Defence budget
Defence Forces of any country essentially consist of (1) Personnel (2) Equipment (including arms and ammunition) and (3) Real Estate. The Budget to maintain the Defence Services, therefore, revolves around these three major heads consisting of (1) Administrative (2) Training and (3) Operational expenditures. Despite the best of intentions and professionalism of the present generation of general officers, we are constrained by hidebound concepts and methods, some of them being handed down for more than a century. It requires men of exceptional vision and professional courage to break out of this mould, to get out of the rut of routine. The fact that the Indians are in a worse predicament than we are is no consolation, the relative sizes dictate that our Armed Forces have to be that much more efficient, we simply must get more bang out of the buck. At the present time our annual budget faces average losses of 35% or more due to faulty planning, bad organisation and inefficiency. We pay a lot of lip-service to organising a unified Armed Services concept but hardly ever practice what is ardently preached.
Our Tables of Organisation and Equipment (T O & E) are an amalgam of the continuing British heritage married to the tactics and doctrine adopted by us from USA along with US military aid. We have never got down to any drastic changes since the 1950s, our rank and command structure is thoroughly antiquated. If nothing else our military edifice bears no resemblance to the simplicity (and thus effectiveness) of command effected by our Islamic predecessors. We have never really shrugged off the debilitating constraints of the routine, the pomp and/or show, one living example is that instead of the Second in Command (21C) of any unit being the operating executive officer, we follow the British system of relatively junior officers acting as adjutant/quartermasters whereas seniority and experience dictates otherwise. The Armed Forces are meant to be a fighting machine, this must be honed to be an efficiently destructive force, capable of inflicting crushing defeat on the enemy. Whereas we must persevere with any useful procedures and lessons from the past, our vision should be established on the future, it must not become mired in systems that pre-date World War II. We have to make the fighting units fully operational, command and structurewise, with greater weightage given for operational postings in fighting units than the comfort of staff. At the moment, however, we are faced with a grave crisis on our frontiers and all our energies would be well utilised in preparing the Defence Forces for war, this is no time to effect structural changes, it will only confuse the issue at this stage, in the manner that the Indian Army post-Sunderji is still struggling with convoluted concepts which have not been well implemented due to lack of logic-based reforms. The Prime Minister of India, V P Singh, has made his intentions well known in the manner of Shastri’s 1965 “time and place of our choosing”, and it would be madness on our part not to take due cognisance of the developing threat. In the circumstances, our Defence Budget in the immediate present and future must consist of (1) the normal peacetime allocations (2) expenditures preparatory to hostilities and (3) anticipated defence expenditures during and post-hostilities. Our approach would, therefore, be rather general in nature, taking into account detailed recommendations for peacetime expenditure allocations made in earlier years and the requirement of national security considerations.
While the media is no place to discuss specifically any of our dire shortages of personnel and equipment, the first priority must be to quickly make up our deficiencies on the highest priority basis. In the present crisis other than our normal peacetime allocation, we must cater for expenditures anticipated pre-hostilities.
(a) Personnel:
We must earmark funds for mobilisation which may be done in three phases in order to conserve expenditures. Phase 1 would involve calling up all the reservists to report to their traditional locations for reporting, i.e. Regimental, Arms and Services Centres. This period should involve about a week. Phase 2 would entail earmarking the personnel for their assigned tasks/units including (1) meeting deficiencies of fighting units and specialist arms and services (2) raising of new units and attaching skeleton HQs with operational units and (3) replacements for casualties. This would not take more than 2 weeks. Thereafter all reservist personnel except those (1) volunteering to stay on (and needed) and (2) critical deficiencies, particularly in specialist arms and services should be sent home. During Phase 3, i.e. when war is imminent, simple coded messages (so allocated to personnel during Phase 2) over radio and TV would ensure that the personnel reach their assigned units directly (or through given transit station near the war front). The actual details of the modus operandi can be worked out separately. For all new raisings, particularly infantry, it should be ensured that nucleus staff including unit commanders, adjutants, quartermasters, senior JCOs, NCOs etc are attached to comparable units of formations which will directly not be involved in the first phase of operations (e.g a new raising of an infantry battalion say 94 FF, would be attached to 2 FF) so that by dovetailing comparable unit requirements, the normal delay entailed in raising a new unit may be avoided. One of the better mobilisation system is that of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) but they have advantages in literacy of personnel and distances that we do not have. Furthermore, individuals keep their personal weapons with themselves at home, something not possible in Pakistan. This disadvantage can be offset by immediately creating a Mobilisation Command under the Joint Chief of Staffs Committee, headed by a Lieutenant General (or equivalent) whose function would be to task force the requirements of the Army, Navy and Air Forces as the case may be. The General Staff may lay down the parameters and objectives, the Mobilisation Command must ensure that all the requirements are met by effective organisation and coordination in each branch of service, with appropriate transit centres manned by the Command personnel located in the proximity of the war zone. To an extent the logistic support for Ex Zarb-i-Momin worked in the manner envisaged for the Mobilisation Command.
(b) Equipment:
The Defence Services need a vast array of equipment including arms and ammunition. During Ex Zarb-i-Momin the critical deficiencies must have become more than apparent. Hopefully action has been taken to resolve the shortages. Pakistan has to make up remaining deficiencies by outright purchase and lend/lease from our friends on a crash programme basis. Naturally this would entail a lot of foreign exchange, of which we are normally in short supply. Our greatest need must be to build up adequate reserves of expendables, eg. fuel and ammunition of all kind and to arrange NOW for their transportation, which remains a weak area. The Prime Minister of India, V P Singh, has claimed that India has better chances in a long drawn out war so our priorities must be to ensure that logistics do not fail us even if the war elongates. To an extent these can be made up by turning to our good friends Iran, Turkey, China, UAE and Saudi Arabia. Coordination cells must be set up in all these countries to arrange for procurement and despatch by the fastest available means. A War Resource Command that goes over the heads of all our normal channels of procurement must be set up. Private businessmen have a lot of resource ability, at the very outset they must be associated as integral part of the War Resource Command, since they can travel freely and be flexible in negotiations and arranging necessary despatch of critical items, their value is immense in the commercial field. At this time, we need to immediately request Iran for a land surface tanker fleet and for coastal vessels that will bring in vital supplies, fuel and ammunition, without being interdicted by the Indians. Our transportation sector being very weak at any given time, we must immediately earmark trucks and jeeps at this time which on mobilisation, will report directly to the fighting units as well as the logistics units. At the same time, the static and non-fighting units and formations must shed all serviceable jeeps and trucks for the fighting formations, all peacetime locations must requisition civilian cars and pickups for their use in the towns and cities. Budget allocation must be earmarked. The Government’s departments have a lot of jeeps and pick-ups (Toyota and Datsun-type), these need to be inducted for the war duration into the war effort, induction being actually done when hostilities are imminent to previously assigned locations and formations. The availability of all vehicles must be intimated by the civilian government to the local HQs of the War Resource Command within the shortest possible time. As regards the state of serviceability of our existing transportation, the EME must arrange to indent for such so that these spares can be flown in as are/will be necessary, if that does not solve the issue then a cannibalisation programme must be instituted forthwith. The War Resource Command should be given extraordinary powers to requisition whatever they require from whomsoever they require for the war effort. The Federal Government would do well to pass this as simple legislation at the earliest.
(c) Real Estate:
Most of Army’s Cantonments are in the proximity of the War Zone. An evacuation plan for dependants must be instituted immediately and a Budget allocation done. Those that can go to safer areas under their own resources must so intimate local HQs so that when hostilities are imminent, we are not bogged down with non-essential personnel. At the same time wherever the families are evacuated must be well organised so that they do not face hardships. The men at the front should be able to fight without worrying about the safety of their beloved ones. In previous articles we have been constantly suggesting that big cantonments like Sialkot and Lahore on the war front itself, should be reduced to smaller locations spread more evenly along the frontier with Brigade Group-type cantonments in Pasrur, Narowal, Raiwind, Lulliani, Kasur, etc.
(d) Civil Defence:
We have a relatively smaller airforce as compared to that of India, though certainly we have a qualitative edge, similarly we do not doubt for an instant that our Navy (in cooperation with the Air Force’s Exocet-equipped Mirages) will be able to keep the Indians outside a stand-off distance from Karachi, but the fact of the matter remains that our Air Force’s first priority would (and should) be to obtain air superiority over the local battlefield. This would mean that the Indian Air Force may be able to throw some of their weight at our cities in order to harass/break civilian morale, while this will not be the total pushover that it would seem, the cities are going to see destruction and the civilians are going to take casualties. There may be even missile attacks which are within the Indian’s known capabilities. As such we must immediately organise civil defence in every locality of the big cities and towns, this should include earmarking doctors, ambulances, trauma centres, first aid posts and hospitals.
Similarly those areas next to sensitive installations e.g refineries, POL and Ammunition dumps, etc must be evacuated according to a pre-set plan. Necessary funds may be earmarked by the Provincial Governments, Municipalities and Councils for Civil Defence. TV and radio should propagate civil defence programmes extensively.
Indigenisation:
We have been talking about indigenisation till we have become blue in the face. During the previous year an excellent effort has been made in the electronics field e.g shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles, radars, short range surface-to-surface missiles, etc. However, in the major field of transportation we are still lacking (or lagging). The Pakistan Automobile Corporation (PACO) is making a determined effort to produce the Army staple 5 Ton tactical truck through its National Motors subsidiary. However, some agents of outside manufacturers have been spreading propaganda to ensure that this truck never gets into serious manufacture in Pakistan. One person even went to the extent of feeding adverse material to correspondents of THE NATION against Mr Muzammil Niazi, M D National Motors, who is leading the Truck Indigenisation Programme and happens to be one of the most dedicated technocrats in Pakistan today. While any indigenisation effort will not make a great difference at this stage of the impending situation with India, we must understand the deep implications of the recent statement of V P Singh, Prime Minister of India, when he says that over a longer period Pakistan cannot win a war from India, the direction of his statement is towards our woefully negligible domestic manufacturing programme forcing us to rely on imported material from abroad. Pakistani craftsmen can produce any item, our vendor industry is fairly sophisticated, only the economy of scale prevents expansion and enterprise. We must pay attention to this aspect, one cannot depend upon imports forever, during the last war USA placed a Trade and Arms embargo on both the countries, it did not affect the Indians, they were diversified to Russia, the East European Bloc and their own vast domestic manufacturing programme. The boycott hurt us in 1971, it will hurt us again in the future, domestic manufacture is the only answer. For ammunition we are mostly self-sufficient, one wishes we could quickly establish a fairly large number of skid-mounted refineries to process our domestic crude oil.
The nation will have to make great sacrifices for the present Defence Budget, which in reality may be called the War Budget. Fuel rationing must be instituted forthwith. With due respect to the Armed Forces, they must also exercise the greatest efficiency in conserving fuel and equipment, most of which is obtained from abroad. The Armed Forces expect the civil population to make great sacrifices, they must ensure that the civil population in turn gets value for their money and sacrifices and these are not squandered away by faulty planning or lax control.
The impending war with India is not to our desire and we cannot afford to be the aggressors. The clock has started ticking because of the internal situation in Kashmir. While we must wait for the Indian attack, which will come as surely as night turns into day and day into night, our response must be geared not to acquire territory but in the destruction of their capability to wage war. To that end, our defence expenditures have to be targeted to make every penny pay its way.
Did you enjoy this post? Why not leave a comment below and continue the conversation, or subscribe to my feed and get articles like this delivered automatically to your feed reader.
Comments
No comments yet.
Leave a comment