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D minus one

Given that election fever has now reached a pitch, the indications for the people of Pakistan on the morrow is that essentially we will have a hung parliament. The title of this article, one day less than D-Day (Doomsday, for democracy in Pakistan), is appropriate.

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Ms Benazir Bhutto will remain the single largest national party, its alliance with Asghar Khan’s Tehrik-e-Istiqlal (TI), Malik Mohammad Qasim’s faction of the PML and the Tehrik-i-Nizam-i-Fiqria Jafria (TNFJ) in the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) is that much window dressing meant to restore the respectability lost due to various shenanigans. Asghar Khan loses some of his principled lustre, jumping onto the PPP bandwagon, he “democratically” divided the two seats allocated to TI between himself and his son. The PPP has been resurgent at the expense of the IJI in the last weeks of the election campaign and should obtain at least 4-5 more seats in the Punjab than the 35-36 seats originally predicted, increasing their tally of seats to 41 or maybe 42, 25-26 seats in Sindh, 6-7 seats in NWFP and 1-2 seats in Balochistan, a total of about 77-78 seats. Because of its hard-core electoral support a clutch of Alliance partners and some notable lapses in the ONE on ONE strategy of the IJI maybe 2-3 seats additionally may come within its grasp but even then the tally will be about 79-80 seats in a National Assembly of 217 members. This constitutes at net loss of about a dozen seats from the 1988 tally. Some of this loss can be attributed to the crucial swing factor created by the Asif Zardari-yoke of corruption.

The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by former Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo is the largest faction within the IJI and the second largest national party in Pakistan. In the heartland of agriculture Punjab it will still be the single largest party while being almost non-existent as an Assembly entity in Sindh. In the Provinces of NWFP and Balochistan it has very few likely prospects for the Assemblies, even with the electoral support of the other members of the IJI, the crucial swing vote being provided by the anti-PPP Jamaat-e-Islami cadres along with the negative feeling for PPP rather than the positive support for the IJI. The two main concerns in the Punjab are India and spiralling costs, in that order, but PPP has made some significant gains in the closing stages, due to Ms Benazir’s enduring charisma. Her dynamism has been matched on the electoral hustings by Nawaz Sharif. While voters do respond to the colour of money, e.g. the amount of PPP flags along the GT Road from Attock to Lahore especially Gujrat (Ch. Shujaat Hussain in trouble against PPP’s Ahmad Mukhtar) defies adequate description, the hard core Punjabi off the GT Road will still go the way of the Provincial elections in 1988. IJI should get about 63-64 seats in the Punjab and about 9-10 seats in the NWFP, in Balochistan and in Sindh maybe 2-3 seats each, a total of about 79-80 seats, making it into a dead heat with PPP. IJI’s electoral spread is not a very happy situation for an alliance that claims national status.

Altaf Hussain’s Mohajir Qaumi Mohaz (MQM) remains the dominant force in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad and will retain its previous 14 seats, maybe even increasing it by one. Despite differences with the JI component of the IJI, the MQM will give excellent support to anti-PPP forces within Sindh, the crucial swing votes in critical constituencies may help those forces, including NPP and independents, to get about 6-7 seats.

The JUI (F) is confined mainly 2-3 seats each in Balochistan and NWFP, maybe getting 1-2 seats in the Punjab. The next two parties are totally confined to the Provinces, the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) of Akbar Bugti in Balochistan and should get about 7-8 seats and Wali Khan’s Awami National Party (ANP) in NWFP which should get 4-5 seats.

Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani’s Jamiat el Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) is non-existent except in Punjab, where it may get 1-2 seats, mainly because of PDA support. A clutch of independents will be elected, getting as much as 7-8 seats in the National Assembly, these are crucial to whichever Alliance is likely to form a Government. The IJI’s real problem in the Provincial Elections in the Punjab on October 27 will be to shun voter apathy because a comparatively better showing in the National Assembly may result in a complacent low voter turnout. The PPP has a die-hard hard core and would do better in the Provincial elections in the Punjab than it did the last time but the IJI will be better placed to form the Provincial Government.

The PPP will maintain its dominant majority in the interior of Sindh and MQM will keep its stranglehold in urban Karachi and Hyderabad with about 14 seats in the NA and 31-32 seats in the PA. However, there will be one important difference, a motley crew of IJI, independents, etc should carry about 12-15 seats, thereby cutting into PPP’s earlier overwhelming majority. The MQM anticipated support to IJI in the National Assembly is a major factor deterring the eventual winner. Of great concern to PPP is that some of their stalwarts may be owing their allegiance secretly to Jam Sadiq Ali rather than the PPP. One estimate is that Jam Sadiq, anticipating the PPP wave, counselled about 14-15 of his fellow dissidents to obtain PPP tickets for the PA and thus stand a better chance of winning their seats, switching sides when required to do so in a Forward Bloc. Given that 9-10 of such “moles” may elect to cross over after the elections, the PPP in Sindh becomes vulnerable. With Jam Sadiq combining the dissident PPP with the independents, the 31-32 or so odd seats of MQM could conceivably ensure a coalition government. Inviting Jam Sadiq Ali to form the government may not be according to democratic traditions but it is assumed that is what the Sindh Governor will do. Even if a PPP Government comes into power in Sindh Province, it will probably not last as either the President may impose Governor’s rule or the PPP Provincial Government may have its powers emasculated by the powers given to the Army under the Constitution to root out terrorism. Whatever way one looks at it, Sindh epitomizes Pakistan’s soft underbelly, in all senses of the word, domestically and regionally. A lot will depend upon Jam Sadiq Ali, easily the most effective Chief Minister that Sindh has ever had politically (Gen Iqbal Khan was perhaps the best administrator Sindh has ever had but he was not an elected representative). Jam Sadiq is a consummate politician, Sindhi politicians live on favours, his favours as Chief Minister will not be confined to one family but that the largesse will be spread around. The recipient of the last PPP government’s largesse was mostly believed to be Asif Zardari himself (and his close friends), hardly a PPP activist among them. Ms Benazir will rue the day she did not utilise Jam Sadiq Ali’s political acumen and services as Chief Minister, he is going to be lethal to her hopes of a Sindhi electoral base of power.

 Akbar Bugti will provide the locomotive that will generate the consensus machine for Balochistan, a normal Baloch conclave. The JUI (F) is estranged from Akbar Bugti, may embarrass him to an extent in the formation of a Government but the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) along with the IJI winners and independents will be able to overcome the unlikely JUI (F)-PPP front. Akbar Bugti is a dark horse for candidacy of the PM’s post, whether he opts for a more central role in the Centre or keeps within his own “fiefdom” of Balochistan is a toss-up.

NWFP is the scene for a “Grand Compromise”, Aftab Sherpao ran essentially a minority PPP regime with the support of ANP and independents, later attracting defectors from the IJI that in turn saved his government when ANP abandoned him. The greatest coup came along when the Provincial IJI head who had filed references against “defection” himself, defected. Aftab Sherpao’s own political performance ranked par excellence, by constant dialogue and compromise, he kept the functioning of his government smooth and effective as Chief Minister, particularly in the face of the winding down of the Afghan war and Peshawar’s location as a base city for Afghan Mujahideen. The cumulative effect of pragmatic policies is that the PPP is set to gain maybe 7-8 more seats in the Provincial Assembly though in the National Assembly it may have to be satisfied with 6-7 seats. Sherpao’s problem is that neither ANP nor JUI (F) may countenance a coalition government with PPP and the IJI will hardly lose his stalwarts to him the second time around. Arbab Jahangir could conceivably head an ANP-led coalition in the NWFP but the results are still too close to predict confidently.

The overall prognosis is, therefore, an IJI-led coalition in the Centre led by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, with the PPP in the form of PDA making a strong opposition bloc. In the circumstances Nawaz Sharif probably cannot leave Lahore and will head the IJI Government in the Punjab. Akbar Bugti will head a JWP-led coalition in Balochistan and Mir Afzal Khan or Arbab Jahangir may form a government in NWFP. With an IJI-led Federal Government and the major cities of Sindh (Karachi included) in the hands of MQM, a PPP Government in Sindh, despite its showing, is unlikely. A Jam Sadiq-led coalition along with PPP dissidents may be in the works. Keeping Ms Benazir out in the cold may be sweet revenge for the IJI for November 1988, having multiple complications later. The major test of IJI will be whether the coalition can be kept together in the Centre, maybe even attracting dissident PPP members. Democracy is always on test in Pakistan, the following months will see this becoming a greater ordeal. If the IJI or the PPP can endure without self-destructing by taking politics into the streets, a giant step towards institutionalising democratic rule will have been taken.

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