The Gulf War Misconceptions about a calculated risk
The Gulf war started early in the morning of Jan 17, 1991 while we were on our way to witness the Final Briefing of the Pakistan Army’s Map and Signal Exercise in Gujranwala. By the time we entered the top security perimeter containing all the Corps Tac HQs of the Army and the Central Briefing tent, the Allied air war against Iraq was well under way and to all accounts the first strikes had successfully pulverized the Iraqi Air Force. Being incredulous at the apparent lack of Iraqi response, we tended to receive the reports with skepticism, taking that to be one-sided propaganda. One of the senior journalists present, who was closely listening following the radio news, informed us proudly that Saddam Hussain had just proclaimed, to quote, “the mother of all battles had begun”, unquote.
Our attention thus strayed from the subject at hand which was the requirement of the COAS of the Pakistan Army to exercise his General Staff, his Corps Commanders and their respective staffs along with Senior echelon HQs of the Air Force and Navy in command and control functions in real-time battlefield conditions. In the presence of the country’s top military brass, we became more interested in their perceptions about (1) the actual situation obtaining (2) the likely future scenario (3) Pakistan’s perceived role and (4) the regional situation likely after the Gulf War. The Army hierarchy obliged by a detailed briefing by Maj Gen Agha Talat Masood, Commander Army’s Air Defence Command. There were some perceived contradictions that went beyond his mandate to answer and was taken up by the COAS, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, in a Question-and-Answer Session. As is usual the COAS Media dialogue, turned into a lively wide-ranging all encompassing discussion, focussing on the options available to Pakistan and our geo-political responses.
Given the realities of Allied preponderance into air power and the high tech available, the COAS felt that the Iraqis were going to be relentlessly pounded, the Allied aim being to destroy Iraq’s capacity to wage war, with objectives targeted in priority of importance, viz (1) command and communication centres (2) radar stations (3) airfields (4) bridges, etc, etc. The phrase used was “a violent, overwhelming application of force”. The COAS felt that given the capacity of the Allied Forces to wage unchecked electronic warfare, the Iraqis capacity for outer-communication, even with what escaped destruction, would be severely limited, thereby making the Iraqis, sic “blind, deaf and dumb”. Though the COAS felt that the air war alone could not win the war he did not feel that ground war was imminent till the Allied had suitable intelligence that the Iraqis were broken in spirit and material. On being questioned about military dispositions in Kuwait, he felt that Iraqis had made a mistake by keeping their maximum forces within Kuwait, thereby boxing themselves into “Kuwait pocket”, a unique opportunity for the Allies to envelop and cut the Iraqis off. He did caution that limited intelligence was available about the extent of Iraqi deployment and without full knowledge, our assumptions would not be entirely correct.
An argument ensued about the battle-worthiness of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Given that Iraqi Armed Forces had fought a long war with Iran, we collectively felt that their capacity and willingness for combat fight would not be impaired by the Allied Air Power. Saddam’s basic strategy seems to be to have Allied Forces into the built-up areas of Kuwait where he could inflict heavy casualties on the Allied Forces, it being common knowledge that the US could not afford many battle deaths because of the likelihood of domestic uproar. While the COAS and his staff agreed that this was Saddam’s strategy, so that he could walk off with a reasonable ceasefire, the COAS felt that given the fact that (1) the Iraqis were conflict-weary after the long Iran-Iraq war (2) the Iraqi soldiers had not shown any great prowess during that war as they had surrendered in droves whenever they came into physical contact with Iranians (3) Iraq’s relative dominance at the Iran-Iraq war was mainly because of their unrestricted use of chemical warfare (4) the Iraqis were not driven by any great motivation (5) except for the Republican Guards most Iraqis were not regular volunteer soldiers but conscripts with suspect capabilities and motivation and (6) faced with overwhelming air superiority their Soviet training of mobile armoured warfare would be reduced to immobile tanks being used as pillboxes, the air war could culminate in a short, sharp ground offensive to destroy the Iraqi Army. Some of us wanted to hear otherwise and seemed stunned by the COAS’ contrary appreciation of the situation. It is difficult to describe the emotions except that it was a natural feeling for the underdog, howsoever monstrous that underdog, a hoping against hope that though Iraq would be beaten, they could walk away with some pride from the fracas of their making. The COAS threw a lot of cold water on these assumptions. The COAS strongly defended the despatch of Pakistan Army’s detachments to Saudi Arabia. He stated that we had an existing protocol with the Saudis that obliges us to go to their defence when they should so need it, the defensive nature of their deployment was clearly agreed to with the Saudis and they were under Saudi command, though frankly one finds it only a technical sleight to hand, given that Prince Khaled, Commander of the Multi-National Forces was acting under the general plan devised by the US. Even if there had been no protocol the COAS felt that we had (1) a moral obligation to the Saudis because of the tremendous moral and material support given to us over the years and (2) a religious obligation to defend the Holy Lands. We had no animosity or grouse with the Iraqis, he said (despite the known Iraqi animosity towards Pakistan), Pakistan troops would not take part in any offensive into Iraq. There seemed to be a confusion of intention here but in hindsight this was the only place a Pakistani could be on a no-win tightrope. The COAS was supportive of the PM’s diplomatic peace recourse, to maintaining that the Iraqi fighting machine (which without the excesses of Saddam was a great asset to the Muslim Ummah) should not be destroyed, in the circumstances very imminent.
The COAS expressed guarded apprehension about the post-war prognosis in the region. Renewed pressure would be put on Pakistan because of suspicions of our nuclear intentions and that here US, Indian and Israeli interests seemed to coincide for different reasons. While distancing ourselves from Iraq’s aggressive adventures towards its neighbours, first Iran then Kuwait, the COAS felt that we had to be cautious about long term western intentions to dictate future policy in the Gulf. While he did not perceive an immediate threat to Pakistan militarily, economic ostracisation was possible in the future. Given India’s domestic troubles he did not feel that they would take advantage of the situation to have a go at us. Pakistan (and Iran) had to have a role in the Regional Peace Keeping Force, the COAS felt, without the participation of these two countries the region would remain an area of instability.
While some of us debated that there seemed to emerge a varying posture between the Government’s stance and that of the Armed Forces, the difference was in style rather than in substance. While we came away with an unambiguous understanding of the Army’s approach to the Gulf situation, the problem seems to have started after the Jan 28 Press Handout of the COAS, address to GHQ officers when he repeated his early December assertion of “strategic defiance” and seemed to come down heavily in favour of negotiated peaceful solution, in some other key factors in utter contrast to the “closed” briefing of Jan 17. That really hit the ceiling and has caused criticism post-Gulf war. Delivered in good faith the COAS change of assertions needs some analysis (if not clarification) from a neutral standpoint. In the third week of January 1991, a concerted Iraqi propaganda campaign aimed domestically at our masses went into high gear through paid agent provocations with onset of the Gulf war. Colour posters of Saddam Hussain appeared at street corners, some politico-religious leaders, rejected by the electorate, but freshly returned from Baghdad went on the offensive against the Government. As it is feelings were running very high in Pakistan, our people are basically gullible and were fed by calculated falsehoods by vested interest. Boxed into a no-win situation, the PM had taken off on his Peace Mission leaving the edifice of government crumbling. The law and order situation was deteriorating badly, the Army was standing by to be called out in Aid of Civil Power, severe polarisation threatened to run out of hand, with real danger that the political government would come to grief. Probably to head off a possible confrontation between the Army and the masses the COAS gave a public statement of sorts by the Press Handout what the masses wanted to hear, rejection of Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait but more importantly, deep concern at the continued bombing of Iraq and an evaluation that instead of obtaining an outright surrender, the Allies would have to negotiate an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, anything less than outright defeat would be a victory for Saddam Hussain. Coupled with the PM’s visit abroad in search of peace, the COAS’ stance defused the potentially volatile situation, avoiding a possible direct confrontation between the Army and the public in the streets. The COAS thus acted as a lightning rod to divert the powerful blow that was all set to be delivered. By defusing the situation in this manner, the COAS ensured that a possible, mindless blood cycle was avoided. “Glasnost” can be useful if used intelligently.
The COAS of the Pakistan Army, essentially took a calculated risk carrying both individual and collective danger. The ploy worked and the situation calmed down and steadied, warding off the possibility of collective danger to the nation, but bringing some acrimony onto the person of Gen Beg by interested quarters. The COAS has had an eventful 30 months at the epicentre of quite a few crisis. That full control was exercised on his ambitions was seen to good effect on Aug 17, 1988 when the COAS could have had Caesar-like a “kingly crown” and then many times in the interim at regular intervals. Even this latest episode only confirms the Army’s commitment to democracy, they could have easily led matters slide into anarchy and then stepped into the political void.
There is always a danger of misconceptions about a calculated risk but if the final objectives are based on the highest national considerations rather than on crass individual interests, one must always take that calculated risk.
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