areas where other than political posturing, establishment-created forces with influential links will have to be made examples of if the Army’s plans are to be seen as above board. The essence of success of the PLAN will lie in the mass population’s perception of the Army’s strict impartiality.
The judicial process that we have been so proud of has been subverted in the past few years, mainly by intimidation and coercion. The prosecuting agencies are infested with rampant corruption. The Army cannot afford that those they apprehend should walk off scot-free, thumbing their noses at them. While there is broad agreement in the ruling political circles about action under the Constitution there is still dithering about invoking Article 245 of the Constitution. There is no way out from this, as Ms Benazir discovered to her detriment when she was PM and the situation had become extremely bad but not as bad as it has now become. The Army has not only to do the routine work of the police in apprehending criminals and prosecuting them but it must also set up Courts to act as the Judge and Jury.
All the political parties, irrespective of their present political stance, must be taken into confidence. One way is to ensure regular briefings by either GHQ and/or Task Force HQ of 5 Corps so that any misunderstandings or misapprehensions can be sorted out on a periodic basis. An impartial military action will certainly affect the militant factions of all the political parties, it is exceedingly important that their higher leadership be kept apprised of the developing situation. No democratic party can countenance criminal activity within its midst and if there is evidence of such activity by underlings running wild then the political leadership must publicly disassociate itself from these elements or accept responsibility and face the consequences.
The great silent majority among the masses is fully supportive of the Army’s contemplated action to stabilise the law and order situation in Sindh. No sane person who has the good of the country at heart would wish otherwise. Whatever may be one’s political affiliations, peace-loving citizens will always pray for the Army’s success, therein lies the salvation of Pakistan as a nation.
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