The internal security environment
Pakistan continues to be-devilled by internal security problems that contribute to an unhappy economic environment. To some extent these are influenced by external circumstances, particularly by continuing Indian interference in Sindh and the persisting instability in Afghanistan. Given that the present Government has economic reforms as its primary political plank, measures have to be taken to ensure that the environment is made conducive for the reforms to take hold and the economy to flourish. Throughout the past year, Sindh has been the focus of national concerns, pushing aside the momentous changes taking place in the world. The world situation will eventually affect us but with relations with the US, our Superpower partner of the last decade, out of kilter, we presently lack a coherent external policy that will (1) preclude any disadvantage that we may face because of the unprecedented geo-political changes and (2) benefit from turning the situation to our advantage.
Jam Sadiq has been successful in subduing ethnic tension as well as controlling crime in the urban areas because of the Jam-MQM coalition and the efforts of the law enforcement agencies, particularly the Military Intelligence (MI) Detachments that, along with dedicated help from the Citizens Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), went successfully after the kidnapping and car-lifting gangs. However, the Veena Hayat case has severely exposed the fragility of the illusion that urban areas are relatively crime-free. What was more horrible was the nature of the crime and, despite the High Court Tribunal verdict, the persisting public perception of the possibility that it may have been perpetrated by members of the law enforcement agencies. Despite having some of the finest police officers, the credibility of the uniformed Sindh police and their associate intelligence agencies thereof has been so eroded that the mass belief is that most crime originates because of their machinations.
The virtual state of insurrection in the Sindh rural areas represents complete breakdown of the authority of the law, bandit gangs operate with impunity throughout the countryside. Dacoit-law has gradually replaced the constitutional authority of both the Federal and Provincial Governments. The problem is now beyond the capacity of the Sindh Police to cope with. The ethnic Sindhis are already estranged in droves from the national mainstream, they have a genuine belief that they have been systematically discriminated against in a national conspiracy to deprive them of their homeland and hand it over to outsiders, particularly those of Mohajir origin. Mass Sindh resentment in internal Sindh has thus gradually erased the fine line dividing crime and unrest due to social tension, a situation tailor-made for rebellion against the concept of a Federation. The price then becomes too high one is paying for urban peace, it amounts to gambling with the existence of Pakistan. The deliberate act of benign neglect in taking effective responsible measures represents an open-ended risk. The genuine grievances of the Mohajirs focussed itself into a mass movement and the MQM into a potent political party. Giving allowance for criminal neglect of their rights for years, the clout that MQM presently enjoys by holding virtual sway over the port city of Karachi primarily as well as the cities of Hyderabad and Sukkur, lying astride the main national arterial communications, may represent an element of over-kill. Historically, the Pakistan Armed Forces, more particularly the Pakistan Army, have been generally sympathetic and supportive of their Mohajir brethren, being acutely aware of the discrimination against them, the natural affiliation with the underdog. Yet in the last year or so, some unfortunate incidents have been perceived as deliberate excess, this perception being reinforced by what seems to be an apparent lack of remorse, indeed an attitude of defiance instead of even a show of diplomatic contrition. Given a large number of sophisticated weapons and diehard faithful there is always the fatal illusion among the un-informed non-uniformed that the potential of the military can be circumscribed. This is true but only when brutality and ruthlessness by an occupation force cannot be endured anymore. Reality being far removed from this home truth, for the sake of hundreds and thousands of innocents who may end up being used as human shields, one hopes that before the bluff is called with bloody consequences, better sense will prevail all around and such fallacious presumptions will not be put to a test.
Somehow one feels that things are coming to a head in the near future and something has to give in the next 30-45 days. The detractors of Jam Sadiq Ali are not ready to concede his achievement insofar as Karachi, which has been beset by curfews in one locality or the other on a daily basis since 1985, has not seen a single curfew in 1991. The political maestro of Sindh has built an amazing detente for social and industrial peace, but as we go into 1992 this is at best becoming another illusion, hardly likely to last, events are now exposing reality. Whether it be Jam Sadiq or his (rumoured Governor-rule) successor, someone has to take pragmatic and far-reaching social, economic, political and security measures to ease the situation in internal Sindh. If the armed bands of dacoits and separatists are to be eradicated then their counterparts in the urban areas also need to be disarmed simultaneously to give the perception of neutrality. This exercise will give an opportunity to the MQM to play a central and important part as a genuine grass-roots political movement, they will have to shun militancy among their cohorts and opt to go the route of peace and prosperity which their dedicated and deserving masses have desperate need of. The MQM cannot be faulted for banding together to defend themselves in the past. With the JI, PPP and Jeay Sindh militant activists running wild, they had been pushed around to the limit and could hardly be persecuted for justifiable self-defence. With their own government in power in the Province and with their support in the Centre, with the civilian law enforcement agencies under their political control, there is no further reason to stay militant or armed. Mature political thought must reason out the social and psychological consequences of persisting with militancy and the necessity thereof of becoming synonymous with the forces of constitutional order.
The Pakistan Army is faced with the possibility of internal action in the urban and rural areas of Sindh. One redeeming feature is that the present COAS had been Corps Commander in Sindh for almost three difficult years and while having first hand knowledge of the personalities, problems, terrain and political chemistry thereof, he had exercised considerable patience. The relative success of the MI Detachments has been due to a deliberate policy formulated by HQ 5 Corps in 1990 and duly approved by the previous COAS, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg. With the plan of action in place, it was then implemented in full by (then) Lt Gen Asif Nawaz, the operation being carried on by his successor. Any “search for arms” exercise in the future will depend upon the information picture developed over the past few years and the useful experience gained therein.
Unsettled by the pace of geo-political changes and in the absence of determined political initiatives for a coherent Afghan policy, the Pakistan Army is moving to consolidate the success of the ISI in Afghanistan by working to ensure that peace returns shortly to Afghanistan. Gen Asif Nawaz’s recent meeting with King Zahir Shah in Rome is a recognition that a central authority (of some kind, even a figurehead) is necessary in Afghanistan and with the Soviet Union having ceased to exist as a nation, the possibility of a hostile Afghanistan is substantially eliminated, if not altogether. Pragmatism calls for a return to peace so that rehabilitation can commence forthwith, heralding the return of millions of refugees who have been eating away at our economic ramparts while continuing to infiltrate our security environment with arms and drugs on a massive scale. The head of the Pakistan Army always has a larger-than-life role in security matters that affect the nation, in times of stress the country naturally looks to him, their hopes sometimes exceeding his charter or ability to assuage. Any positive moves by the COAS to help out the political government in power is always a plus point, more so at this point when the President’s stature may have been unfortunately and irretrievably damaged by the Veena Hayat affair and the PM has not managed to really shake off the tar from the Coops scandal.
Sometimes conscience must compromise with the concept of duty, this is possible till the time that misdemeanours increase in frequency and/or in substance and conscience cannot further stomach unfolding circumstances. Given the fears one has about the institutionalizing of democracy in Pakistan, one hopes that matters are resolved by constitutional means and we do not return to the beat of the drum because of our consistent inability to be politically mature.
Did you enjoy this post? Why not leave a comment below and continue the conversation, or subscribe to my feed and get articles like this delivered automatically to your feed reader.
Comments
No comments yet.
Leave a comment