Zarb-i-Momin, the acid test-I
Pakistan has fought wars of survival against India almost from the moment of its independence. With the bulk of defence production facilities and defence stores falling within the territories comprising India at the time of partition, the Pakistan Armed Forces, besides being under-equipped, were woefully undermanned, short by 1,500 officers of the 4,000 required to man the planned army of 150,000 men. Even the 500 British officers inducted to fill the shortfall could not satisfy the last British C-in-C of India, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck who made the strategic appraisal that “Pakistan was indefensible”. What he failed to state was that the deck was stacked against us. Yet, despite truncation in 1971, mainly due to internal political mistakes, Pakistan has survived due to the ardent defence of the homeland by its valiant uniformed sons, despite being always out-gunned and against overwhelmingly numerically superior forces. To quote from Chapter 2 of “The Defenders of Pakistan”, “the Pakistan Armed Forces is a weapon cast from pure faith. It is called courage”, unquote.
While courage is a necessary ingredient of soldiering, modern warfare incorporates advanced strategy with high-tech weapons and communications held together by sound tactical doctrines. For the past 40 years, despite having fought many wars the Pakistan Armed Forces have, except once in the 50s during Exercise “November Handicap”, never been exercised on the army scale. The past wars have taught us many lessons, the major one being a singular lack of cohesive war plans sound enough to be implemented during war. The result has been a disjointed war effort and major debacles (like the one in East Pakistan, circa 1971). Even 1965 as the common knowledge goes was victory only in the sense that superior Indian forces were ground to a halt. At the generalship level we had at best a stalemate achieved through the blood and sacrifice of our younger combat commanders and soldiers. Tempered by war, steeled by experience, those young men of yesterday are in many cases today’s general. Almost none of them is tainted by being part, in whatever capacity, of the Martial Law bureaucracy. The time has, therefore, come during the years of peace to analyse our drawbacks that surfaced during the past wars and try and hone our graduated responses without any further loss of time.
Post-1971, Pakistan took a far more positive role in the Middle East than previously. For some years, the country’s foreign policy direction even thought seriously of abandoning a South Asian role in an Indian-dominated region. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, first as President and then as PM, was the chief architect of exercising new foreign policy options; through a crucial but delicate period he guided Pakistan to a semblance of stability while straddling the regional fence. Most of the Mujahideen players of the Afghan war-game leadership-wise are Bhutto creations of our West-Politick. While domestic events overcame his regime, the Soviets moved to contain the fire he had lit. As forest fires are apt to do, it became all-consuming and raged directionless thereafter. By 1981, the lines were drawn and substantial western aid was in the offing, this gained momentum especially when Reagan took oath as US President. With Zia now adopting the role of front-line steadfast proponent of the Afghan Mujahideen, the internecine conflict was internationalised. The rest is history but the major event as far as Pakistan was concerned was the re-armament and re-equipment of the Pakistan Armed Forces by the USA. One salient example sums it all.
In the absence of Afghan war we could not have been able to afford the F-16s, let alone get US Congressional sanction to ever purchase them. We could never have acquired this air-superiority gun platform, in the face of massive Indian military build-up, particularly with help from the Soviet Union, we could never have matched adequate response. In the circumstances while we may have remained proforma an independent nation, we would have been reduced to Sri Lanka-type acquiescence ripe for Indian adventure, hegemony would have been Pax Indiana.
History is still incomplete as far as Afghanistan is concerned, as by now we are used to the complications caused by it. This should not unduly concern us because given the pre-dilections of Afghanis to remain a society of tribals, many years will elapse before they can ever agree about anything.
The immediate results of the Afghan war have been (1) the withdrawal of Russian troops (2) the freeing of those of our forces mobilised by new raising to defend our north-western borders and (3) the possibility of Afghan Mujahideen support against India not only in any future war but indeed independency a holy war waged by them to help their Kashmiri brethren.
Given that the better part of three complete Infantry Corps, one armoured division besides independent infantry, armour and artillery brigades are additionally available with the COAS for any future war with India, he has to look closely at his options and decide his course of planning for such an eventuality. Given that our existing force levels in defensive positions are adequate to contain any Indian adventure the COAS has to think about possible defensive and offensive operations employing the additional large composite forces available. Given that since 1947, India has had frequent recourse to the use of force in the region to settle its arguments with its neighbours, the COAS has to take into account the Indian predilections. Given that we in Pakistan would like to remain an independent nation not given to tutelage by Indian hegemony which is the only other alternative in the geopolitical circumstances, the COAS must persevere with the people’s aspirations. Given that India’s size and depth precludes a war of attrition in which Pakistan is bound to come off second best, the COAS has then only one option left to him, plan a swift, devastating offensive with the intention of destroying India’s capability to wage war. To achieve that aim, the Pakistan Army in close collaboration with the PAF has to strike deep in enemy territory, not to acquire territory but to destroy the enemy formations and logistical areas in proximity to our international borders.
Lofty intentions, but can success be achieved or should the exercise be renamed MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? On the ground, given the honourable manner in which the uniformed professionals remained professional even at the height of our previous martial law regime, one cannot doubt for one instance that the objectives remain achievable. Simply stated, we have the flexibility to bring the most by the fastest means at a critical point. Indians may have much larger Armed Forces, how much of the Army and Air effort can it bring to any one point to contain our offensive, given the horrendous logistical problem it encountered in Exercise Brass Tacks? The Indian COAS can opt for defence in-depth at certain critical points, he runs the risk of making greater numbers of his forces vulnerable to the concentrated Pakistani offensive. All along the front, barring a major debacle, the Pakistani defence line is capable of holding its own, even the option of local limited offensives is available to deny the enemy any launching-pads for its offensive. At least in two sensitive areas, the Indian Lines of Communications (L of C) is open to internal sabotage in Indian Occupied Kashmir and Punjab. If the population was completely hostile then the Indian Commanders would have safely opted for a “scorched earth” policy and protected their rear areas by brute force, in the event there is a mixture of friendly and not so friendly population with the problem that tough measures will alienate the friendly lot. This ties down Indian hands, forcing them to deploy more forces into guarding their L of Cs. The Indians thus have room only for manoeuvre in the vast deserts of Rajasthan, where no sane commander will ever permit his forces in strength unless he has clear air superiority. Certainly our offensive will take into account the fact that PAF can and will achieve local air superiority in the area of planned offensive. This would force the Indian war planners to deploy their forces to counter the threat from us. In the open areas of the desert or the plains of the Punjab, other than the air to ground effort, motivated young combat commanders directed by superior generalship cannot only inflict great damage but also destroy numerically greater forces.
We must never ever make the mistake of aiming to capture Indian territory, this will detract from the war aim, i.e., the destruction of the Indian war potential, at least for some time. In a swift surgical operation, whether it slices through the Indian Occupied Punjab or going through the desert envelopes the area thus isolating Kashmir, our war aim must be singular, the destruction of Indian war potential. The law of nature will then take its own course, both Indian Occupied Kashmir and Punjab have signification movements for liberation. Freed of the imposition of large Indian forces, these will be effervescent and should be so nurtured. The moment we deviate from our given war aims we shall be in trouble. Independent Kashmir and Khalistan will be the buffers that we have always needed from long term interference of India. With our borders shortened with India we shall be able to contain the on-going bloody Indian interference in our Sindh Province.
A thought has been aired about the possibility of various breakdowns in Zarb-i-Momin, whether it be of command and control, communications, logistics or of equipment. While wishing the Pakistan Armed Forces was success one wishes that all the breakdowns do take place during the Exercise and that these are ruthlessly analysed and rectified. Zarb-i-Momin is essentially a training exercise built-up systematically from a paper exercise to sub-unit/unit level exercises to army level manoeuvres, it must bring to surface all our shortcomings, it is extremely necessary that our glaring weaknesses be exposed. All the sweat and toil during peacetime will save blood, tears and lives during actual war; it will make the mission very possible. While the sound of a bullet is a great “equaliser” for classroom Guderians, peacetime manoeuvres expose the inabilities of commanders at various levels while honing actual decision-making among the real leadership cadre. The true test a soldier is in actual combat, what Zarb-i-Momin does is to give us for the first time an Acid Test for the Army as a whole during peacetime.
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