The tracks of Al-Khalid
Post-1965 war and the stoppage of US military aid, the Pakistan Armed Forces went into a diversification programme out of sheer necessity, the immediate priority being to fill deficiencies in the enhanced security requirement from any available source. In terms of standardisation of equipment it became a logistical nightmare. This crisis deepened after the 1971 war, particularly in the transportation sector. In armoured tracked vehicles, US origin M series (M47s and M48s) had been supplemented by Chinese T-59 tanks. In the post-1971 period, the paucity of funds limited our objectives to rebuilding and/or retrofitting our existing tank fleet. The Heavy Rebuild Factory (HRF) was established in Taxila with Chinese assistance to rebuild the Chinese T-59 tank and the first (and only) squadrons of M-48s were sent to Iran for retrofitting as M48A5s (the equivalent of the US M-60). The beginning of the 80s saw our Armoured Forces relatively vulnerable when compared to the Indian Army in terms of numbers and armour plating while being out-gunned at the same time. The limited money available with the re-opening of US military aid in the 80s was utilised mainly for replacement of our obsolete fighter aircraft, modernisation of our tank forces was held in abeyance. Measures were taken for enhancing our all-round anti-tank capability but in the ultimate analysis the best tank killer is always another tank.
In the face of known Indian armour capability, the 80s lack of initiative in the armoured forces sector was essentially a calculated risk, the bankruptcy of this policy being woefully exposed in 1986-87 during the Indian war games (a la Sunderji) culminating in the security scare perpetuated by Exercise Brass Tacks. The Russian T-72 in the Indian armour inventory meant that our armour was vulnerable to the penetrative power of their tank guns while the effectiveness of our own main tank guns (105 and 100mm) became doubtful against the T-72’s enhanced armour plating.
In 1985, the General Staff, headed by the then CGS, Maj Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, was given the go-ahead by then President (and COAS) Gen Ziaul Haq for their proposed Main Battle Tank (MBT) – 2000 programme, a plan to build an indigenous tank according to the Pakistan Army’s needs taking us into the 21st century, keeping in view the terrain and the known (and possible future) enemy capability. The on-going tank programmes in various countries were studied, with special interest in the replacement/upgrading of the German Leopard 2. Lessons were learnt from the fact that the optimum in tank development had been reached, NATO countries scrapping plans for Leopard 3 and opting instead for improving and upgrading the Leopard 2, keeping in mind that the adding of more armour on the tank would result in a heavier behemoth, sacrificing mobility. The objectives were spelt out in General Staff Requirements (GSR) of the Pakistan Army, viz (1) improve the quality tank ammunition without adding to the calibre of the gun so as to penetrate any known armour in existence (2) bring in composite replacement of armour including reactive and/or ceramic armour (3) increase the Horse Power (HP) of the engine so as to have a better power-weight ratio and increased mobility and (4) improve the target acquisition capability as well as the horizontal and vertical stability of the gun, particularly when the tank was moving.
Two other considerations had to be kept in mind, the acquisition of technology that could be easily duplicated (and handled) in Pakistan and the paucity of money available for Research and Development (R&D). From 1985 to 1988, this process underwent various phases with only limited progress. Manufacturer’s representatives of various countries became extremely active, particularly the lobby for the induction of the high-tech high cost US M-1 Abrams tank. When test and trials were conducted, the M-1 Abrams was found suitable for our desert terrain (though the desert filter had to be changed every 30 kms in contrast to 200 kms for Al-Khalid) but too heavy for use in the high water table areas of the Punjab plains which formed the probable main battle area in any future Indo-Pak war. The induction of the M-1 Abrams would certainly have meant qualitative improvement in our existing inventory but at a prohibitive cost and limited utility value. In retrospect the stoppage of US military aid to Pakistan because of the Pressler Amendment would have meant unmitigated disaster in the delay to our plans for modernisation of our armoured forces. In October 1988, barely a month or so after Gen Zia’s untimely death, the new COAS, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, took a crucial decision, to go ahead with the MBT-2000 (T-85) as our new main battle tank (Al-Khalid). The basic T-59 was gradually being replaced by the more modern, updated and upgraded T-69 and T-69 2 (equivalent of the Russian T-62). With many parts already being manufactured locally and the pragmatic realisation that most of the technology had to be acquired from different sources, it then became a matter of dovetailing the various technological and military requirements in a sensible and cost-effective manner.
Of great importance was India’s Arjun tank experience and the lessons learnt from eighteen years of frustrating experience of this technological disaster. India tried to manufacture everything under one roof, a bankrupt possibility. Economically speaking, the numbers did not justify it. The result has been a tank that is too heavy by far (it’s 60 tons limits transportation by the Indian railroad system) and without commensurate improvement in main battle tank qualities. Maj Gen Popli of the Indian Army has labelled the Arjun a Sitter for the proposed Pakistani T-85 series production, the Al-Khalid.
Al-Khalid has been designed primarily for speed (64 km per hour), a smooth bore 125 mm main gun firing Armour Piercing Discarding Sibot Fin Stabilized Tank (APDSFST) ammunition capable of penetrating any known armour and with reactive armour to act as a deterrent to the T-72 main tank gun. Keeping in mind the Chinese collaboration in HRF in the modernizing/rebuilding programmes of the T-series, the T-85 is seen as a continuation of ongoing programmes that dovetail naturally with the existing collaboration. Within 3 years of signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with NORINCO (China), the first prototype was unveiled by the PM at a ceremony in HRF, Taxila on 17 July 1991.
The first prototype was built in China according to the GSR requirements. We are hardly in a position for sustained Research & Development either cash-wise and/or technology-wise, it is a wonder that Series production is scheduled for early 1994. Down the line our vendor industry will be able to produce the stipulated parts in commercially feasible numbers. Compared to top-of-the-line tanks available the M-1 Abrams (US), Leopard 2 (German), T-80 and T-72 (Russian), etc it has a favourable ratio in all major tank quality areas, viz (1) speed (64 kms/hr) (2) tank gun (125 mm smooth bore firing APDSFST ammunition (3) reactive armour (exploding outwards and added externally to the best known alloys in hull and turret manufacture (4) an excellent power to weight ratio (the 1200 HP engine on the prototype will be further enhanced to 1500 HP in series production) in relation to its maximum 48 ton weight (5) state-of-the-art target acquisition devices including night driving and firing capabilities (6) horizontal and vertical stability of the gun during firing even when the tank is moving (7) fuel capacity for a range of upto 400 kms in one filling (8) automatic ammunition loading providing for more spacious compartment giving the 3 man crew relative comfort and (9) induction of technology easily handled by our soldiers.
The Series production will be done in Pakistan. Two other countries, Iran and China, are extremely interested in its induction into their armies, thus possibly reducing the cost factor. US$ 1.5 million per unit compares fairly cost-effectively with US$ 4.5 million for the M-1 Abrams. Parts being manufactured locally will be a boost in net terms for the economy instead of a net loss when you have to pay precious foreign exchange for any imported item. The trend for indigenous production in other arms and equipment manufacture areas is also force-multiplied by this example. The objective of manufacturers’ representatives is to deter local manufacturer as it cuts into their commissions abroad. Some of these people are unscrupulous in using their family and uniform connections while maintaining a holier-than-thou mien while arranging falsification of official “test and trials” results. Indigenous production undercuts (1) the basis of their activities to an extent and (2) the capacity of these free-loaders to compromise national security.
HRF is to be congratulated for initiating the induction of Al-Khalid into the Pakistan Army. For this tremendous achievement Maj Gen Farhat Burki (as well as his predecessor Maj Gen Shabbir Ali Shah) and his colleagues deserve plaudits. Sometimes the national psyche and morale requires that you blow your own trumpet. Above all, let us salute a man who meant every word that he has been saying for the past three years while COAS, capping it by retiring on schedule despite prophecies otherwise. Gen Mirza Aslam Beg took a historic decision by opting for the Al-Khalid instead of the imported M-1 Abrams option. Among his many achievements on the national scene, Gen Beg can be ever proud that Al-Khalid was a prime trend setter for our Defence industry and a force-multiplier addition to the Pakistani tank capability.
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