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The Thin Green Line

Gen Babar seems to have a born-again reputation in Karachi, many admire him openly, many more surreptitiously. He was derided and reviled when at a very bloody price he brought peace to Karachi and gave Ms Bhutto a tenuous respite to launch desperately needed economic initiatives. Unfortunately she only initiated cosmetic proposals, high on rhetoric, meagre in substance. The root cause of Karachi’s problems being economic, this fissure is being exploited for narrow selfish ends, mainly on ethnic basis. A major part of the populace being Mohajir face acute economic disparity, maybe in lesser quantum than in other parts of the country but in much more concentrated density. The Central District and other areas like Landhi, Korangi, Orangi etc, are at best ghettos. While other communities share similar backward localities deprived of basic socio-economic facilities throughout the country, the maximum square miles of misery are populated by Mohajirs — thus MQM fulfilled the need for raising a voice in protest, formerly Mohajir Qaumi Movement eventually became the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, change of name but no change of character. In a change of substance and direction inasfar as the leader, Altaf Hussain, seems to have made an individual transition from leader in Pakistan to gradually assuming the role of leader of all displaced Indian (and Pakistani Muslims of Mohajir origin) all over the world, particularly in UK, USA and the Middle East. Looking beyond the Pakistan identity is a most dangerous development — a subtle but deliberate cleavage created in the body politic of the Pakistani nation. Whereas the great silent majority of Mohajirs want to live in peace and harmony despite their misery, privation and travails, a vocal militant minority is hell-bent in holding both their own ethnic minority and the entire country hostage, Karachi being the economic jugular vein of Pakistan.

The MQM continues to command adulation and respect amongst the Mohajir supporters. There are reservations about their militancy. There are also deep schisms with splinter groups like the Haqeeqis and Goga’s crowd (BACK) becoming quite potent, not quite the size to counter the mainline MQM but neither insignificant enough to be shrugged off as of only nuisance value. Of deep concern is the fact that a large number of MQM cadres were trained in India as terrorists, it is now an open question which master’s voice they now listen to. There is open-ended danger to the Federation in allowing them to run scot-free, a fact well-known to the PML(N) leadership. Yet the PML(N) persistently attempts appeasement to keep the political alliance intact, to keep the Sindh Government nominally a PML(N) one. For the sake of the party politics, the fate of the country has been thrown as a dice into the ring.

The PML(N) should have allowed the party with the maximum MPAs in Sindh i.e. the PPP to form a minority Provincial Government. Liaquat Jatoi has been virtually a pawn in MQM hands, democracy’s built-in system of checks and balances having failed. It would have been interesting to see how MQM could have reconciled with PPP, the obvious would have been a PPP minority government that would have looked to the Centre and PML(N) for support to contain the MQM. Now the whole Sindh Assembly seems almost unitedly alienated from the PML(N) and the Federal Government over issues like Kalabagh Dam and Governor’s Rule. In 1992, the MQM made a strategic decision in not putting up armed resistance to Operation Clean-up, the result was that its militant cadres lived to fight another day. It was not till Gen Babar assumed charge in mid-1995 that the MQM took grievous losses among its militant cadres. This time around the MQM Chief seems ready to give battle, from far away London he has given a stirring battle cry literally “to man the ramparts”, to be ready to fight any law enforcement agencies (LEAs) trying to enter “MQM areas”. Rumours are rife that a “search and locate” operation for illegal arms and terrorists is imminent. This time it may not be easy and that forcible entry may lead to reaction and thus becoming “search and destroy”. It is believed that satellite telephones have been acquired by the recalcitrants to provide necessary communications, mainly to avoid being located as was done by the monitoring of mobile cellular telephones. Sophisticated weapons and large quantities of ammunition have also believed to have been stocked. The intelligence agencies and the LEAs would be particularly frustrated that those terrorists they had hauled up at great cost and risk in 1995 were let go wholesale in 1997. These would form the nucleus of any militant activity that would have to be brought to heel again, at great human cost.

And who will be at the cutting edge of any operation if it is executed? While Karachi police would certainly be in substantial numbers “the thin green line” would be held by the green uniformed Pakistan Rangers (Sindh). Having borne the brunt of the responsibilities to maintain law and order since the Army withdrew in 1994, their withdrawal would have led to large-scale bloodshed and anarchy in Karachi. In mid-1995 they were used effectively by Gen Babar. Based on accurate intelligence information and closing down of arms supply routes and cellular-based communication channels, they managed urban peace in Karachi. Having served well, they have been at the receiving end because it now suits PML(N) politics to keep them at a distance. In the process, they have become frustrated and trigger-happy. In a horrible incident, trigger-happy Rangers in a passing mobile gunned down the son of a retired cavalry major and a colleague of mine. My Qaimkhani friend’s son’s only fault was that he was at the wrong place at the wrong time, in a car on the side of the road where they had pulled up to let the Ranger mobile pass on its way to NED University where trouble had erupted during examinations. Having fought two wars gallantly for this country (1965 and 1971), the father may be forgiven for being bitter at his son’s grievous injury, another two inches and he would probably have taken up arms against the uniform he once served so well. Many parents in Karachi have sons who have been thus lost, many innocents among them. If strict fire control cannot be exercised by the officers of a unit, that unit becomes a dangerous commodity, particularly in urban guerrilla warfare. One wrong pressure on the trigger and dozens of innocents can be mowed down. With the situation crumbling into anarchy and a militant few baiting the LEAs, a situation has arisen where innocent civilians are caught in the cauldron making it into the “killing fields of Karachi”. The Rangers Command will have to exercise much tighter control, Commanders require a special courage to deal under one’s command who step out of line. Unless this is done, the Command loses out on discipline. Instead of being apologetic, the DG Rangers (Sindh) resorted to brusquely brushing aside my friend’s complaint in the face of the glaring truth. This is not Somalia, this is Pakistan, in Karachi we require someone with a reputation of being tough but fair. Otherwise the situation is tailor-made for disaster, widespread bloodshed waiting to happen. And will that solve the problems?

So much has been written of so much to do that an entire briefing book would be necessary to accommodate all economic and political initiatives. Suffice that Rs 10-15 billion must be literally thrown at Karachi, all to be spent judiciously on a crash basis in the “deprived” areas, modern schools and colleges, more hospitals, better transportation, enhanced water supply, rehabilitated power lines for constant electricity, police reforms with induction of educated youth with better salary and service conditions, federally provided job opportunities, private sector encouragement, etc. Above all, what is required is immediate Local Bodies elections and one central authority for Karachi with all administrative and socio-economic powers concentrated. Unless local leadership is elected by the will of the people at the grassroots level, there is no hope. For the moment the Local Bodies formed can function below the District level at the level of sub-division it is necessary to provide the public with the means to control their own destiny or at least have a positive perception about access to their grievances on a day-to-day basis. The metropolitan city of Karachi needs a Lieutenant Governor as City Manager for law and order, management of socio-economic facilities, civic administration, etc. Police action is necessary to control the rampage of criminals, particularly those under one political guise or the other across a broad political spectrum, however before such a peace-enforcing campaign commences the peace gameplan must be in place to reap the benefits of what the LEAs bring to the table, hopefully very much like the environment Gen Babar created for Ms Benazir’s PPP in 1995. We must remember the saying, “those who sow the wind shall reap the whirlwind”.

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