The Intent of Fairplay
The Caretaker Government is committed to holding free and fair elections in Pakistan, to that end there has been a very deliberate choice of neutral personalities in forming the Administration at the Federal and Provincial level. Strict neutrality is a commitment of the Caretaker PM. Less than one month into the Caretaker period and less than two months before the October elections, the carefully nurtured perception of impartiality has taken a very hard knock in Sindh.
Independence Day 1993 was initially touted as the day of launching campaigns by the major political parties, knowledgeable speculation was that the two chosen symbolic points of departure would be the Quaid’s Mazar and the Pakistan Memorial by the PML (N) and PPP respectively. While the PML (N) applied for permission from the local Karachi administration on 5 August, requesting for a procession culminating in a public rally at the Quaid’s Mazar, the PPP immediately made a similar request. Faced with the possibility of clashes, the Civil Administration imposed Sec 144 and refused permission for both the rallies. In an advanced stage of preparation in contrast to the fairly low level of interest shown by the PPP, the PML (N) felt aggrieved that they had been badly treated. Notwithstanding the lack of permission, Nawaz Sharif did come to Karachi, did lead a long slow moving procession from the Airport to the Quaid’s Mazar and did address a 20,000 plus crowd at 3 O’clock in the morning of August 15, 1993, without any interference from the Civil administration, a benign indifference after the flat refusal that showed good sense in hindsight and stopped further erosion of the Caretaker’s moral authority about neutrality.
Charges of partiality are being increasingly levelled at the Caretaker Sindh Government. Earlier, a difference of opinion had been rumoured between the Acting Governor and the Caretaker CM about transfers and postings of civil servants because of the perception that the new incumbencies were overwhelming pro-PPP. The role of the local Army hierarchy has been questioned because without the consent of the mini-Troika, established in Sindh at the launch of the Army action in May 1992, no major administrative changes can be made. If doubts were to be cast on the neutrality of the Army, then their moral authority for having brokered the present arrangement and the future supervision of elections would be badly eroded. As one of the few remaining institutions evoking universal trust, every action attributed to the Army that tends to be less than partial, whether intended or not, causes ripples and rumours to run riot through the mass psyche of the people of Pakistan.
In any case, politically speaking the denial of permission was unnecessary. Nawaz Sharif is not a main contender for winning the elections in Sindh, at best he can shore up the support for the anti-PPP forces in the Province, mainly the MQM (Altaf Hussain), the Pir Pagara faction of the PML and the motley coalition firmed up by late Jam Sadiq Ali and kept alive by Muzaffar Shah. That the PPP is going to gain the maximum number of NA seats in the Province and a majority in the PA is a foregone conclusion, the margin of their victory is still not clear. Over the past year Nawaz Sharif has certainly evoked a basic stirring of support in Sindh but unfortunately his close allies in the Province are political lightweights without real grassroots organisation, living more in hope of a miracle than any real fact to support their electoral contention.
In May 1992, the Army launched Operation Clean-Up in Sindh. In the rural areas the Army was extremely successful in not only cutting deep into dacoit power but for the first time getting ethnic Sindhi approval of their actions as being fair and needed. Rural Sindh was brought back into the Pakistan mainstream, a major achievement of national importance. This Sindhi vote of approval was further cemented by the Army action in the urban area, the major targets being MQM militants as well as urban dacoits and kidnappers. However, the urban area operations were conducted on a parallel-mode basis, by the uniformed Army and the intelligence agencies in contrast to almost sole involvement of the uniformed Army in rural areas. Since militant groups within the MQM were loudly proclaiming their intention to oppose the Army’s entry into their strongholds, the widely held belief fostered by the intelligence agencies was that there would be considerable casualties on all sides including non-combatants caught in the crossfire. To minimise attrition, the then GOC Karachi, Maj Gen Malik Saleem, decided to use the dissident MQM faction, the MQM (Haqiqi) as a shield in a Trojan Horse ploy. The primary factor motivating the Army urban planning was to keep casualties down, in the words of Sen Tzu, “to win a war without bloodying swords”. In this Maj Gen Malik Saleem was spectacularly successful, albeit with a lot of help from the new-found maturity (and discretion) of the MQM militants. Except for token opposition to the MQM (Haqiqis), the MQM challenge melted and a vast number went underground. The Army (along with Rangers) occupied points of tactical importance without any opposition. In the circumstances, this was a most significant achievement particularly with the memory of the ill-fated Indian Army Operation Blue Star in Amritsar against the Sikhs in 1984 still afresh. Once a blood cycle ensues it is difficult to break the process, it was extremely important for the Army to exercise strict fire discipline. In the face of grave provocation, the Army managed a miracle of sorts, to the credit of its hierarchy up the line. Since power flows from the barrel of a gun, trigger-happy and flamboyant commanders are seldom a rarity, mature officers capable of controlling the baser urges of their command are.
What is usually won on the battlefield is lost on the negotiating table. Similarly the battle for hearts and minds of the people are seldom lost by a uniformed Army, such losses are usually the prerogative of intelligence agencies. The mainline German Army was seldom responsible for atrocities in World War 2, most of it was perpetrated by the SS and the Gestapo but the blame was unfairly taken by the uniformed army. One believes that Commanders at all levels can exercise better judgement and can be taken to task for allowing these agencies to operate with impunity in areas within their command. Unfortunately, the mandate of the civilian garbed Armed Forces personnel in such a role usually exceeds that of the uniformed section.
The first mistake in dealing with MQM was not dropping the discredited Haqiqis after using them to reach MQM strongholds. This was due to incorrect analysis made by the concerned officials of a premier agency. This failure by certain key individuals in our intelligence apparatus has meant that the hard-earned laurels on the brows of the Armed Forces have been cast to the ground. Whereas it is true that the MQM harboured many militants with abhorrent crimes to their credit, the ISI-led “mufti” operation went after their former proteges, the MQM lock, stock and barrel. Their mandate should have specified only the search and persecution of specific individuals alleged to have committed crime, they could not label the whole of MQM as terrorist without alienating the entire Mohajir community. In a classic illustration of Murphy’s Law, two critical appointments in the chain of intelligence command were people of indifferent calibre, not averse to using the blanket authority of the intelligence agencies to further their own personal interest or even that of their drinking friends, even resorting to the blackmailing of individuals. These unscrupulous people did not think of the overall consequences to the nation, virtually destroying the deep-rooted patriotism that had propelled the Mohajir forefathers from their hearth and home in search of a land of their dreams. The Mohajir is a patriot out of conviction and belief, not out of birth and heritage. The bankruptcy of supporting the MQM (Haqiqis) was exposed in an election this year when their winning candidates got a grand 1.2% of the vote. This policy failure has been an unmitigated disaster, leading to an estrangement that bodes ill for the Federation. The fact that these despicable people were ultimately discovered and transferred out from their intelligence fiefdoms serves no useful purpose. The limit of our accountability for a person belonging to “the clan” is to post him to an out of the way place where he stays out of sight and mind till his sun should rise again. If you do not belong then you have had it, mostly at the hands of such scum.
One also suspects a failure of command here despite the excellent work of the uniformed Army in both the urban and rural areas. The man on the spot has to accept responsibility to keep those within his area of command in check. He can only do so if he has strength of conviction to do the correct thing based on principles rather than convenience of the moment. All commanders must have the character to stamp down on any activity by his subordinates that violates the rule of law and good faith. In this respect, the sense of impartiality in an individual has a lot to do with personal motivation and human urges, particularly greed and ambition. The Army has to be careful in its choice of people, ensuring that its Commanders down the line are not tainted in any manner by personal preferences or compromised due to perceptions about their integrity and honesty. Sometimes friends and relatives contribute to besmirching a fair reputation, taking advantage of their relationship to exploit their immediate administrative environment. The litmus test of impartiality of the Army will be seen in the level to which it carries out an exercise in accountability for any individual seen to be leaning towards any political grouping or having succumbed to nepotism and corruption. The acquisition of land is a great corrupter of souls. The COAS has clearly laid down that no one of any rank will take part in politics of any kind, one does expect that anyone found guilty of political taint of any kind will be severely dealt with. That inherent accountability in the system will confirm the intent of fairplay on part of the Armed Forces.
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