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The constitutional process

By insisting that Pakistan is not facing a serious social, political and economic crisis, the government is losing the “credibility battle”. Except for the propaganda disseminated by the government media, everyone else seems to agree with the Opposition that we are indeed in the throes of a series of tumultuous events that may lead us into a state of anarchy. We normally turn to the Army to drag us back from such an abyss, very well knowing that once the military takes power they automatically assume responsibility and it is then easy, once their usefulness is over, for motivated interest to tar and feather them for their “Bonapartist” tendencies. Luckily for us, a new found sophistication among the military hierarchy as well as the absence of cabal similar to that of the trio of three-star intriguers who manipulated events and pushed poor Gen Waheed into an ill-suited role as mediator in 1993, has ensured that the Army has stayed publicly out of the political fray. On the other hand the military hierarchy’s resolve seems to have quietly stiffened up the spine of both the President and the Supreme Court (SC), taking care not to influence them towards any particular direction or end but giving them the necessary confidence to do what they are supposed to do, to separate right from wrong. With that necessary constitutional check and balance in place as in any democracy, any Government, including conceivably Ms Benazir’s one, may function responsibly toward the populace as is their fundamental duty under the Constitution. There is much truth in the dictum about “absolute power” corrupting absolutely. The division of authority between the President, the PM (and as such the executive) and the judiciary has always been delineated but never really adhered to, resulting that at any one time, depending upon the personality and the opportunity, either the President or the PM has exercised more authority, with a more or less subservient judiciary toeing the government’s line. Whenever the friction has become pronounced, the Army has come into the fray at least thrice with direct physical intervention and a number of times before 1958 and after 1988 indirectly by throwing its rather healthy weight behind one or the other, depending upon its preference for the personalities involved.

Ostensibly this present constitutional crisis started on the morning of March 20, 1996 when the SC, in a unanimous judgment, one honourable judge being absent, held (in sum) that the attempt of the present PPP regime to pack the judicial courts with “pliable individuals” was not constitutionally correct. It must be said in PPP’s defence that before them other regimes were also guilty of the same, maybe not in so blatant a fashion. Because of a coincidental separate legal process that required the judiciary to be separated from the executive by March 23, 1996, the battle was entered into in earnest. In acts reminiscent of Hitler’s Germany in the early 1930s, the SC was intimidated, harassed, cajoled and subjected to adverse propaganda by the state-controlled media, most of it focused on the person of the Chief Justice. Having neutralized the Air Force and the Navy by having pliable men of straw to head their hierarchy, the PPP regime had tried in similar fashion to install one of their favourites in the Army and failed. Ironically had they done so, they would have been in real dire straits by now, given that particular gentleman’s penchant for back-stabbing his mentor in time of crisis. In actual fact the present constitutional crisis started on Dec 12, 1995, when the President, duly fortified by the advice of the outgoing COAS Gen Waheed, made his own judgment about the selection of the new COAS based on professionalism, merit and seniority. That President Farooq Leghari could take such a far reaching decision on his own in keeping with his conscience was a crossroad of sorts in the previously unequal relationship between the President and the PM, therefore Dec 12, 1995 rather than March 20, 1996 can be said to be the benchmark in the road downhill for this government. Tantrums notwithstanding, the failure of the PM to coerce the President into rubber-stamping such a major decision gave heart to those who thought the President was only a ceremonial prop for the Bhutto clan. Other than late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, people forget that the PPP had platonic beginnings, being formed as a pure ideological party by such honourable men with misguided socialist vision but with honesty and interesting of purpose as J.A.Rahim, Dr Mubashar Hasan, Meraj Khalid, Shaikh Rashid, Mairaj Mohammad Khan, etc. This once great party that was in the forefront in the fight against corruption and deprivation has now been reduced to a “wagon circle” mentality of defending its leaders from charges of corruption, mostly from whom they have deprived, the masses. Its plight can be measured. Things started to unravel much faster in 1996 in every sector of governance, the prime being the economy where pride of place in its being brought to its knees was not only gross mismanagement by an inept team but rampant corruption at the highest level.

To ensure longevity of the regime, it will become necessary to throw a few sacrificial lambs to the wolves, this gives a different twist to the term employed in military jargon “friends of the accused”, since they are the ones who are now at peril, whose heads are likely to roll! Rumours about the inefficacy of the economic team that “has let the PM down” is already being disseminated to “prepare” public opinion to that end, in a last service they have been dispatched to the IMF to accept without condition IMF conditionalities. This is bad news not only for the populace but may be worse news for the government as reaction thereof in the streets will follow as surely as night does day. Barely three months after the Federal Budget, a mini-Budget is even now in the making, further devaluation is on the cards. Pakistan is in need of major structural reforms to correct the economic imbalances, unfortunately democratic governments rarely have the strength to attempt these, in all fairness this is not a failure of the Ms Benazir government alone.

Unfortunately for the Bhutto regime the one hand that was clear and concise in authority throughout its tenure is himself a besieged man in the PM’s house after the murder of his brother-in-law Murtaza Bhutto. Since most of the appointees in key places of influence and authority have been handpicked by him, some of these feeling the guillotine will be his men (the “Sahib’s” “Sahibaan”) and in this crisis, because of the very real threat to his personal security by those of Murtaza’s fanatical followers who believe he is directly responsible for Murtaza’s murder, Asif Zardari (AZ) has been immobilized at a very inopportune moment in the battle for survival for the Bhutto regime. With Murtaza’s widow requesting an FIR in a petition before the Sindh High Court (SHC), any number of possibilities present themselves. In particular the inclusion of the name of Maj (Retd) Masood Sharif, the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and a close personal friend of the PM’s very influential spouse will become awkward if not an embarrassment alone. In a rather bizarre coincidence namesake Masood Mahmood, who was the head of late ZAB’s Federal Security Force (FSF) and who had turned approver against his former mentor, died very recently. At this point of time AZ is desperately needed by the PM to keep those wavering (“D” for Doubtful) MNAs in line. Fortunately for Ms Benazir, two very important and steadfast colleagues, Aftab Sherpao and Gen Babar, have kept the whole edifice from keeling over. For Gen Babar, loyal to the core (and maybe to a fault) with respect to his late friend ZAB’s children, Murtaza’s killing at the hands of Karachi Police must have been a grievous personal blow, yet he soldiers on keeping his emotions in check, an amazing virtuoso performance at his age.

The fact of the matter is that notwithstanding the litany of woes that has engulfed the Bhutto regime, the Opposition is powerless number-wise take up her repeated challenge to table a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly (NA) against her, they simply do not have the 109 MNAs in the NA to vote the PM out of power. It may be an imperfect process by which legality has been accorded to such a “majority” but it is the accepted process according to the Constitution. The Opposition is, therefore, moving against her on a broad front with charges of corruption and mismanagement to convince the President to use Article 58(2)b, the last resort being street power, where without the Jamaat-i-Islam (JI) cadres, protest is going nowhere. Whether the government faces its nemesis in the form of censure by the SC judges or at the hands of the President in the exercise of Article 58(2)b is a moot point but one believes that it would not be in the interest of the country to embroil either the President’s office or the SC judges in a controversy by going the route where it would seem that it is a culmination in the conspiracy to destabilize the PPP regime.

A long list of failures has led to the present paralysis in governance, it would not be right to make a Joan of Arc out of Ms Benazir when a constitutional mechanism to do the right thing exists. What we have here is a majority government that has failed. Instead of dismissing the government out of hand and creating a bad precedent in the manner for Bhutto in 1990 and Mian Nawaz Sharif in 1993 the correct way would be to the PM to herself conclude that “since a situation has arisen in the Federation that has shaken the confidence of the masses in her personal and professional capacity to manage the affairs of the State, it is necessary for her to take a fresh vote of confidence from the National Assembly” and if she does not come to the conclusion herself in the face of a mountain of evidence, then it would fall on the President to make such a request from her as is mandated under the Constitution. If a mandate is denied to her by the members of Parliament then the President can turn to the Leader of the Opposition to form the government and if that fails, to a third person who can form a national government in order to serve out the remaining term of the National Assembly. If that should also fail, the President could then dissolve the Assembly so that a fresh mandate can be taken from the people, elections in February/March 1997?

On the other hand, given her numbers, the powers of incumbency and the monetary resources available to the PM, she will probably win a vote of confidence from our pragmatic legislators who prefer cash over conscience. In that case, it would be the fitness of things to give her and the nation a breathing space. God knows all of us need it! The caveat to all this must be that if there is clear evidence that the loyalties of MNAs are being bought, then this negates the constitutional process and the President could then act on his own and dissolve the Assembly or make a reference to the Supreme Court to once and for all decide whether “horse trading” in Pakistan will continue to flourish or be brought to a dead stop.

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