Mission Impossible
Over the past week, the Pakistan Army has cordoned off three entire areas in Karachi in well-coordinated urban area operations, first the hotbed of Jacob Lines followed by sections of North Karachi and Korangi. During these operations which were kept a well guarded secret, the Army has netted in more illegal arms and ammunition than any single month of Operation Clean Up in the last 30 months. Furthermore, given that over a million people were affected (and discomfited for a day or so), public protest was almost non-existent (and muted at that). Other than weapons, over 200 criminals involved in various crimes were netted. During the whole operation, only one youth was killed resisting arrest in a shootout. Many of Karachi’s citizens have commented that more than two years after its launching, Operation Clean Up has now started in earnest.
After an uneven beginning Operation Clean Up succeeded in the rural areas mainly because a change of command from an atrocious General officer. In the urban areas after a good start it got bogged down, succeeding only in imposing an immediate peace in the city. While it took some time for the general public to clearly identify the reasons for the uneven performance of the Army, for military analysts the reasons were clear. In the rural areas, a clear-cut mission was given to eradicate criminals while in the urban areas, the mission given to the uniformed personnel was subverted by duality in aim, under the guise of eradicating criminal elements, the MQM were the only party so targeted. Though one dare says that MQM’s militants had gone past the fail-safe line, the fact remains that every political party had militant factions running riot. The uniformed Army was further frustrated by the men in mufti whose only mandate was to eradicate the MQM, an impossible task given that this party is representative of the urban majority in Karachi and the Province. All the initial gains made by the then GOC Karachi, Maj Gen Malik Saleem Khan, were compromised by the fact that whereas his was the command to exercise, instructions were issued directly by the Corps HQ and the DG ISI separately. In essence, the principle of military command was violated by the then Army leadership. If it were not for the unbending will of Malik Saleem in keeping the troops under his command restrained, the excesses of the intelligence agencies would have been surpassed by the bloodbath that would have ensued as frustration seeped into his command. This was accentuated by the fact that the civil administration had no socio-economic plan to follow the restoring of the immediate peace. To complicate it further, successive political governments had no political initiatives to offer. Instead of tarring and feathering MQM’s ultimate leader-in-exile Altaf Hussain, the duality of objectives succeeded only in solidifying Mohajir support behind him, including for the first time the community as a whole. Though some people were disenchanted with him they rallied behind him in the greater cause.
By early 1993, the GOC Karachi had been isolated from his mandate and command was being virtually exercised directly by Corps HQ which earnestly took on the trappings of royalty. With the late Asif Nawaz’s demise, this situation became worse as the new COAS was faced with crisis on the national scene with Karachi as only one of the many problems. While Gen Waheed has been a professional from Day One, he was detached from the Karachi problem and this allowed the national elections to be crucially effected by the motivated local command in one significant feature, the exclusion of the MQM from the National Assembly and thus deepening the polarization of the Mohajir community. By late 1993, Mohajir resentment against the Army action come to a seething head but in asking for Lt Gen Naseer Akhtar’s removal, the MQM in fact gave him a further lease of life as despite the fact of the dawning realization of the actual facts on the ground, the Army could not seem to be succumbing to pressure. However, Gen Waheed preserved in one extremely crucial test of his leadership, both in 1993 and in 1994, the fairest promotions up the line to the rank of the Lt Gen in the history of the Pakistan Army, coupled with this were postings to crucial post on “horses for courses” basis, i.e. selecting men for appointments for which they were suitable.
In Karachi, Maj Gen Malik Saleem Khan, who had opted to leave rather than be put in a position to be disloyal and disobey the increasingly political orders, was replaced by Maj Gen Saleem Haider. For the new incumbent it was a no-win situation, almost isolated from his own troops in the field by the dominating role being played by the Corps HQ, he had to bear approbation for the many problems that arose out of the continuing “Aid to Civil Power” process. He had to face approbation for the faults of his superior whereas the plaudits he should have earned went to the Corps HQ. A good officer, he found himself emasculated and thus even more powerless to change the scheme of events than his predecessor. By the first quarter of 1994 Karachi was about to explode. Taking good advantage of the hiatus and confusion, criminal elements flooded back into the city. Car snatching and kidnappings started in earnest, civil disorder and strife increased. MQM’s Haqiqi faction that had come in resentment against Altaf Hussain and were nurtured by the ISI before suffering a resounding electoral defeat came back to the fore with a vengeance. Karachi had become a cauldron with every kind of militant faction, ethnic and sectarian, in the melting pot. With the rural majority PPP Government in Sindh not willing to come to terms with the MQM representatives of the urban majority, the political horizon became increasingly bleak.
With the Army now truly professional in its hierarchy, the COAS finally moved to correct the political anomalies that had crept into the hierarchy of its Sindh contingent. As a replacement Gen Waheed brought in a truly professional soldier, the newly promoted Lt Gen Lehrasab Khan, who had been eminently successful in the rural area sector of Operation Clean-Up. In a complete sea-change of command, the hapless Saleem Haider was replaced by Maj Gen Mohammad Akram. As the new commanders started to get to grips with the situation, and indulge in self-clearing of their commands, things got worse. The slate had to be swept clean. Even worse was the political meddling. While it was to be expected that any extended period of interaction with civil administration does affect the Army’s morale and discipline, the adaptation of such bureaucratic practices that is normally treated by the men in uniform with contempt was pathetic to say the least. This was a case of severe dereliction of duty to the Army and to the nation, for a time the Army as a whole came to be treated with the same contempt reserved by the public for the police because of the lack of character, sense of responsibility and deviation from professionalism by a handful. Such things do not remain isolated in the hierarchy, it permeates eventually down the various levels to the solitary soldier on outpost duty.
In short, Lt Gen Lehrasab and Maj Gen Akram had their hands full but they started with a tremendous advantage on which they capitalized, the great silent majority of the Army is comprised of clean living, honest and dedicated professionals, often lacking for gout, leadership not motivated by extraneous factors. The change in Karachi has been remarkable. It is nature’s way before that things get better, it usually gets worse and both artificial and natural means, beset Karachi between June and August this year. However, the first trial of strength was coincidentally on 14 August in a Shia-Sunni confrontation, handled firmly and with impartial conviction. The silent message was being heard loud and clear by all those who mattered, the men at the helm of affairs would remain even-handed without fear or favour, coming down equally hard on perceived friend or foe for transgressions against society. As the gradual realization seeps into Karachi’s people, there is admiration though yet grudging for the new-look Army in the city. Above all, there is hope that there is indeed light at the end of the tunnel. In small ways, unpublicized but firm, the Army is going back to its best role, deterrence, the show of the use of force rather than the application thereof. When the civil administration asked the local commander on the spot in Jacob Lines at first light as to why they could not be informed about the impending operation they were politely told that in order to maintain surprise the whole point of the exercise would have been lost if they (the civil administration) had knowledge. No further questions were asked in later operations.
There is a long way to go before Karachi comes back to normal. A myriad number of exercises have to be gone through, political, socio-economic and administrative before things come to an even keel. Operation Clean Up has been delayed two years in Karachi but better late than never. While there is sense of relief, a wave of security has not yet engulfed Karachi’s citizen. As the realization dawns that this time the Army means business and that its local hierarchy has not become prone to local social, political and criminal elements, the sense of security that the people of Karachi are looking for will come.
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