The Province of Sindh
In May 1992, Sindh was in the grip of severe lawlessness. On the prompting of numerous intelligence reports about the helplessness of the Sindh Administration to prevent crime in both the urban and rural areas, the Pakistan Army brought it to the attention of the Federal Government. They feared that anarchy was around the corner. While reluctant to get involved, the Army hierarchy had concluded on the evidence at hand that no other option existed. The Federal Government mandated the Pakistan Army to restore the rule of law in the Province “at the request of the Sindh Government”.
The problems in the urban and rural areas were of completely different nature. The MQM had been formed in the urban areas of Sindh as a defence mechanism for the Mohajirs against the excesses of Sindhi ethnicity, local police, public transporters and militant gangs of other political parties, etc before its evolution as a political organisation. Essentially it adopted militancy to fight transgress from various quarters, the militants within MQM ultimately became a law unto themselves. On coming to power the MQM’s own militants resorted to bullying and intimidation, mostly against their own community. Such are conditions of anarchy created, the result was a free for all wherein the criminal elements on the fringes of political parties infiltrated the body politic itself and mixing with the militants replaced genuine political activity with criminal intent. With the police either helpless or collaborating or in a combination of both, the rule of law disappeared.
The age-old dacoit problem in the interior of Sindh has been force-multiplied by the advent of modern technology and the reversal of the normal Client-Patron relationship between the Dacoit and the Wadera. The dacoit has for the most part become the mentor of the landowner instead of the other way around, and a more than equal partner, this has resulted in a proliferation of dacoit gangs as it is the most lucrative employment opportunity in a land plagued by unemployment. Modern technology in the form of radios, cellular telephones, etc have compounded the problem for the ill-equipped local Sindhi Police. In some cases, the waderas themselves have turned from being mentors only to active collaboration in dacoity and kidnapping. The police were so helplessly compromised that in most areas they could not be distinguished from the dacoit gangs, in fact some even functioned as a support group.
At the very start of the army action, it was clear that the action itself was not an end in itself, while it would provide temporary relief, long term socio-economic and administrative measures were needed to create a lasting environment of peace and tranquility. In both the urban and rural areas, the problem had been compounded by the involvement of law enforcing agencies in crime itself, members of the Administration became so corrupted that the citizenry felt a lack of faith in the law-enforcement system. A situation was so reached that even the honourable among the politicians had to collaborate or associate — or perish. By 1992, the system had become rotten to the core, both the willing and unwilling parties of the dacoits felt vulnerable and threatened by them. From a Kingdom of the Lawless, Sindh was in danger of becoming a Kingdom of Dacoits. It was reported that the crowning of one such dacoit as “King” was attended by high ranking police officials.
In the old days in Sindh, the dacoits were harboured by waderas who used them to keep their tenants in line. As soon as the dacoits showed some signs of independence or rebelliousness, the law enforcement agencies were used to destroy them. This was an extremely neat arrangement that had been repeatedly used over the last century. Because of the decade of Zia’s martial law and other connected socio-economic as well as political factors, the dacoits had become so powerful that the local police had become their instrument rather than their mentors. With that sea change in roles, the wadera crowd felt totally overwhelmed and turned to the Establishment for help. Since it dovetailed their own objectives, the Sindh Administration turned to the Army to correct this imbalance.
The Army had watched the alarming deterioration of the law and order situation in Sindh with increasing concern. Faced with consistent evidence of intercession by India through terrorist groups and individuals trained, armed and controlled by India’s Research and Analytical Wing (RAW), the Army rightly feared that with the situation worsening into virtual anarchy, bandit groups could become nascent secessionist movements. The links of Jeay Sindh separatists with such entities could not be ignored. At the same time, Karachi, the principal and only commercial port city of Pakistan had increasingly fallen into the hands of militant faction of the MQM who seemed to be running wild, directed by hardliners within the party rather than their more moderate superiors. This inherent capability to close down Karachi meant that the rest of Pakistan could be held virtual hostage to the dictates of the militant elements within MQM. In fact the moderates within the MQM hierarchy were themselves captives of this lot. While the police had long ago given up any hope of containing the urban gangs, certain incidents against army officials indicated to the Army that the militants were increasingly becoming bolder and the Army was in danger of losing its deterrent status. As everyone knows once shots are fired, the threat of force as a deterrent evaporates. If in 1988 and 1989, the task was harder, by 1992 it had become much more hard and was in danger of going past a point that it could ever be controlled.
While the Federal Government had something to lose by action in the urban areas of Sindh because of its MQM allies, the Provincial Government had much less to lose since the MQM had seemingly grown out of their boots and was dictating terms rather than behaving like pliable allies. As far as the Sindh Government were concerned they gave lip-service to amity with the MQM but actually were quite happy in having them sorted out by the Army. With respect to the bureaucracy and police, they had been rendered helpless by the MQM who deeply resented this as it hurt them where it counted most, their pockets. While the Army’s move to rid the city of lawless elements was sincere, the local Administration had no such altruistic purpose. Very much like the threatened Wadera in the rural area, they badly needed the Army to restore their freedom for corruption!
Operation Clean-Up was launched in Karachi on June 19, 1993 under the cover of fighting between MQM militants and dissidents. While the Army secured all their immediate objectives without any bloodshed, the use of the dissident MQM (Haqiqi) faction as a shield in a Trojan Horse ploy was controversial. This shield was used successfully to minimise casualties all around but should have been discarded immediately after the operation. The creation of a premier intelligence agency, these people were man to man equal if not worse than the MQM militants that the Army was hunting. In short order, they cut into the credibility of the uniformed Army and a Mohajir backlash went into effect. This was most unfortunate because the uniformed Army had achieved a miracle of sorts by securing all urban areas without a shot being fired. This parallel-mode operation tends to undercut the performance of the uniformed Army in the restoration of the rule of law in the urban areas. In the rural areas where the Army was not under the urban area restraints, the results were more spectacular, with over 1,000 dacoits rendered ineffective, over 200 being killed and nearly 900 apprehended. While the eradication of dacoity is a long drawn out process in which socio-economic initiatives must have pride of place in any plans, the succour gained for the people of the rural areas was immediately visible in their reaction to the Army. Since 1983, when the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) primarily created in Sindh against late Gen Zia’s rule was crushed by the Army, the Army had been deeply resented in interior Sindh. In a complete sea change of attitude, the rural Sindhi now saw the Army as a saviour from the curse of the dacoits who threatened not only his life and property but his honour and womenfolk. Used to sleeping outside during most of the year through the centuries, the villagers now locked themselves into their homes at dusk, dreading the banging on the door announcing the arrival of their nemesis. Luckily for all concerned, the dacoits made the cardinal mistake of fighting back and as such a high percentage were killed in real encounters in contrast to the fake encounters staged by the local police to keep their superiors (and everyone else) from becoming wise to their active collaboration with lawless elements. As the rural Sindhi saw the bodies of real dacoits knocked off by the Army in increasing numbers, his confidence in the Army increased manifold and information about dacoit activity became more readily available. This increased intelligence raised the kill ratio considerably. The net effect has been that the estranged Sindhi has come back to the Pakistan mainstream, in many areas the villagers have beseeched the Army not to pull out and leave them to the mercy of the local law enforcement agencies as they fear that this will only facilitate the return to the lawlessness of the past.
The Army has done an excellent job in Sindh overall. Besides the number of dacoits killed and apprehended, over 11,000 weapons have been recovered and nearly 6,000 suspected terrorists/dacoits are being held for questioning, mainly in the rural areas. The immediate threat to anarchy has been averted and elections which were once considered unthinkable are planned to be held within a month along with the rest of the country. A significant lesson that militancy does not pay has been meted out to criminals and activists in both the urban and rural areas, to a great extent the rule of law has been restored.
The Army’s role has to be always limited in scope in relation to their capabilities, it can only carry out battlefield surgery, it does not have the capacity to get involved in resuscitation and rehabilitation. Socio-economic and political initiatives are the prerogatives of politicians and the civil administration, by no means can the Army get involved over any lengthy period of time in such activity. This detracts from their real mission. However, in order to ensure that the initiatives are effective, the first and foremost task is to make the Sindh Police more potent as an organisation. This is more easily said than done given the level of corruption manifest in their rank and file. Whatever gains the Army may have made will be completely eliminated once they return to the barracks unless something drastic is done about the Sindh Police. One feels strongly that all officers of the Sindh Police from DSP upwards must be replaced for a period of 3 years by Armed Forces officers who are close to retirement. While a fair number of Police officials may be honest, hardworking souls, a greater number are corrupt to the core as is quite apparent from their lifestyles. A complete change is required at the officer level before the weeding out process at the level below DSP can be initiated. At the same time, a great effort is required to bring the Police manpower upto strength (with an increased percentage of educated persons), weapons and equipment must be updated on more modern lines while the pay service conditions of the rank and file should be improved. Every Police Station must be given an adequate and realistic budget to cope with the present situation and Magistrates should be available in every Police Station around the clock so that the daily trips to the civil courts are not required for remand and routine cases of petty nature. Unless the Sindh Police is completely reformed whatever the Army has achieved in the past 15 months will come to naught within a very short time. Coupled with Police Reforms, something has to be done with the Judiciary at the lower levels. Increasingly criminals caught red-handed are walking free because of the incomprehensible attitude of the Judiciary. One must confess that in many cases, the incomplete challan prepared by the Police has led to acquittals but it is very frustrating for law enforcement agencies to catch offenders and see them go off very shortly without any punishment. Judicial Reforms aimed at improving the quality of justice must be a top priority in order to consolidate the gains made by the Army in bringing Sindh back from the depths of anarchy.
In sum total, the Pakistan Army has achieved considerable success in Sindh. In the narrow sense they accomplished the objectives they set out to do, in the broader equation they are not equipped to carry out the long-term changes necessary with respect to socio-economic moves. A more thorough evaluation is required at the policy planning level and a greater emphasis on activist implementation of any plans made to improve the quality of life in Sindh. In the final analysis, it is the sense of deprivation and sustained poverty that becomes fertile ground for the criminal-minded. The Pakistan Army has taken the first large step in bringing the rule of law back to the Province, it is now upto the elected representatives and civil administration to build up on this foundation.
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