Passion and prejudice
(The FIRST article in a THREE PART series on the present SINDH situation)
The Pakistan Army was ordered by the Federal Government, ostensibly on the request of the Sindh Government, to restore the rule of law in the Province of Sindh in May 1992. With powers under Article 147 of the Constitution, the Army commenced operations on a low-key basis in the rural areas of Sindh almost immediately. Moves in the urban areas were delayed because the MQM, political allies of the Federal and Provincial governments, were reluctant to give up their undisputed authority, there was understandable hesitation on the part of the PM. Some of the MQM’s leaders publicly vowed to violently resist any Army move into “their” areas. The Army had a freer hand in the rural areas, though here also its freedom of action was restricted by the requirement of the Federal Government that potential targets who were allies of the already tottering Sindh Government (including a handful of Provincial Ministers) should not be touched.
To further complicate the issues, there are a host of other diverse reasons for the bad law and order situation, viz (1) the age-old dacoity menace of Sindh nurtured and sustained by the landed rural community (2) the proliferation of weapons due to the Afghan war (3) the drug trade caused militant NARCO forces motivated by criminal intent to emerge (4) the militant modus operandi of the activists of the various political parties, some under control of the leadership and some running wild (5) Jeay Sindh activists working for an independent Sindh (6) Al-Zulfiqar terrorists working to destabilize the Federal and Provincial Government (7) Khad/KGB agents active during and after the Afghan War (8) Pro and anti-Iranian government militants as well as Iraqi agents left over from Iran-Iraq war, and last but not the least (9) the machinations of RAW to destabilize Sindh, the terrorist arm of our friendly neighbour, India. There are numerous other mind-boggling permutations and combinations of the above, some politically motivated, almost all criminal minded and in business on their own. Karachi being Pakistan’s only port city makes it virtually the only import/export conduit for the entire nation as well as its major industrial city, that has its own dynamics for organised crime. With over-population, bad city planning, deteriorating economic conditions, lack of water and electricity, lack of employment opportunities etc Karachi is a socio-economic disaster waiting to happen. That the social explosion has not taken place is partly due to the induction of democracy with genuinely elected MQM representatives since 1986-87, first at the local level then at the Provincial and Federal level.
There is severe polarisation between ethnic Sindhis and the Mohajir community in the Province of Sindh. When Ms Benazir took power in Dec 88, she had routed the secessionist forces in the interior of Sindh. Despite an overwhelming majority in the Province she made a pragmatic compromise on that mandate to gain a workable majority in the Centre by establishing an alliance with MQM which had swept the major urban centres of Karachi and Hyderabad. This made for an extremely strong government in Sindh but unfortunately Ms Benazir made the same mistake that the Federal Government always makes, trying to rule the Provinces by proxy by nominating pliable Chief Ministers without any real political support. In contrast to the prop-up nominees of the Establishment, e.g Ghous Ali Shah, Akhtar Ali Qazi, Muzzafar Ali Shah, etc the PPP CMs did have a modicum of political credibility but not enough, they were always looking over their shoulders for prompting.
The prime consideration before the Army was that innocent civilian bystander-type casualties as well as those to be absorbed by the law enforcement agencies were unacceptable. The Bhalwal incident involving civilian “terrorists” was already being rumoured as an army-perpetuated atrocity before it blew up into a full-fledged embarrassment for the Army. If the Army had as much as singed the hair of one old man, woman or child in the urban areas of Karachi and/or Hyderabad, there would have been hell to pay, adverse public reaction becomes much more media-genic in the towns and cities in comparison to the rural areas. The Army was expected to restore peace while hostiles armed to the teeth were beating their chests about violently opposing it, to expect that non-combatants would not be caught in the crossfire is like ordering for an omelette while stipulating that the eggs should not be broken. Because of ethnic Sindh sensitivities, action against the dacoits in the countryside only would be perceived as purely an anti-Sindhi initiative unless simultaneous moves were made in the urban areas. To complicate the issues further, there was publicity about the impending army action as well as inordinate delay with respect to its execution. In a typical “Judo” ploy, turning the disadvantage to an advantage, this became the base for an elaborate deception plan. The first objective in the urban areas was to scare the possible hostiles into giving up without a fight, to reach without opposition those areas where the rule of law had been supplanted by MQM writ. For this the ISI and MI had probably no better sources of information or guides than MQM dissidents, not only did they know the routes and the objectives but they had a deadly grouse to avenge, the cold-blooded murder of some of their friends and associates. In a sharp and swift action, intelligently exploiting the move of the MQM Haqiqi Trojan Horse, the Army reached all its designated objectives, without incurring any civilian casualties or having casualties inflicted on them. The bloodless operation was brilliantly conceived and flawlessly executed. The myth of armed resistance blew away like the morning mist. Discretion got the better of chest-beating manhood.
Convinced that the army would call their bluff, the MQM showed maturity in deciding not to physically oppose the army action. However, they had already dispersed their weapon caches into penny packets with loyal members hiding weapons and ammunition at various places. The Army thus fell short of their other objective of recovering large weapons dumps, criticism is now being levelled at the Army for “failing” in its objectives, this is neither fair nor correct. Operation BLUE STAR, the Indian Army’s foray into the Sikh Golden Temple at Amritsar resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides, the blood spilled initiated a violent Sikh reaction which then created a vicious blood cycle, the Indian nation has been in its bloody embrace for 8 years. The Pakistan Army had good intelligence and information base, it made good plans and then executed them brilliantly. The best successes in war are those achieved with the least bloodshed, this was not even war!
With the Army in place in all targeted urban areas, the second phase of the operation calls for the hunting down of those who had misused the cover of various political parties for their own criminal activities. As the fear of militants recede more and more, people are coming forward to volunteer information about such individuals, it is now only a matter of time, a game of patience. Unfortunately, bad PR handling has made a mess of the Army’s success.
Instead of the regular ISPR operatives, an officer was brought in from GHQ to brief the Press regularly. Professional PR men cannot be supplanted by amateurs, an outstanding success became a media disaster. This was force-multiplied by the Bhalwal incident, suddenly Murphy’s Law was very much in existence. In comparison to the hard-bitten journalists he had to face, the officer designated was the provincial lamb to the slaughter and it was no surprise that he tripped badly. Among other things, Brig Asif Haroon exceeded his level when he talked about MQM’s alleged plan for turning Karachi into a HK-type Jinnahpore. Even if the facts had been true (and it could well be a RAW-inspired canard), there is a constitutional provision under which a political party inimical to the country’s integrity and solidarity can be prosecuted. Some elements of MQM may well have been foolhardy to engage in such an exercise, not the broad mass of the people. Similarly, there was also never any question about the Army’s going after the MQM lock, stock and barrel. In some cases, words that the COAS had never uttered were put in his mouth. If anyone can be said to have been fair to the MQM in the Army, it was Gen Asif Nawaz. As Comd 5 Corps when the PPP Government-MQM combine had a falling out, he had remained scrupulously neutral, balancing out the anti-MQM feelings of the Government of that time and thus maintaining peace. To avoid media SNAFUs, particularly when knowing that vested interests are desperately trying to malign the person of the COAS and the Army as an institution for their own ulterior motives, the Army should have confined themselves to bland, cryptic announcements (Situation Reports or SITREPS) that gives as little detail as possible instead of expanding on an analysis of the situation.
Democratic leaders have no business going underground, particularly if they are innocent. The disappearance of the MQM leadership was based more on apprehension than fact, it became a self-fulfilling prophecy. On the other hand, the perception wrongly arises that the whole MQM leadership were collaborators in the heinous crimes being perpetrated by certain criminally-minded individuals among them on their own electorate, to perpetuate their hold and for personal financial gain. These are certainly exceptions to the broad mass of the MQM leadership, criminal activity can hardly become all-pervasive in grass-roots democratic party. Having committed no crimes, most of the MQM leadership have nothing to fear and should not have abandoned their democratic responsibilities. Instead of becoming absentee landlords enconsced in safety and luxury, exhorting their followers to take to the streets, the task of leaders is to lead from the front. The sudden loss of courage has caused a dangerous vacuum, now open for exploitation by heterogeneous elements.
Army action is not an end by itself, only a short-term solution to restore law and order. No sooner the Army goes back to the barracks then criminal elements will raise their heads again with a vengeance. Medium and long-term plans have to be made for socio-economic solutions, these are all based on political initiatives. The Army can create a fear-free environment, governance is the prerogative of the elected government, they cannot abdicate from it or shift that responsibility onto someone else’s shoulders.
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